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Maine Turnpike Authority – Strong Planning Process Drives Bond and Toll
Decisions; Some Contracting Practices and Expenditure Controls Should Be
Improved; Additional Clarity Needed Around Surplus Transfer and Operating
Expenses

Introduction ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
The Maine Legislature’s Office of Program Evaluation and Government
Accountability (OPEGA) has completed a review of the Maine Turnpike Authority
(MTA). This review was performed at the direction of the Government Oversight
Committee for the 124th Legislature. The questions addressed by OPEGA were
approved by the Committee prior to the review’s initiation. See Appendix A for
complete scope and methods.

Questions, Answers and Issues ―――――――――――――――――――――
1. Why hasn’t MTA been transferring operating surplus to MaineDOT as required by statute? Does MTA
have an operating surplus as defined by 23 MRSA §1964? What other types of financial support has
MTA been providing to MaineDOT, if any? To what degree can MTA provide financial support to MaineDOT
without increasing toll rates?
see page 11 for
more on this point

MTA maintains there has been no operating surplus per the definition in statute.
OPEGA agrees there is technically no surplus given the statutory definition of
operating surplus. The Legislature and MaineDOT appear to have been satisfied
with this explanation, since no surplus funds have been transfered or specifically
requested by the Legislature since 1997.
MTA is still paying on bonds it issued for MaineDOT's benefit in 1996. The
Authority has also provided significant support for the State's transportation
infrastructure and other efforts. Examples include paying all costs associated with
State Police Troop G that patrols the Turnpike, conducting and/or funding
transportation studies, and paying a portion of costs associated with constructing
interchanges.
Any required transfer of funds to MaineDOT would affect the Authority's current
financial situation and, therefore, its strategy for achieving stated objectives and
maintaining a strong bond rating. MTA would likely make other adjustments to
compensate for the transfer after analyzing various options and their impacts.
Those options include changing the amount and timing of toll increases.
Modifications to future bond amounts and their timing, the schedule for planned
capital projects and/or the level of operating expenses could also be considered.
MTA is constrained, however, in how much it can adjust any given area.
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2. What factors most significantly affect MTA’s bond rating? How is the bond rating affected by legislative
oversight actions, including OPEGA reviews, or by changes in MTA’s operations, governance structure,
revenue stream, etc?

see page 16 for
more on this point

The three major rating agencies consider similar factors when determining bond
ratings for tolling entities, but they do not specify which are most significant. Their
assessments appear more subjective than formulaic. OPEGA's observation is that
those factors most directly affecting the level and stability of MTA’s revenue
stream, and its ability to pay bondholder obligations, are most significant. Factors
most frequently mentioned in rating agency reports include independent ability to
raise tolls, a history of raising tolls when necessary, and maintaining an acceptable
debt service coverage ratio.
OPEGA noted legislative and other events since 1991 that could have concerned
rating agencies. Nonetheless, MTA’s revenue bond ratings have been stable,
strong, and gradually improved between 1997 and 2003. These favorable ratings
were likely due to the fact that none of the changes resulting from the activity
substantially interfered with MTA’s ability to repay bondholders and/or there were
other positive factors offsetting any changes perceived as negative.
There is risk, however, of certain legislative actions negatively impacting MTA’s
bond rating. Any actions that could adversely affect MTA’s revenue stream, or its
ability to repay bondholders, should be approached with caution and a thorough
understanding of potential impacts.

3. What specific obligations does MTA have to its bondholders as expressed in the Bond Resolution? Are
these typical obligations for an entity that issues revenue bonds?

see page 19 for
more on this point

MTA’s Bond Resolution includes specific obligations that prevent it from issuing
more bonds than can be paid, assure it has sufficient money to repay existing
bonds, and require it to maintain the Turnpike in adequate condition. These
obligations are generally typical of revenue bonds, but MTA’s are more specific in
some areas when compared to bond resolutions for other tolling authorities. The
additional specificity provides all parties with more clarity and, while it could
restrict MTA more in some situations, it does not appear to be unreasonable.
The Bond Resolution is a contract between MTA and bondholders. There is risk
that legislative actions could result in a violation of this contract which could result
in legal action being brought against the State. Legislators should proceed
cautiously when considering action that would impact MTA’s ability to meet it
obligations under the Resolution.

4. Is the amount of bond debt currently held by MTA reasonable, and has the full amount of that debt been
necessary to ensure the Authority could effectively carry out its mission?

see page 23 for
more on this point

Overall, MTA’s debt level appears reasonable. The Authority currently owes just
over $400 million in bonds. This amount does not exceed the statutory bond cap,
and rating agency reports have not included any negative comments about MTA’s
debt level. MTA uses cash to fund a portion of its capital and maintenance
projects. Bond funding is limited to longer term capital improvements.
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The Board has a strong, established process for deciding when to bond, and for
how much, based on the Authority’s 20 year financial and capital plan. OPEGA
observed that decisions to refinance existing debt are well supported and justified
in terms of cost savings or cashflow improvements. Decisions to issue new debt
have been tied to capital projects related to MTA's mission.
5. Are MTA’s policies, procedures and processes for selecting contractors and administering contracts
adequate to ensure that MTA receives best value for contracted services?
see page 26 for
more on this point

MTA manages its contracts for construction projects well. Processes and practices
for selecting and monitoring construction contractors are sound, consistent and
adequate to ensure best value. The same is true for contracts involving the
procurement of goods. Services contracts, however, are not handled as well.
Processes for selecting service contractors, and administering those contracts, are
informal and do not consistently include practices typically relied upon to ensure
best value.

6. What entities have a role in governing and overseeing MTA? What role is each entity supposed to play
and how effectively does each entity carry out that role? How does MTA’s governance structure compare
with those of similar authorities in other states?
see page 30 for
more on this point

MTA is overseen by a number of public and private entities, all of which appear to
have appropriate and adequate authority to fulfill their roles. Effectiveness in
filling these roles can vary with the characteristics, perspectives and priorities of the
individuals representing these entities. Taken together, these oversight entities
form a comprehensive governance structure that is not substantially different from
the governance structures of tolling entities in other states OPEGA selected for
comparison.
The specific entities overseeing the MTA include: the Legislature, which approves
the operating budget and confirms board members appointed by the Governor; the
Authority Board, which approves all significant financial matters, capital plans, and
general operations; MaineDOT, which has a position on MTA’s Board and
separately approves all MTA construction contracts; the Consulting Engineer,
responsible for inspecting the Turnpike and ensuring the Authority is in
compliance with the Bond Resolution; and, the Trustee, responsible for ensuring
MTA has adequate funds to repay bondholders and releasing bond funds for
appropriate expenditures.

7. What is MTA spending its toll revenue on? How does MTA define reasonable expenditures? Are the
Authority’s expenditures reasonable?
see page 36 for
more on this point

MTA spends its toll revenue on three major categories of expenses: operations,
including routine maintenance; payments and required reserves for outstanding
bonds; and projects to construct, reconstruct or repair the Turnpike and Authority
facilities.
The Authority defines reasonable expenditures as any that are legal, consistent with
MTA's mission and goals, within approved budgetary limits, and authorized for
payment. Whether outsiders would judge MTA’s expenditures reasonable depends
on their perception of the Authority’s mission, and their expectations for how this
quasi-governmental agency should conduct its business.
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OPEGA observed that MTA’s current expenditures are consistent with the culture
of a regulated private entity that is financially sound, values quality, desires to stay
current, believes in being a good corporate citizen, recognizes its employees and
assertively promotes its own best interests. From this perspective, MTA’s
expenditures overall could be judged as reasonable. However, certain categories of
operating expenditures – by virtue of their nature or magnitude – might be
questioned as to their reasonableness, appropriateness or necessity when judged
against expectations for fiscal stewardship or adherence to statutory purpose
typically applied to State agencies.
8. How does MTA compare to toll authorities in other states on financial and performance measures such
as personnel and management costs and cost per mile?
see page 46 for
more on this point

OPEGA attempted to compare MTA to a number of its peers in other states based
on 26 selected financial and performance measures. MTA provided all data
requested, but we encountered significant issues in collecting the necessary data
from the other tolling entities. Those issues included difficulty finding truly
comparable entities, incomplete survey responses and inconsistent publicly
available data. In the end, we had too little useful data to complete a meaningful
analysis on our selected measures within the timeframe for this review.
Bond ratings encompass both financial and other performance considerations and
offer one general comparison point among tolling authorities. We noted that
MTA’s bond ratings compare favorably with those of other tolling entities.
OPEGA also observed that MTA is pursuing some financial and performance
objectives and is collecting performance-related data. We shared with MTA the
performance indicators we had identified and discussed the benefits of establishing
a more formalized performance measurement effort.

OPEGA identified the following issues during the course of this review. See pages 49 – 60 for further
discussion and our recommendations.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Current Definition of Operating Surplus Makes Transfers to MaineDOT Unlikely
Nature of MTA’s Relationship with Contracted Engineering Firm has Implications for Capital
Program and Bondholder Protections
Management of Services Contracts Often More Informal than Prudent
MTA is Sole Sourcing Services that Could be Competitively Bid
MTA’s Operating Budget Does Not Include All Operating Expenses
MTA’s Sponsorships and Donations Suggest Expansion of Mission and Present Risk of
Inappropriate Expenditures
Policies Governing Expense Approvals, Required Documentation and Allowable Expenses Not
Effectively Implemented, Particularly for Travel and Meal Expenses
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In Summary―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――

Some expect the MTA to
behave like a State
agency. Others expect it to
behave more like a forprofit private entity. In
actuality, the MTA’s
culture is closer to the
latter.

While the MTA is
progressive in many ways,
it has been slow to
implement some practices
that would keep it in line
with public expectations.

MTA was established in 1941 as an independent agency to fulfill a governmental
purpose operating and maintaining the Turnpike. The Authority, as established in
statute, is a Board that currently has a staff of about 470 to assist in carrying out its
assigned function. MTA’s status as a quasi-State agency, with its own selfgenerating revenue source and bonds secured by that revenue, make it challenging
to find a comparative standard. Some expect MTA to behave like a State agency,
others expect it to behave like a for-profit private entity. Judgments of MTA’s
conduct and performance will be based on those expectations. In conducting this
review, OPEGA used what is typically expected of both types of organizations as
comparisons.
OPEGA finds MTA’s culture is, in many ways, more like a regulated private entity
than a State agency. MTA has a stable management team and a strong planning
process that looks beyond the organization’s immediate needs and drives financing
decisions on bonding and tolling. The Authority’s long-term focus also leads it to
invest in items or projects that it believes will produce benefits over time - even if
they have higher current costs. Examples include MTA’s consistent pursuit of
technologies to improve efficiencies and customer service, and investments in
higher quality equipment and assets likely to have a longer useful life. MTA sees
itself as a customer service oriented organization that needs to compete for
customers and wants those customers to view it positively.
While MTA is current and progressive in many ways, there are other areas where its
culture is old-fashioned compared with what is expected of either a regulated
private entity or a State agency today. Over time the public has increasingly come
to expect fiscal restraint and stewardship, transparency and accountability from its
government and private entities alike - especially when tax dollars, personal
investments, and fees for essential services are involved. MTA has been slow to
effectively implement some changes in policies and practices that would keep it in
line with these expectations. This may be because MTA’s quasi-governmental
status, and the fact that it receives no State or federal funds, has shielded it from
needing to comply with certain State and federal rules and regulations, and the risk
of scrutiny and penalties that accompany them.
For example, MTA is not required to have an accounting and financial reporting
system in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and
Standards (GAAP). GAAP compliance has been required for publicly traded
entities for many years in a federal effort to assure transparency and consistency in
their financial statements. MTA is not subject to these regulations, however, and
previously maintained its financial system in accordance with the funding and
reporting requirements in the Bond Resolution. MTA moved to become GAAP
compliant in 2008, however, at the insistence of the Chairman of its Finance and
Audit Subcommittee.
MTA also has yet to fully establish strong policies and practices to assure economic
purchasing and reduce risk of inappropriate, unnecessary or excessive expenditures.
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Some progress has been made in this area over the past decade, but a number of
written policies and procedures still need to be developed or updated to provide
adequate guidance. Even where written policies are strong, OPEGA identified
incidents of non-compliance indicative of ineffective implementation, particularly
among the Authority’s top management.

A number of MTA’s
expenditures might be
questioned as they are not
typical of governmental
entities. Though the
amount of these
expenditures is small
compared to MTA’s total
operating expenses, they
may indicate an expansion
of MTA’s mission or a use
of toll revenue that differs
from what may be
expected based on MTA’s
statute.

MTA’s focus on upholding
its contract with
bondholders makes it
highly sensitive to any
legislative activity that
might be perceived as
impacting this contract or
MTA’s bond rating.

A number of expenditures OPEGA reviewed might be questioned as reasonable,
necessary or appropriate if one is expecting the same kind of fiscal stewardship and
adherence to mission typically expected of governmental entities. According to
MTA, some of these expenditures resulted from State requests for assistance.
While MTA also benefitted from some of these expenditures, in other situations
the benefit to MTA was less clear.
MTA has also been incurring expenses for purposes that seem more related to
supporting general economic development, or other efforts, than to operating and
maintaining the Turnpike. While such expenditures are a small portion of MTA’s
total operating expenditures, they are indicative of a possible expansion of MTA’s
mission being driven either by the State or MTA’s perception of its role, or both.
It also represents a use of toll revenue that some may not expect based on the
language in MTA’s statute and the Bond Resolution.
OPEGA observed a high degree of sensitivity to the terms and conditions of the
Bond Resolution, and MTA’s bond rating, exists among MTA’s management and
has apparently been passed down over time. Consequently, Bond Resolution
requirements, input from the private oversight entities and advisors assigned under
the Resolution, and MTA’s desire to maintain a strong bond rating are primary
considerations in MTA’s planning and decision-making. They also drive how MTA
manages its finances on a day to day basis with financial accounts established and
funded according to a structure defined in the Bond Resolution.
MTA’s focus on the Bond Resolution has several implications for the Legislature’s
ability to effectively carry out its oversight and policy-making role. For example,
the Legislature has a role in determining “reasonable” operating expenses for MTA
through its annual review and approval of MTA’s operating budget. While the
operating budget MTA provides to the Legislature for approval has substantial
detail, it does not include all of MTA’s operating expenses. Rather, it only includes
those operating expenses MTA is planning to fund with monies in its Revenue
Fund account. Operating expenses that MTA plans to pay for with monies from
its Reserve Maintenance Fund – a separate fund mandated by the Bond Resolution
- are presented separately, for informational purposes only, in the form of budgeted
costs for perennial “projects” the Authority is undertaking. This format does not
allow the Legislature to see, or approve, total dollars spent on all operating expense
categories.
MTA’s sensitivity to its contract with bondholders, and its bond rating, also leads it
to be highly alert to any legislative activity that might infringe on its independence
or impact its finances. MTA’s assertiveness in protecting its bondholders’ interests
can have a dampening effect on legislative inquiry and debate that may not always
be warranted. There is risk, however, that legislative actions with the potential to
adversely impact MTA’s revenue stream, its ability to repay bondholders or comply
with Bond Resolution requirements could result in a downgrading of MTA’s bonds
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or legal action against the State. Consequently, such actions should be approached
with caution and a thorough understanding of potential impacts.
MTA’s enabling statute requires the Authority to annually transfer its operating
surplus to MaineDOT. MTA has not transferred any surplus since it began paying
on bonds issued on behalf of MaineDOT in 1996. The Authority maintains that it
does not have an operating surplus under the definition in statute and OPEGA
found this position to be supportable. However, there are a number of other
significant ways MTA has contributed, and continues to contribute, to Maine’s
transportation infrastructure.

MTA’s Mission ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
MTA's Statute

MTA is governed by 23
MRSA §§1961-1983
which establish the
Authority and list its
powers and duties. The
statute also defines the
Authority’s purpose as
public and states that MTA
is performing a
governmental function.

The Maine Turnpike Authority is authorized and governed by 23 MRSA, Chapter
24, §§1961-1983. Statute establishes the Authority as a board with seven members,
six of which are appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the
Legislature. The seventh member, ex-officio, is the Commissioner of the
Department of Transportation or designee. Among the six appointed members,
there must be at least one resident from each of the four counties through which
the Maine Turnpike passes - York, Cumberland, Androscoggin and Kennebec.
The Governor is also charged with naming one of the appointed members as
chairperson of the Authority. A member who is named to represent a certain
county ceases to be a member if they move their residence to another county.
Statute requires the Authority to operate and maintain the Turnpike including
connecting tunnels, bridges, overpasses, underpasses, interchanges and toll
facilities. To carry out this purpose, 23 MRSA §1965 establishes the Authority as
"a body both corporate and politic in the State" imbued with certain powers
including:
• adopting rules governing use of the Turnpike and other services;
• acquiring real property by purchase, lease, eminent domain or otherwise;
• charging and collecting fees, fares and tolls for use of the Turnpike and
other services made available in connection with the Turnpike;
• entering into contracts;
• employing such assistants, agents, experts, inspectors, attorneys and other
employees as deemed necessary or desirable; and
• issuing revenue bonds or other instruments of indebtedness secured by
pledging all or part of the operating revenues of the Turnpike.
Statue further specifies that the assigned purpose of the Authority is public and that
MTA shall be regarded as performing a governmental function. It also sets out
particular duties and requirements for MTA. The sections of 23 MRSA Chapter 24
most relevant to this review are summarized in Appendix B.
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Historical Changes to MTA’s Statutory Mission
The Maine Turnpike Authority was originally created in 1941 via Public and Special
Law 1941, Chapter 69. The Authority was authorized to build a turnpike from
Kittery to Fort Kent and to issue revenue bonds, payable only by tolls, to fund this
construction. The law specified that MTA’s debt would not be considered a debt
of the State, or a pledge of the State’s faith and credit. It established the
Authority’s powers, appointment of board members, and eminent domain
authority. The law also called for the Authority’s termination when all bonds and
interest had been paid in full, or enough money had been set aside to do so. When
that time came, the Turnpike and all of MTA’s other assets, were to become
property of the State with toll revenue payable to the State Treasurer and the
Turnpike maintained by the State highway commission.
Figure 1. Timeline of Select Legislative Activity Significantly Impacting MTA’s Mission, Structure or Operations

1940s-1970s
MTA created – once bonds paid off

1941 Turnpike to become property of State,
toll revenues to go to State Treasurer.

1963 After bonds paid off MTA to be dissolved
and road to be toll free.

After bonds paid off MTA to be

1978 administered by MaineDOT, toll revenue
for use by MaineDOT.

1980s
MTA to be continued regardless of
outstanding bonds. MTA to pay greater of
1981 25% of operating revenue, or $4.7
million, to MaineDOT annually. MTA
assumes cost of State Police activities on
the Turnpike.
MTA to pay MaineDOT $4.7 million of
1982 total annual operating revenue after
money has been put aside to pay
operating expenses and meet bond
payments.

1987 Gubernatorial appointments to MTA
board become subject to legislative
confirmation.

1987 MTA required to report semiannually to

Legislature and MaineDOT on activities,
receipts and expenditures.

1988

MTA’s maximum annual contribution to
MaineDOT increased to $8.7 million.

1990s
MTA’s maximum annual payment to MaineDOT increased to

1991 $17.4 million. MTA to make $6.3 million early payment for
Scarborough Interchange.

Sensible Transportation Policy Act passes by referendum –
MTA required to pay MaineDOT its annual operating surplus.
Before highway capacity can be increased reasonable
1991 alternatives must be evaluated. Requires legislative approval
of MTA’s operating budget and revenues needed to meet
requirements of any resolution authorizing MTA bonds. MTA
may only make expenditures in accordance with allocations
approved by the Legislature.

1992 MTA to make one time payment of $5 million to General
Fund in addition to annual MaineDOT payments.

MTA to purchase 4.7 miles of I-95 for $16 million in two

1993 installments; $15 million in 1993 and $1 million in 1994.
Proceeds used for general purpose education aid.

MTA to issue up to $40 million in bonds for MaineDOT’s use.
Bonds secured by no more than $4.7 million of the annual
1995 Turnpike revenues that would otherwise be deducted from
operating surplus and provided to MaineDOT.
Clarification that Legislative approval only required for MTA’s
operating budget. MTA provides, for informational purposes,
1996 statement of revenues needed for capital expenditures,
reserves, and to meet bond requirements. Legislative
approval not required for those expenditures.
MTA board increased by 2; one to be added in 2000, one to
be added in 2002. Of the total members one must reside in
1999 York County, one in Cumberland County, one in
Androscoggin County and one in Kennebec County.
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When the MTA was
created in 1941, statute
called for its termination
once the bonds associated
with the initial road
construction were paid off.
However, in 1981 statute
was amended to allow for
the MTA to exist as a
closed toll facility
regardless of whether
outstanding bonds exist.

In 1981, 23 MRSA §§311-318 were enacted to continue the MTA beyond the time
when its initial bonds were repaid. The Turnpike was to be a closed toll facility
whether there are bonds to pay off or not, and toll revenues were to be used to
retire debt, operate, maintain, and reconstruct the Turnpike. For the first time in
statute, MTA was required to support the State by paying MaineDOT the greater
of 25% of total operating revenue or $4.7 million. To the extent possible, MTA’s
net revenues were also to be used to pay for costs, or portions thereof, associated
with maintaining, operating, constructing or reconstructing interconnecting access
roads and interchanges. Although this new statute still included a provision to
reorganize MTA when all bonds had been paid, in 1982 the language was amended
again and replaced with a declaration that MTA would not be dissolved unless the
Legislature called for such action.
Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s there was also legislative activity that adjusted
bond caps, increased the amount of cash MTA had to transfer to MaineDOT or
contribute to other State purposes, and altered MTA’s governance or oversight
structure. Selected events with significant impact to MTA’s mission, structure or
operations are summarized in Figure 1.
MTA’s Mission, Goals and Objectives
MTA’s Board has adopted a mission for the organization:
“The Maine Turnpike Authority and its employees will continue to be national leaders in the user
fee highway travel and significant contributors to Maine's transportation system. The Authority's
primary function is to operate and maintain a toll express highway through its short term and long
term capital improvement plans.”
The Authority also has a number of goals and objectives including financial
planning goals which reflect not only the Authority’s responsibilities to Turnpike
users and the citizens of Maine, but also to those who invest in MTA bonds.

Goals and Objectives of the Maine Turnpike Authority
• To manage a top quality highway serving Maine, providing the link between the Maine
Department of Transportation and the rest of the United States and Eastern Canada.
• To seek innovative ways to improve service, building on our customer responsive tradition.
• To affect traffic movement that will encourage commerce, and emphasize safety.
• To provide excellent maintenance on a daily and long-term basis.
• To provide quality service at a reasonable cost to Turnpike patrons.
• To involve the talents and experience of our employees.
• To use tolls, fees and the Maine Turnpike Authority's unique revenue bonding capability to build
partnerships that will benefit Maine transportation.
• To serve as facilitator for additional corridor needs.
• To assist in implementing corridor improvements that clearly demonstrate benefits relevant to
the Maine Turnpike.
• To cooperate with local, regional, state and federal policies and initiatives.
• To be sensitive to Maine's special environmental heritage.
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MTA’s Financial and Capital Planning Process――――――――――――

MTA uses a 20 year plan
to guide many of its long
term decisions about
capital improvements, tolls
and bonding. The plan is
updated regularly. It
incorporates MTA’s most
current financial figures,
recommendations from
the Consulting Engineer,
and forecasts from the
Traffic Consultant.

MTA’s staff and Board work together on an annual financial and capital plan in the
context of the organization’s long term plan. MTA pulls revenue projections,
projected operating budgets, debt service obligations and capital improvement
needs together in a model known as the 20-year Plan. The model shows whether
cash available from revenue and previous bond issuances will suffice to cover
MTA’s anticipated operating expenses, debt service, and maintenance and
construction costs. It also projects when toll increases and new bond issuances will
be necessary to meet those needs.
Debt Service Coverage Ratio is

The Board uses the model to make
a measure of how readily an entity
decisions about the Authority’s ability to
can meet its debt service
obligations. It is calculated as:
cover the costs of new and existing debt.
The model calculates MTA’s debt service
Net operating income (operating
revenues less operating expenses)
coverage (DSC) ratio for each year in the
divided by total debt service.
Plan, which informs the Board’s decisions
about changes in toll rates. One of the Authority’s goals, and an important factor
for bond rating agencies, is maintaining a DSC ratio of at least 2.0. The model
shows when the DSC ratio will drop below 2.0 without a toll increase.

The Long Range Planning Subcommittee of the Board updates the capital portion
of the 20-year Plan based on information in the annual inspection report prepared
by the Consulting Engineer (CE). The inspection report details current
infrastructure conditions, and needed maintenance and capital improvement
projects. Subcommittee members work with the management team and
consultants in developing the capital program. It determines the schedule for
projects and may choose
Financial Planning Goals of the Maine Turnpike Authority
whether to fund a project in
one year or over two years.
• To maintain the 2 times or better annual debt service coverage financial ratio.
There is less flexibility with
(Operating Revenues less Operating Expenses divided by Debt Service)
some projects, such as
• To fund Reserve Maintenance Projects and all required deposits from operating
bridges in very poor
cash flows.
condition that must be
• To issue future debt using level debt service structures.
reconstructed quickly.
• To minimize future toll increases.
• To minimize future debt issuances.
• To maintain or increase the MTA’s Financial Rating.
• To provide adequate funding to make all necessary system upgrades. (Roadway,
Interchange, Bridgework, Toll System, etc.)
• To maintain manageability of capital improvement program by limiting the overlap of
major projects.
• To maintain manageability of capital improvement costs by equalizing, to the extent
possible, annual capital project costs.
• To maintain a minimum unencumbered residual value of at least 5 percent of
annual toll revenue or five million dollars, which ever is greater, at each year end in
working capital. (Exclusive of Reserve Maintenance Fund, and Bond Proceeds)

The Board’s Finance and
Audit Committee works with
the Plan after the list of
capital projects and their
costs is completed by the
Long Range Planning
Committee. Finance and
Audit develops MTA’s annual
operating and capital budgets
and determines what level of
bonding may be necessary.

In addition to departmental
budget submissions and the
recommended capital program, MTA’s management team and the two
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subcommittees consider toll revenue projections and MTA’s financial planning
goals as part of this process. Traffic and revenue projections incorporated into the
model are based on projections developed by the traffic and revenue forecasting
consultant and by MTA staff.
Once both Board committees have agreed upon a final project list and budget, the
CE calculates the Reserve Maintenance (RM) Fund 1 deposit amount required by
the Bond Resolution. The CE’s final report includes the annual inspection results,
approved list of projects to be funded with bond proceeds and reserve maintenance
funds, and the RM deposit.

The Legislature’s
Transportation Committee
receives a bill including
MTA’s proposed operating
budget each spring. Upon
passage of that bill, the
MTA’s annual operating
budget for the following
calendar year is
established.

MTA’s budget runs on a calendar year. MTA’s Board approves a preliminary
budget in October which is used to develop the legislative budget packet. This
schedule provides time for MTA staff to review the proposed budget with the
Legislature’s Transportation Committee, and for the Board to consider issues raised
during this review, before the Board approves the final budget. After MTA Board
approval, the final budget goes back to the Transportation Committee and the
Legislature in the form of a bill. The Legislature’s passage of the bill in the spring
establishes MTA’s annual operating budget for the following calendar year
beginning January 1.
MTA’s 20-year Plan is a living document updated regularly to reflect changes in
projected revenues and costs. For example, the Plan was recently updated to
reflect revised traffic projections indicating additional capacity on the Turnpike will
not be needed for some time. The widening of the Turnpike through and north of
Portland that had been anticipated in the next 3-5 years was shifted in the Plan to a
time much further out. However, bridge reconstruction projects along that stretch
of the Turnpike, which must be completed in the near term, will be designed to
accommodate a wider road.

Transfer of Operating Surplus ――――――――――――――――――――――
Historical Support Provided by MTA to the State
The MTA has provided
support in various forms to
the State since 1981.
Total cash support of State
programs has been
approximately $75 million
during that time. Some of
this amount came from
the annual payments of
between $4.7 and $8.7
million MTA was required
to make to MaineDOT for a
period of years.

Since 1981, MTA has provided support of various kinds to the State, including cash
transfers, spending to maintain interchanges, and other non-cash assistance
MaineDOT. Cash transfers for State programs have totaled approximately $75
million since 1994. Most of that money went to support MaineDOT’s
transportation needs, but $16 million, paid by the MTA to purchase approximately
4.7 miles of Interstate 95 between Kittery and York, went to general purpose aid
for education.
About $34 million of the $75 million was given to MaineDOT in a lump sum in
1996. MTA issued a special obligation bond specifically and solely to provide funds
to the State. MTA was originally obligated to pay approximately $4.7 million per
year to cover the interest and principal on those bonds over their ten year life.
1The

Reserve Maintenance Fund is one of the specific accounts established by the Bond
Resolution. The purpose and allowed uses of this account are described on page 20 in the
section of this report that discusses MTA’s Obligations to Bondholders.
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MTA also provides noncash assistance to
MaineDOT. This includes
reduced cost services
such as striping, plowing
or mowing. MTA estimates
that support of this type in
2008 represented
$78,960 in avoided costs
for MaineDOT.

MTA refinanced these bonds in 1998, then again in 2008 2 . As a result, the
Authority is still making payments on the special obligation bonds, though with a
significantly lower annual cash outlay due to the refinancing. Current interest and
principal payments on these bonds is approximately $2.4 million annually. These
bonds cannot be refinanced again and are scheduled to be paid off in 2018. MTA’s
total cost for the bonds issued on behalf of MaineDOT, including interest paid, will
be over $47 million.
MTA has also paid over $60 million additional dollars since 1994 to the State in the
form of payment for the services rendered by the Maine State Police (MSP). MSP
has a separate troop responsible for patrolling the Maine Turnpike. MTA pays all
costs associated with that troop. Table 1 summarizes transfers of actual cash to the
State from 1994 to 2009.
Table 1. Cash Transfers from MTA to State 1994 – 2009
MTA Cash
Transfers to
the State
$23,354,488*
$7,700,000*
$4,700,000
$4,700,000

MTA Bond
Proceeds to
MaineDOT

MTA
Payments to
Total Cash to
Year
MSP
the State
1994
$2,399,592
$25,754,080
1995
$2,348,361
$10,048,361
1996
$34,000,000**
$3,442,111
$42,142,111
1997
$1,386,325
$6,086,325
1998
$2,878,080
$2,878,080
1999
$3,253,886
$3,253,886
2000
$3,625,449
$3,625,449
2001
$3,324,068
$3,324,068
2002
$3,946,214
$3,946,214
2003
$4,798,213
$4,798,213
2004
$4,647,854
$4,647,854
2005
$4,769,211
$4,769,211
2006
$5,415,847
$5,415,847
2007
$4,933,797
$4,933,797
2008
$5,706,942
$5,706,942
2009
$6,142,065
$6,142,065
Total
$40,454,488
$34,000,000 $63,018,015 $137,472,503
*$15 million of the cash transferred in 1994 and $1 million of the amount
from 1995 were transferred to the State by MTA in exchange for 4.7 miles of
the interstate from Kittery to York.
**$34 million was actually transferred to MaineDOT and the MTA incurred
an additional $1.27 million in bond issuance costs.
Source: Data provided by MTA and confirmed to records maintained by the
Legislature’s Office of Program and Fiscal Review.

In addition to cash transferred directly to the State, MTA has provided certain noncash assistance to MaineDOT. Such assistance has included performing
maintenance on particular interchanges and stretches of road - striping, plowing,
and mowing - at or below cost. In 2008, MTA provided these services to
MaineDOT for $78,960 less than the cost incurred in providing them.

According to MTA, the Legislature’s Transportation Committee agreed that refinancing the
bonds, and extending the term, was preferable to a substantial toll increase.

2

Office of Program Evaluation & Government Accountability

page 12

The Maine Turnpike Authority

Other Contributions to Maine’s Transportation Infrastructure
MTA assists with Maine’s
overall transportation
infrastructure by working
cooperatively with
MaineDOT to share costs
on projects that are
directly linked to the
Turnpike.

MTA contributes to improving Maine’s transportation infrastructure more
generally by participating in cooperative projects with MaineDOT. MTA and
MaineDOT share costs on these projects which are linked directly – physically,
functionally or both – to Maine Turnpike infrastructure. When doing a cooperative
project, MaineDOT and MTA establish a Cooperative Agreement and assign
responsibility for administering that agreement. When MTA administers the
agreement, it pays all costs on the project and MaineDOT reimburses MTA for the
percentage of project costs that has been agreed on. When MaineDOT administers
the Agreement, it pays the upfront costs and MTA reimburses.
Table 2 lists examples of the cooperative projects MTA and MaineDOT have
undertaken through the spring of 2008 with MTA’s share of the costs.
Table 2. Examples of MaineDOT and MTA Cooperative Projects with MTA Share of Cost
1. Gray By-Pass/Route 202 bridge - joint agreement with MaineDOT

$2.3 million

2. GPCOG/Shuttlebus - Rideshare program and Zoom bus

$2.8 million

3. Park & Ride Studies - joint with MaineDOT (more in 2009 planned)

$53,000

4. Interchanges/Intersections/Connector studies with local roads - all
joint efforts with MaineDOT/Communities

$32.6 million

5. Wells Train Station - joint project with FTA/MaineDOT/Wells
6. West Gardiner Service Plaza/Truck Parking - joint project with
MaineDOT
7. Payne Road Bridge - MTA agreed to repurchase the bridge after it was
rebuilt by MaineDOT
8. Other Transportation planning/Origin & Destination studies not
related to toll plazas/MaineDOT funding issues/ARTC
9. Interstate renumbering/re-designation effort

$2.4 million
$11.2 million
$6 million
$500,000
$50,000

10. Streamlining and Mallar Studies (2000 and beyond)
$15,000
Source: Data provided by MTA. OPEGA was unable to obtain confirmation from MaineDOT.

MTA reports it is currently considering providing support to the replacement or
rehabilitation of the Interstate-95 and Sara Mildred Long Bridges in Kittery, Maine.
This support could be approximately $3 million annually for the next 30 years.
Statutory Requirement for Transfer of Operating Surplus
Statute used to require
MTA to transfer a set
amount of money to
MaineDOT each year, but
since 1991 has required
MTA to transfer their
operating surplus instead.

Maine Statute Title 23 §1961.2 states in part that the Department of Transportation
must be provided each year the operating surplus of the Maine Turnpike Authority.
Title 23 §1964.6-A goes on to define operating surplus:
"Operating surplus" means the total annual operating revenues of the
Maine Turnpike Authority, after money has been put aside to pay the
reasonable operating expenses, to pay or to reserve for capital
expenditures and to meet the requirements of any resolution
authorizing bonds of the Maine Turnpike Authority, including any
amounts pledged to secure obligations issued pursuant to section 1968,
subsection 2-A or to pay principal, interest or premium, if any, with
respect to these obligations.
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This language resulted from the passage of a voter referendum in November 1991.
Prior to that time, from 1982 – 1991, statute specified a particular dollar amount
that MTA would transfer to MaineDOT. As shown in Figure 1 on page 8, statute
was amended to adjust the maximum amount of this transfer several times through
the 1980’s and early 1990’s with the amount ranging from $4.7 million to $17.4
million.
For several years after the requirement for a specified dollar amount was replaced
with the requirement to transfer “operating surplus”, MTA continued to make
annual cash transfers to MaineDOT in amounts ranging from $4.7 million to $8.7
million. These transfers continued until MTA began paying on the special
obligation bonds issued on behalf of MaineDOT.
Determining Whether MTA Currently Has an Operating Surplus
MTA has not transferred any operating surplus to MaineDOT since its last
payment of $4.7 million in 1997. MTA management maintains the Authority has
no surplus according to the definition in statute. A cursory look at some key
financial data would seem to confirm this. Operating the Turnpike and
maintaining it in the manner required by the Bond Resolution costs MTA more
money annually than it receives in revenue. As a result, the Authority issues bonds
to pay for some long term capital improvements. MTA currently has over $400
million in outstanding bond obligations.
MTA has not been
transferring any operating
surplus to MaineDOT and
maintains there has not
been any “surplus”.
OPEGA found MTA’s
position supportable given
the statutory definition,
and further noted the
definition is not specific
enough to calculate a
definitive surplus figure.
Consequently, OPEGA
believes it unlikely that any
transfers of surplus will
occur in the future.

Additionally, as described on page 20, MTA manages its finances using a “bucket”
system as required by the Bond Resolution. It is designed to prioritize the uses of
MTA’s revenues and is a typical requirement in revenue bond resolutions for
tolling authorities. Over the course of a year, this bucket system continually moves
funds to lower priority buckets as higher priority ones fill. Any monies in the lower
priority buckets can be, and often are, used to pay for capital improvements and
emergency repairs to the Turnpike. All funds are assigned to a purpose at all times.
As a result, there has never been any money that MTA would consider “surplus”.
OPEGA attempted to definitively calculate whether MTA has had an operating
surplus as defined in statute. In doing so, we found the statute lacks specificity as
to the point in time when the surplus is to be calculated, whether it should be based
on budgeted figures or actual revenues and expenditures, and whether it is meant to
capture only current year expenditures or also projected future expenditures.
For example, the phrase “after money has been put aside to pay the reasonable
operating expenses” could be taken to mean after MTA has paid its current
operating expenses. It could also be taken to mean after MTA has put aside (or
saved) any amount of money it reasonably believes it could need to cover operating
expenses now or in the future. Similarly, the phrase “to pay or to reserve for
capital expenditures” could be taken to mean MTA should only set aside funds
needed for current capital expenditures. But, it could be taken to mean that MTA
may first set aside any amounts needed for current and projected future capital
expenditures before transferring any surplus to MaineDOT.
Consequently, OPEGA finds there is no operating surplus under the definition
currently in statute, and further asserts it is unlikely there will ever be a surplus.
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This is both due to the lack of specificity mentioned in the statutory language, and
because MTA makes the decisions about what projects are to be done in any given
year. Thus, the Authority can legitimately continue to “reserve” all monies for
capital and reserve maintenance expenditures for as long as the annual resources
needed to properly maintain and improve the Turnpike exceed annual revenues.
Potential Impacts of Requiring MTA to Transfer Funds to the State

If required to transfer
funds to MaineDOT, the
MTA would likely make
other financial
adjustments. Options that
may be considered under
MTA’s current planning
model include: changing
amount or timing of toll
rates or bond issuances;
adjusting schedule for
capital projects; and
reducing operating costs.

If the Legislature wants MTA to transfer some amount of money to MaineDOT
each year, then a change to statute would be required. Whether this is desirable is a
policy matter for the Legislature’s consideration. (See Recommendation 1.)
Any required transfer of funds to MaineDOT would affect the Authority's current
financial situation and, therefore, its strategy for achieving stated objectives and
maintaining a strong bond rating. MTA would likely make other adjustments to
compensate for the transfer after analyzing various options and their impacts.
Those options include changing the amount and timing of toll increases.
Modifications to future bond amounts and their timing, the schedule for planned
capital projects and/or the level of operating expenses would probably also be
considered under MTA's current planning model. MTA is constrained, however,
in how much it can adjust any given area, as depicted in Table 3.
Table 3. Adjustments MTA Could Make to Maintain Desired Financial Position if
Required to Transfer Money to MaineDOT
Potential Adjustments

Limiters

Decision Makers

Toll Rates

Public Acceptance

MTA Board

Frequency or Amount
of Bonds

Statute &
Bond Resolution

MTA Board

Operating Costs

Bond Resolution

Capital Improvements

Bond Resolution

Maintenance Costs

Bond Resolution

MTA Board &
Legislature
MTA Board &
CE
MTA Board &
CE

Further analysis would need to be done by MTA, or the Legislature’s non-partisan
staff, to determine the potential impacts of any specific action(s) the Legislature
considers. The amount of any required cash transfer from MTA to MaineDOT
would be constrained by the Bond Resolution which appears to allow for a
maximum transfer of $8.7 million from MTA’s MaineDOT Provision Account.
Additional funds might be transferable from the Improvement Account, but would
be limited by allowable uses for that account and a Net Revenues test 3 .

3As

stated in the Bond Resolution, payments from the Improvement Account for “any other
lawful purpose” may only be made if certain criteria are met. Those criteria include the
condition that net revenues during the preceeding fiscal year were at least equal to 200% of
the debt service on outstanding bonds for that fiscal year.
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Factors Affecting MTA’s Bond Rating ――――――――――――――――――
The Most Significant Factors Driving MTA’s Bond Rating

MTA’s bond rating is a
measure of the risk
associated with its bonds.
The rating affects whether
the bonds will be
marketable and the
interest rate the Authority
must pay on the bonds it
issues.

The interest rates on MTA’s bonds and the attractiveness of those bonds are based
on the Authority’s bond rating, and how MTA’s rating compares with other tolling
entities. MTA guards its bond rating very carefully because this rating determines
whether the Authority is able to borrow money and what interest rate it will have to
pay. Given the substantial bonds the Authority issues to support its capital
improvements, it is easy to see how a small difference in a bond’s interest rate
could have a big impact on the organization’s finances.
The three major bond agencies that rate MTA’s bonds, and most other bonds
nationally, are FitchRatings, Moody's Investors Service, and Standard & Poor's.
They assess an organization’s finances, management structure, economic
environment, political environment, revenue forecasts, and asset characteristics to
determine whether an entity’s bonds appear to be a stable investment. Ratings
indicate how sure investors can be that an organization will be able to repay bonds
over the long term. Table 4 shows the bond rating scales used by the three major
rating agencies.
Table 4. Bond Rating Scale for Three Major Rating Agencies
Moody’s
Strongest/extremely strong/high
Aaa
Very strong/very high
Aa (1,2,3)
Above average/strong/high
A (1,2,3)
Average/adequate/good
Baa (1,2,3)
Below average/major ongoing
Ba (1,2,3)
uncertainties/speculative
Weak/highly speculative
B (1,2,3)
Very weak/vulnerable
Caa (1,2,3)
Extremely weak/highly vulnerable/probably
Ca
default
Bankruptcy filed but payments
made/imminent default
Weakest/default
C

S&P
AAA
AA (+,-)
A (+,-)
BBB (+,-)
BB (+,-)

Fitch
AAA
AA (+,-)
A (+,-)
BBB (+,-)
BB (+,-)

B (+,-)
CCC (+,-)
CC

B (+,-)
CCC (+,-)

C

C

D

D

Source: MTA

There are three major
bond rating agencies. All of
them use similar factors
and their own subjective
analysis to determine the
ratings of entities issuing
bonds. MTA has
historically received strong
ratings from all three.

Although the big three rating agencies use a number of similar factors when
determining bond ratings for tolling entities, they do not specify which are the most
significant. A review of their published analyses shows their consideration of
factors appears more subjective than formulaic. Furthermore, it appears rating
agencies consider a tolling authority’s strong positives as possible offsets of some
negatives. An entity with a stable and mature asset (i.e. older, established toll road),
strong financial performance, and a history of capable management presents less
risk to potential investors and therefore will be rated higher.
MTA has a history of strong ratings, and has most recently been rated A+, Aa3 and
AA by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch respectively. OPEGA reviewed a June 2009
special report by FitchRatings entitled “U.S. Toll Roads and the 2007-2008
Recession: A Diagnosis of Performance” that illustrated the interconnected factors
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considered by a rating agency when assessing bond ratings. It also showed MTA’s
ratings comparing favorably with those of other tolling entities, some of which
FitchRatings had downgraded due to conditions described in its report.
The factors that seem
most critical to bond
ratings for tolling entities
are independent tolling
Authority, a willingness to
raise tolls when needed,
and a good debt service
coverage ratio.

Based on a review of rating documents published by the three major rating
agencies, the most important factors appear to be those that directly affect MTA’s
revenue stream and, therefore, its ability to pay bondholder obligations. In
particular, the following three factors seemed obviously important in the rating
agency reviews:
• independent tolling authority;
• history showing a willingness to raise tolls when necessary; and
• maintenance of an acceptable debt service coverage.
It can be assumed, therefore, that any actions or events (including legislative
actions) that would adversely impact any of these three things could potentially
result in a change to MTA’s bond rating.
The Effect of Legislative Actions on MTA’s Bond Rating
Our review of legislative history for MTA identified several instances of legislative,
and other activity, that could potentially have been concerning to rating agencies
and, thus, negatively impacted MTA’s bond rating. Examples of such activity
include:

OPEGA compared MTA’s
legislative history to its
past bond ratings and was
unable to find a direct
correlation between the
two.

•

In the late 1980’s, the Legislature passed bills that required legislative
confirmation of the Governor’s appointments to the MTA Board and
increased the maximum amount to be transferred to MaineDOT, after
operating expenses, from $4.7 million to $8.7 million.

•

In early 1991, the Legislature passed a supplemental budget bill that
increased MTA’s transfer to MaineDOT for fiscal year 1991 to a maximum
of $17.4 million and required MTA to make an early payment of $6.3
million for the Scarborough interchange project.

•

In November 1991, the Sensible Transportation Act, adopted by voter
referendum, changed MTA’s statute to require legislative approval of both
MTA's operating budget and the revenues needed to meet Bond Resolution
requirements. It also replaced the cash transfer of a specific amount to
MaineDOT with the requirement to transfer “operating surplus” as
discussed on page 13. Statute was changed in 1995 to clarify that only
MTA’s budget for operating expenses needed legislative approval.

•

In early 1992, a supplemental budget bill for fiscal years 1992 and 1993
required MTA to transfer $5 million to the State’s General Fund.

•

In 1995, the Legislature passed an act requiring MTA to evaluate reasonable
alternatives to widening as per the Sensible Transportation Policy Act and
report back to the Legislature by a specified deadline.

OPEGA has been unable to detect, however, any direct correlation between
specific past legislative actions and MTA’s bond rating. As shown in Table 5,
MTA’s revenue bond ratings have been stable and strong, even gradually improving
between 1997 and 2003, despite the noted examples and legislative debate on a
number of controversial bills involving MTA.
Office of Program Evaluation & Government Accountability
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Table 5. Bond Ratings for MTA’s Revenue Bonds
Bond Ratings (1)
Year of Issue
$ Bonds Issued
Moody’s
Fitch
S&P
DSC Ratio (2)
1991
$15,250,000 A
A
A
NA
1994
$73,130,000 A
A
A
9.120
1997
$50,000,000 A2
A+
A
2.66
1998**
$47,970,000 A1
A+
A
2.27
2000
$126,000,000 A1
AAA+
2.79
2003
$51,000,000 Aa3
AAA+
1.9
2004
$115,050,000 Aa3
AAA+
1.79
2005
$76,715,000 Aa3
AAA+
2.62
2007
$50,000,000 Aa3
AAA+
2.16
2008**
$45,885,000 Aa3
AAA+
2.04
2009
$50,000,000 Aa3
AAA+
NA
**These issuances were for the refinancing of existing bonds.
(1) Represents “underlying ratings” given
(2) Represents MTA’s debt service coverage ratio in the year the bonds were issued
Source: Maine Turnpike Authority

MTA’s management and Board members assert bond ratings have stayed strong
despite legislative activity because:

MTA asserts its rating has
stayed high despite
legislative actions in part
because it has prevented
actions that would
decrease autonomy and
has also typically insured
its bonds. OPEGA believes
it is likely because none of
the activity interfered with
ability to repay
bondholders and there
were positive factors that
offset any negative
changes.

•

MTA has been able to fend off any legislative involvement that would
decrease their autonomy;

•

the rating agencies have seen some of these changes, such as the move to
the “operating surplus” language and the 1995 reasonable alternatives
requirement, as positives rather than negatives;

•

the level of legislative activity has been low in the eyes of rating agencies
and has given those agencies a level of comfort about the limits of political
interference in MTA’s finances;

•

MTA has typically insured its bonds, making investments in MTA bonds
essentially risk free, which rating agencies have seen as a significant
strength 4 ; and

•

MTA stopped making cash transfers to MaineDOT in 1997.

OPEGA reviewed the rating agencies’ reports and found no specific explanation
for why the noted legislative actions did not negatively impact the Authority’s bond
ratings. We believe it could have been for two primary reasons. First, it could have
been due to the fact that none of these changes substantially interfered with MTA’s
ability to repay bondholders. This continues to be of critical importance in bond
ratings.
A second reason could be that positive factors offset or overshadowed any negative
changes. OPEGA also noted legislative activity that could have had a positive
impact on MTA’s bond rating – like increasing the authorized bonding limits and
4OPEGA

notes that the situation with bond insurance has significantly changed in the past
couple of years as bond ratings on the surety bonds MTA purchased as insurance have
declined below the ratings on MTA’s own bonds. Consequently, MTA currently does not
have the level of bond insurance it has maintained in the past.
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authorizing the widening of the Turnpike. In addition, MTA has typically
maintained a debt service coverage ratio at or above 2x. It also has a mature toll
road with little competition and a stable management team. These are factors
rating agencies have noted as contributing to positive ratings.
It can not be assumed, however, that these positives will always be able to offset
any negative impacts from legislative activity. Consequently, any actions that could
potentially affect MTA’s revenue stream or its ability to repay bondholders should
still be approached with caution. Such actions include any potential legislation that
would:
Any legislative actions that
could affect MTA’s ability
to repay bondholders
could impact its bond
rating and should be
carefully considered.

•

impact MTA's independent ability to raise tolls (e.g. requiring legislative or
executive approval of toll increases);

•

impact MTA's ability to implement the Consulting Engineer's
recommended capital plan and adhere to recommended maintenance and
improvement schedule as required by the Bond Resolution (e.g. requiring
legislative approval of the capital budget and specific projects or lowering
the bond cap below what is necessary to cover capital needs);

•

weaken MTA’s financial position and/or impact MTA's ability to maintain
an acceptable debt service coverage ratio (e.g. diverting MTA revenue to
the State); or

•

impact MTA’s ability to maintain roadways to recommended standards
without increasing revenues and/or impact MTA’s ability to adequately
fund reserve maintenance and capital improvement funds (e.g. requiring
MTA to maintain additional roadways thereby increasing operating
expenses and capital costs).

In addition to impacting MTA’s bond ratings, there could be legal ramifications
associated with any legislation that substantially hinders MTA’s ability to repay its
bondholders or violates other key provisions contained in the Bond Resolution.
These contractual obligations are discussed below.

MTA’s Obligations to Bondholders――――――――――――――――――――

The Bond Resolution
represents a contract
between MTA and its
bondholders. The
obligations included in the
document can be legally
enforced against the MTA
by the Bond Trustee.

MTA’s Specific Obligations to Bondholders
OPEGA contracted with a law firm that has expertise in bond resolutions and
other bond related legal issues to consult on questions related to MTA’s Bond
Resolution. That consultant, Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge, reviewed the
Authority’s current Bond Resolution and noted that it includes a number of
obligations that affect how MTA must manage its finances, assets, operations or
planning. These obligations represent contractual duties that can be legally
enforced against MTA through the Trustee.
The full report provided by Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge (EAPD), detailing all
the obligations, may be seen in Appendix C. Articles V, VII and VIII, concerning
the Authority’s financial accounts and covenants, are most relevant to this review
and are summarized below.
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Articles V – Funds and Accounts
Article V of the MTA’s Bond Resolution directs that MTA funds be placed into
specific accounts, with specific requirements for the level of funds in each account,
and limits the purpose for which the money from each account may be used.
These accounts include the Capital Fund which holds bond proceeds and as a
result can be used only for “Turnpike projects” or for other purposes provided the
Bond Trustee agrees. 5 The level of funding required in the Capital Fund is
determined based on capital improvement needs identified by the MTA, the
Consulting Engineer, the MTA Board's Long-Range Planning Committee, and
approved by the Board.

MTA’s Bond Resolution
requires the Authority to
deposit its revenues into a
number of specific fund
accounts, some of which
are to be held by the
Trustee. Each account has
its own allowable uses and
many have minimum
funding amounts.

The other accounts specified in the Bond Resolution receive funds from MTA’s
operating and other revenue. They are arranged as a series of "buckets" such that
only when the higher priority bucket's requirements have been met may the next
lower bucket receive funding. This system is designed to protect the bondholders
by prioritizing MTA's revenue. These accounts include:
Revenue Fund - All revenues received by the Authority are deposited in the
Revenue Fund. The moneys in the Revenue Fund are primarily used to pay
operating expenses. Funding that exceeds operating expenses flow to the
downstream buckets, and all funds in excess of 15% of the Annual
Operating Budget must be flowed to other funds by the fifteenth of each
month.
Debt Service Fund/ Debt Service Reserve Fund - Moneys in the Debt
Service Fund are used to pay debt service on the revenue bonds. The
funding level is determined by the amount of annual principal and interest
payments due on outstanding bonds. The Debt Service Reserve Fund
holds required backup funds available to pay the interest and principal on
bonds in the event the Debt Service Fund has insufficient cash to make
those payments. This reserve fund includes a combination of cash and
surety bonds, and between those two, the fund’s value must be equal to the
Debt Service Reserve Requirement 6 .
Reserve Maintenance Fund - Section 806 of the Bond Resolution stipulates
that the recommended funding level for the Reserve Maintenance Fund is
specified by the Consulting Engineer’s annual inspection report from the
prior year. Moneys in this account may be used:
• for costs associated with Reserve Maintenance Fund projects;
• for costs of Turnpike projects, provided that such payment is
necessary to prevent a loss of revenues;
• to pay premiums for insurance required by the Bond Resolution;
Capital Fund moneys have been used for other purposes, with the Trustee’s agreement,
twice in recent years, once in 2007 and once in 2009. In both cases the funds were
transferred to the Debt Service Reserve Fund to cover shortages that had suddenly occurred
in that fund due to circumstances beyond MTA’s control.
6 The Debt Service Reserve Requirement is equal to either the maximum annual debt
service (MADS) or, if MTA has maintained two times the amount of debt service coverage for
the prior two fiscal years, then only half the MADS.
5
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•

•

to replenish the Debt Service Reserve Fund if there are insufficient
moneys in the General Reserve Fund to replenish it and certain
other conditions are met; and
to pay for an emergency, subject to certain conditions.

General Reserve Fund - Section 509 of the Bond Resolution describes
the many allowed uses of the General Reserve Fund. MTA explained
that the General Reserve Fund is comprised of three major accounts, the
MaineDOT account, the Interchange account, and the Improvement
account. The MaineDOT account is used for debt service on the
subordinated bonds that were issued for MaineDOT, and residually to
fund any transfers to the MaineDOT. The Interchange account is used
to pay for interchange related capital costs. The Improvement account is
used pay general capital or maintenance expenses and to meet any
funding deficiencies in the higher buckets. Under the Resolution,
moneys in this account can also be used “to pay for any other lawful
corporate purpose of the Authority as authorized in the Enabling Act,”
as long as certain criteria are met.
Article VIII of the Bond
Resolution requires MTA to
take specific steps to
manage its finances,
assets and operations.
These steps include
keeping the Turnpike in
good repair, charging
adequate tolls, and
employing a consulting
engineer to report annually
on the Turnpike’s
condition.

Articles VII-VIII – Authority Covenants
Article VII includes the Authority covenants to pay debt service on the bonds, to
take all action that may be necessary to confirm the pledge made under the Bond
Resolution, and to do all that may be necessary to ensure the tax-exempt status of
any tax-exempt bonds. Section 704 specifically prevents the Authority from issuing
any indebtedness secured by the Turnpike revenues other than the bonds and the
subordinated bonds.
Article VIII contains the provisions that most directly affect how the Authority
must manage its finances, assets and operations. Section 801 requires the Authority
to operate the Turnpike in a sound manner and keep it in good repair and working
condition. It stipulates the conditions under which the Authority may acquire a
road that is more than five miles long. This Section further provides that the
Authority may not transfer more than $8.7 million to the Department of
Transportation from the Department of Transportation Provision Account in any
fiscal year.
Section 802 of Article VIII requires the tolls established by the Authority must be
sufficient (1) to provide funds for the payment of operating expenses and (2) to
provide net revenues that are at least equal to the net revenue requirement 7 in any
fiscal year. Section 803 provides a timeline for the Authority’s submittal of a
preliminary and final budget. It further specifies the amount expended on
operation and maintenance of the Turnpike may not exceed the amount provided
for operating expenses in the annual budget, except in the case of an emergency or
if paid from the Reserve Maintenance Fund or General Reserve Fund.

7Net

Revenue Requirement is, for any stated fiscal year, the greater of:
(a) 120% of the debt service; and
(b) 100% of the sum of (i) the debt service, (ii) the required Reserve Maintenance
deposit, (iii) the required debt service reserve deposit and (iv) any other required
deposit set forth in any Supplemental Resolution.
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Section 804 provides a deadline for the Authority to file its audited financial
statements and also stipulates the information it must file annually with the Trustee
and Consulting Engineer.
Sections 805 and 806 require MTA to employ independent firms to carry out the
duties of the Consulting Engineer and the Traffic Consultant. The Authority must
have the Consulting Engineering submit a report by October 1 of each year to
include the firm’s findings with respect to the condition of the Turnpike;
recommendations for proper operation and maintenance of the Turnpike for the
following fiscal year, including estimated costs; recommendations for the insurance
to be carried by the Authority; and recommendations for the amount to be
deposited in the Reserve Maintenance Fund.
Other sections in Article VIII deal with additional financial matters like the types of
insurance that the Authority is required to carry and stipulations related to
construction contracts.
MTA’s Bond Resolution Compared to Those of Other Tolling Authorities

MTA’s Bond Resolution is
generally comparable to
those of other tolling
entities. It includes a few
covenants that are more
detailed than others.
While the specificity may
be more restrictive on MTA
in some situations, it also
provides greater clarity for
bondholders and MTA.

According to EAPD, the terms of MTA's Bond Resolution are generally
comparable to those of other toll revenue bond issuers. This is true both for bond
documents originally used in the early 1990's as well as the current market. The
terms are expected to differ some between issuers to reflect the individual
circumstances of each issuer and the nature of the governmental entity that is
issuing the debt. Most revenue bond issuers need to balance the terms of their
financing documents against their overall responsibilities for operating their
particular revenue enterprise.
While typical, the consultant also noted that certain covenants contained in MTA's
Resolution are more detailed than those contained in governing documents for
other revenue bond issuers. The increased specificity may be more restrictive on
the MTA in certain circumstances but also provides more clarity with respect to
MTA's obligations to bondholders as compared to the more general terms of other
bond documents. Examples of such detail noted by the consultant included:
• formulas for the Debt Service Reserve Fund requirement;
• set of requirements MTA must meet if it wants to expand the system;
• requirements for the annual report; and
• the requirement for the Consulting Engineer to conduct an annual
inspection of the system.
Also according to the consultant, the roles for the Consulting Engineer in MTA's
Resolution are defined more specifically than in some other resolutions. It is
typical to require various independent third parties to be involved in certain matters
to give comfort that the issuer is fulfilling obligations. However, the roles for the
CE specifically defined in the bond document are usually related just to the physical
condition of the Turnpike. The consultant offered examples of why the CE may
have been specified for the other roles but could not opine on the current CE's
expertise in any of those areas.
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Bond Resolution Constraints on Legislative Actions
OPEGA asked EAPD to provide their opinion on how, if at all, the obligations to
bondholders contained in the Resolution might limit any actions the Legislature
could consider taking regarding the Authority. Below is a summary of the
consultant’s response. The full response is included in the consultant’s complete
report in Appendix C.

In the opinion of OPEGA’s
bond consultant, the MTA
is a creation of the
Legislature and is subject
to further legislative
action, so long as that
action does not adversely
affect the Authority’s
contractual obligations.

EAPD notes the Authority was established by an act of the Maine Legislature and,
in general, it remains subject to further legislative action that could either expand or
restrict the activities of the Authority. The primary concerns in regard to legislative
action that might conflict with the Bond Resolution are presented by the contract
clauses of the United States Constitution and the Maine Constitution which
provide, in part, that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligations of
contracts.
However, the contract clause does not disallow all legislation that might adversely
affect the Authority’s contractual obligations under the Bond Resolution. United
States Supreme Court decisions have found legislative action that does “impair” a
contract constitutional to the extent the impairment is reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine, approximately 20 years before the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, established an arguably more stringent standard that would prohibit
virtually any impairment, regardless of how material.
Assessing the outcome of any particular controversy depends on the actual facts
and circumstances of the legislation. For example, necessity will be found if the
objectives of the legislation could not be satisfied by a “less drastic alternative”.
Other factors used to assess reasonableness include the extent of the impairment
and whether the circumstances giving rise to the impairment were foreseeable at the
time the contract was made.

MTA’s Outstanding Debt ――――――――――――――――――――――――――
Amount of Debt MTA Has Currently Outstanding

Title 23 §1968 caps
MTA’s revenue bonds at
$486 million. The
Authority’s audited
financial statements show
a total of $390 million in
outstanding revenue
bonds as of 2009.

Unlike State bonds, MTA revenue bonds do not require voter approval. The
Maine Turnpike Authority uses a mixture of toll revenues and bonding to fund its
capital program. Bond funds are only used for long term capital improvements and
the term on bonds issued for any project is no longer than the useful life of the
asset. Shorter lived capital projects, such as paving projects, are paid for with cash
and bonds are never used for MTA’s operational expenses.
Title 23 MRSA §1968 sets limits on MTA's bonding authority. The current limits
are $486 million for revenue bonds and $40 million for special obligation bonds
specific to pay costs of MaineDOT projects. Statute further specifies the $40
million in special obligation bonds could be issued no later than June 30, 1997.
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MTA’s audited financial statements report MTA had approximately $390 million in
revenue bonds and $18.5 million in special obligation bonds outstanding as of
December 31, 2009. Though the statutory deadline has passed for issuing
additional special obligation bonds, MTA could issue additional revenue bonds of
almost $96 million without exceeding its statutory bond cap. Table 6 shows MTA’s
outstanding bonds as compared to the bond caps in statute.
Table 6. MTA’s Outstanding Debt as of 2009 Compared to Statutory Caps
Revenue Bonds

Special Obligation Bonds

Statutory Cap
$486,000,000
$40,000,000
Outstanding Debt
$390,115,000
$18,530,000
Remaining Bonding Capacity
$95,885,000
$0 *
*MTA has no remaining bonding capacity for special obligation bonds because statute
required all bonds of that type to be issued by June 30, 1997.

Processes for Deciding the Timing and Amount of Bond Issuances
New Bond Issuances

MTA’s Board makes
decisions to issue new
bonds based on MTA’s 20
year plan and considers
the input of the Consulting
Engineer, Traffic
Consultant and MTA staff.

The decision to issue new bonds is based on the 20 year financial and capital
planning model described on page 10. Only the Board can authorize the issuance
of new bonds, but the decision-making process also includes the involvement of
the Consulting Engineer (CE), the Traffic Consultant, and members of MTA staff.
Outline of Steps in Deciding Whether to Issue New Bonds
1. CE performs annual inspection.
2. CE presents inspection results in preliminary capital improvements report.
3. Traffic Consultant prepares preliminary traffic and revenue projections.
4. Staff reviews capital needs, and projected revenues and costs with the Board
to assess whether new bonds are necessary to support capital needs.
5. The Long Range Planning Subcommittee of MTA’s Board reviews capital
projects and selects which will be funded with cash and which will be funded
with bond proceeds. An initial determination is made of whether new debt will
be needed in the coming year.
6. The Finance and Audit Subcommittee of the MTA Board reviews the results of
the Long Range Planning Subcommittee's work, and the two work together to
finalize the capital plans and bonding decisions.
7. The full Board authorizes bond issuance if new bonds have been determined
to be necessary.

Refinancing Outstanding Debt
The process involved in deciding to refinance existing debt is far simpler than that
for deciding whether new debt should be issued. Refinancing may be suggested by
MTA staff, MTA’s Board, or the Authority’s senior bankers. Once it has been
decided that refinancing is worth consideration, the Authority’s bankers prepare a
proposal or analysis for MTA staff to review.
MTA pays close attention to the net present value and current dollar value of
refinancing and considers:
•

how much the refinancing will cost;
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When deciding whether to
refinance existing bonds,
MTA considers the cost of
refinancing, the time
needed to recoup those
costs, and whether
refinancing would produce
at least $1 million in
savings over the
repayment of the bond.

•

how long it would take for the cost of refinancing to be recouped; and

•

whether refinancing would produce at least $1 million in savings, preferably
$2 million or more.

If MTA managers decide refinancing makes sense for the organization, then the
proposal is brought before the Board’s Finance and Audit Subcommittee. The
Finance and Audit Subcommittee reviews the proposal and brings the proposal to
the full Board for a final decision if they agree it should be considered.
Assessing Whether MTA’s Current Debt Load Is Reasonable
OPEGA considered a number of criteria in assessing the reasonableness of MTA’s
current debt load including whether:

OPEGA concluded that
MTA’s current debt level is
reasonable because it is
within the statutory bond
cap, has drawn no
negative comments from
rating agencies and has
been used to support
capital projects that have
also been funded partly
with cash from revenues.

•

all bonding has been clearly related to organization’s mission;

•

the current debt is within the limits of the bond cap established in statute;

•

rating agencies have made any negative comments about MTA’s debt levels
in their recent rating analyses;

•

MTA has maintained a debt service coverage ratio of 2.0 or higher;

•

debt was the sole funding source for capital improvements;

•

bond proceeds are ever used to cover operating expenses, debt service
payments or reserve maintenance requirements;

•

plans to issue bonds were adjusted as capital needs changed; and

•

there has been an established and reasonable process, with appropriate
Board involvement, for deciding when to bond and for how much.

OPEGA concluded that overall MTA’s current debt level is reasonable. It is within
the limits of the bond cap established in statute. Rating agencies have made no
negative comments about the debt levels in MTA’s recent rating analyses, and the
bond ratings have risen. Furthermore, MTA uses funds other than debt to fund
some portion of the capital and maintenance projects required by the CE.
We reviewed the details of MTA’s most recent refinancings, and found they are
generally well supported and justified in terms of cost savings or cashflow
improvements. New issuances from recent years were also reviewed and found to
be tied to capital projects that appear reasonable and related to MTA's mission.
Furthermore, we observed the Authority’s Board appears to have a strong and wellestablished process for deciding when to bond and for how much, based on a 20
year planning model. Our opinion of the soundness of this process, and the 20
year Plan, assumes the CE only recommends projects that are necessary to the
operation of the Turnpike. It was beyond the scope and resources of this review to
reassess the necessity of the CE’s recommended projects, and we have no reason to
believe any unnecessary projects have been recommended. However, we did note
that the firm currently serving as the Consulting Engineer fills a dual role for MTA
that does present some risk with regard to required projects. (See
Recommendation 2.)
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Contractor Selection and Contract Management ―――――――――――
Overview of MTA’s Current Contracts
MTA contracts for large projects such as a bridge reconstruction, and smaller
projects such as servicing office copiers. Although not legally required to award
contracts by competitive bid, the Authority uses a competitive public process most
of the time and aims to select vendors that represent "best total value." Best total
value is defined by MTA as the lowest price quoted which provides quality, service
and delivery to meet the requirements of the proposed work or usage.

MTA has 100 currently
active contracts. Some are
for large projects, like
bridge construction, and
others are for minor
service, like copier repair.

Seventy-five of MTA’s 100
contracts were
competitively bid. Of the
25 not bid, ten were
situations where the
Authority was locked into
using particular vendors.

MTA’s contracts can be divided into two categories — construction and nonconstruction — each of which are handled somewhat differently both in terms of
how contractors are selected and in the way contracts are administered once they
are established. Contracts for construction and reconstruction projects include
work specified by the Consulting Engineer. They generally follow a process
outlined in the Maine Turnpike General Specifications, which is a slightly modified
version of the Maine Department of Transportation Standard Specifications. Nonconstruction contracts follow the process described in MTA’s Purchasing Policy.
OPEGA assessed whether MTA’s processes included appropriate practices for
ensuring best value through discussions with MTA management and reviewing files
for a selected sample of the highest dollar contracts in both categories.
MTA provided OPEGA a list of 98 active contracts. In our testing of
expenditures, we identified an additional two contractual situations bringing the
total of active contracts we are aware of to 100. Two of the 100 contracts are
associated with the service plazas along the Turnpike and generated about $3.8
million in revenue for MTA in 2009. Total 2009 payments on the remaining 98
contracts were about $44.3 million.
Ten of MTA’s contracts represent situations where the Authority is locked into a
particular vendor. For example, MTA is part of the State’s employee benefit plans
and four of the contracts were for those benefits with vendors used by the State.
Four more of the ten were situations where the need for the contract and/or the
vendor has been mandated by State government. These include the contract with
the State Police for patrolling the Turnpike and three contracts associated with
alternative transportation requirements that are part of the permit MTA received to
modernize and widen the Turnpike.
Ninety contracts, then, represent situations where MTA makes choices about how
contractors will be selected. Of those 90 contracts, MTA considers 80 as having
been competitively bid, meaning the vendor was selected through a formal process
that solicited information on vendor qualifications and proposals for cost and
approach. Vendors for the other 10 contracts were selected without soliciting
qualifications or proposed costs from other vendors and were categorized by MTA
as sole source contracts.
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In our review of selected contracts, we determined that five of the contracts MTA
had categorized as competitively bid were effectively sole source contracts. There
was either no evidence of a competitive bidding process having ever occurred or
the bidding was long ago with the contract having been continued with the same
vendor since then. Table 7 summarizes the number of MTA contracts OPEGA is
aware of by type and contractor selection method.
Table 7. Summary of MTA’s 2009 Contracts by Type and Contractor Selection Method
Competitively Bid
Not Biddable
Sole Sourced
Construction
20
0
0
Non-Construction - Expense
55
10
13
Non-Construction - Revenue
0
0
2
Total – All Types of Contracts
75
10
15

Total
20
78
2
100

Construction Contract Processes
All of MTA’s 20
construction contracts
were competitively bid
using a RFP process.
Under that process, bids
are evaluated based on
projects specs. The lowest
bid from a pre-qualified
contractor that meets
those specs is generally
selected.

Active construction
contracts are monitored by
MTA’s Engineering
Department. Engineering
staff review and approve
all construction
documents, including
monthly invoices, and
conduct regular project
meetings to discuss
progress, safety,
scheduling and traffic
control.

MTA has 20 construction contracts and all are established through a competitive
bidding process. In fact, Turnpike construction and reconstruction work must
follow the procedures required for competitive sealed bids as outlined in MTA’s
General Specifications. The process starts when a construction or reconstruction
project need is identified in the CE’s annual report and incorporated into MTA’s
Plan.
Plans and contract documents are drawn up using the MaineDOT Specifications as
modified by MTA’s Engineering Department. For larger projects, a Request For
Proposal (RFP) is written and a public invitation to bid is advertised in all major
local newspapers. Bids are typically solicited directly from several pre-qualified
contractors on smaller dollar projects. A pre-bid conference is held to address any
bidder questions prior to the bid submission deadline.
Bids are evaluated based on the project specifications. The lowest bid proposal
that meets the required specifications is generally selected. MTA’s Board approves
all major construction and reconstruction projects; however it will occasionally
authorize the Executive Director to make an award if there are issues connected to
the timing of a project. MTA’s Purchasing Department explained that when
several factors other than price are important to the selection decision, a more
formalized scoring process may be used. This is done rarely, for example during
the selection of architectural services for MTA’s administration building.
Once established, construction contracts are overseen by MTA’s Engineering
Department. Although there is no formal, written procedure detailing contract
administration responsibilities, MTA describes a standard process for construction
contracts that includes appropriate monitoring and approvals. All projects are
assigned to either the MTA Deputy Director of Engineering & Building
Maintenance or the MTA Project Administrator for management and coordination.
During the bid phase, a resident engineer and construction inspectors are also
assigned to the project.
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MTA engineering staff reviews and approves all construction documents. The
inspector works with a project engineer, contractor, and any consultants hired for
quality control testing. Monthly invoices from the contractor are reviewed and
approved - first by the inspector, and then by either the Deputy Engineer or
Project Administrator. Weekly or bi-weekly on-site project meetings are held to
discuss various construction issues such as schedule, safety, progress, change orders
and traffic control. Any contractor claims or disputes are settled based on a
decision matrix developed during the pre-construction meeting.
MTA’s Board receives periodic status updates on significant projects. Board
approval is required for final payment and to release all retainage 8 upon successful
project completion.
Non-Construction Contracts Processes
Non-construction contracts
may be for goods or
services. Fifty-five of MTA’s
non-construction contracts
were competitively bid
using procedures detailed
in the Purchasing Policy.
Under this process, bids
are solicited, generally by
RFP, then evaluated for
“best total value”.
Contracts of particularly
high cost may be awarded
by the MTA Board.

Non-construction contracts are for goods or services not associated with specific
construction or reconstruction projects. MTA has 80 of these, 10 of which
represent situations where MTA is locked into a particular vendor as previously
described. The majority of the remaining 70 have been established through a
competitive process. Fifteen of the 70, including the two revenue generating
contracts, are sole source arrangements.
MTA’s Purchasing Policy describes the process for competitively selecting vendors
to supply non-construction goods and services. A purchasing need is identified by
MTA staff and approved by a manager. An approved purchase requisition is sent
to MTA’s Department of Purchasing. Vendors who should receive proposals are
selected by Purchasing which also determines which type of bid request is
appropriate for the situation. There are three types of bid request processes:
•

formal sealed bids if the expected cost is greater than $5,000 (or when
MTA's interests will be best served);

•

requests for quotations if cost is expected to be less than $5,000; or

•

fax or telephone quotations for low value items, urgent purchases, or
otherwise at MTA’s discretion.

Request for Proposal specifications and the contract may be developed by either a
manager or by Purchasing, as deemed appropriate. After soliciting bids, but before
they are due, a pre-bid conference may be held to clarify the scope of work for
certain services, such as landscaping or snow removal.
Active non-construction
contracts are monitored by
the responsible MTA
department in the manner
that seems appropriate to
the individual contract.

The Department of Purchasing, along with the appropriate manager, reviews the
bids or quotes and determines to whom the award will be made based on "best
total value". If the contract is particularly significant, such as the annual salt
contract, the MTA Board may award the contract. According to the Purchasing
Department, awards go to the lowest bid proposals that meet the specifications.

8 Although invoices are paid as a construction project progresses, 7.5% of the total cost
(1.5% when project is substantially complete) is retained until the project is complete and
the MTA Board approves the final payment.
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MTA’s Purchasing Policy does not describe any process for selecting vendors
without a competitive process. MTA also has no other formal policy to guide
when sole sourced contracts are appropriate, or how they should be justified.
Once established, non-construction contracts are administered and monitored by
the appropriate department within MTA, in whatever manner is deemed most
appropriate for the individual contract. MTA’s Purchasing Policy outlines
responsibilities for monitoring quality, quantity and prices of goods purchased and
received. However, there are no formal, written procedures describing
responsibilities for administering contracts and monitoring contractor performance
related to contracts for services.
Results of Contract File Review
Construction Contracts

OPEGA’s review of 10
contracts for construction
services found practices
for selecting those
contractors and
monitoring the contracts
adequate to ensure MTA
receives best value.

OPEGA reviewed contract and invoice documentation for 10 of the 20
construction contracts, representing 2009 payments of about $12.4 million. We
found that MTA’s policies, procedures and processes for selecting contractors and
administering contracts are adequate to ensure that MTA receives best value for
contracted construction services.
The bid information is detailed and accessible to bidders. There is a reasonable
pre-qualification process in place using MaineDOT's pre-qualified vendor list for
construction and reconstruction projects. MTA has written policies that describe
how the bid process should be handled. Construction contract files are easily
located and complete. We also observed evidence that the standard contract
administration and management process described to us is consistently adhered to.
Non-Construction Contracts
OPEGA also reviewed contract and invoice documentation for 13 nonconstruction contracts where the vendor was not pre-determined by a government
mandate or other situation. MTA’s 2009 payments associated with these 13
contracts totaled approximately $12.5 million. We found that these contracts were
generally not as formal as construction contracts and took a variety of forms.
Some were detailed contracts, but others were just rate sheet agreements or letters
accepting a low bid.

OPEGA’s review of 13 nonconstruction contracts
revealed that practices for
purchasing goods
generally included
expected controls for
ensuring best value.
However, practices for
purchases of services
were generally less robust.

Four of the contracts reviewed were for procurement of goods. Documentation in
the files showed that the expected controls for ensuring best value, as described in
MTA’s Purchasing Manual, were usually performed. These controls include
competitive selection, inspection of goods received, comparison of quantity and
price received to what was ordered, and approval of the invoice by a knowledgeable
employee.
Processes and practices for ensuring best value were, however, not as robust for
the nine services contracts we reviewed. The services covered by eight of these
contracts had not been bid recently or, in a few cases, ever. There was no written
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justification for these sole source arrangements, although MTA management did
provide explanations for them. Based on these explanations, two of the contracts
do not appear to be good candidates for competitive bidding because of the
particular conditions under which these services are being procured. The other six,
though, were services that could be competitively bid.
We also found that some of the professional services contracts did not reflect work
currently being performed or current prices being charged. For example, we noted
that neither MTA’s sole sourced contract for engineering services nor its sole
sourced contract for legal services provided sufficient detail on the scope of
services or the duration of the contractual relationship. These contracts were also
less formal than others reviewed and were out of date in some aspects, such as
travel reimbursement rates for contractor staff.
OPEGA also noted the monitoring of work performed under services contracts
was less robust than that of other contracts. Invoices for services contracts were
properly approved by individuals in a position to be knowledgeable about the
contractors work. However, enhanced processes for monitoring the quality of
services would reduce the risk that MTA does not receive the full service it pays
for, and may be worth considering given that some non-construction service
contracts are high value.
Lastly, we observed that original, signed versions of non-construction contracts,
particularly those for professional services, were not maintained in a central
location. Rather they were in the possession of whichever MTA staff person was
most involved with the vendor. Consequently, these documents are not readily
accessible to all who may need them. The lack of centralization may also explain
why OPEGA’s expenditure testing found contract-type agreements that MTA had
not included on its contract list
For more discussion on contract issues and OPEGA’s recommendations, see
Recommendations 3 and 4.

Oversight and Governance ――――――――――――――――――――――――
Entities Involved in Overseeing the Maine Turnpike Authority
MTA Board members are
appointed by the Governor
and confirmed by the
Legislature. Besides the
Board, other entities with
oversight of MTA include
the Legislature,
MaineDOT, the Bond
Trustee and the Consulting
Engineer.

In accordance with statute, the members of the Authority are appointed by the
Governor, subject to review and confirmation by the Legislature. The Governor
also designates one of the appointed members as Chair of the Authority.
Accordingly, the Governor has significant influence over the composition of the
Authority.
For the purposes of this review, however, OPEGA considered oversight entities to
be any entity outside management with direct influence over the Maine Turnpike
Authority's decisions, actions, operations or structure. Based on this definition, we
determined the following entities had a prescribed oversight role assigned in either
statute or the Bond Resolution:
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•
•
•
•
•

Maine Turnpike Authority Board;
Maine State Legislature;
Maine Department of Transportation;
Bond Trustee; and
Consulting Engineering.

As depicted in Figure 2, each of these oversight entities fills a different role with
respect to the MTA. Taken together they represent a relatively comprehensive
governance structure if all of them are functioning effectively. OPEGA observed
that all the entities appear to have appropriate and adequate authority to fulfill their
roles, although effectiveness could be impacted by the characteristics, perspectives
and priorities of the individuals representing them.

OVERSIGHT ENTITIES

Figure 2. Entities Involved in Oversight of the Maine Turnpike Authority
Legislature

MaineDOT

Consulting Engineer

Bond Trustee

Confirms Governor’s
appointments to MTA
Board

Participates as an exofficio member in all
oversight carried out
by the MTA Board

Inspects the turnpike
and suggests capital
and maintenance
needs to keep it in
good condition as
required by the bond
resolution

Monitors fund
balances to ensure
funding is adequate
to make principal and
interest payments

Reviews and
approves operating
budget

Approves MTA
construction contracts

MAINE TURNPIKE AUTHORITY BOARD

Approves operating budget
Approves long term capital plan
Oversees general management and personnel

MAINE TURNPIKE AUTHORITY STAFF
The Maine Turnpike Authority Board

The MTA Board provides
policy direction, contract
approval, budgetary
review, financial oversight,
capital project approval
and general management
direction to MTA staff.

The Authority Board provides policy direction, contractual approval, budgetary
review and approval, financial oversight, approval of capital projects, and general
direction to the MTA’s operating staff in addition to overseeing compliance with
MTA’s Bond Resolution and all relevant statutes. The Board has three
subcommittees that provide more detailed oversight in the specific areas:
•

The Finance and Audit Subcommittee – oversees financial and related
policies and procedures to ensure compliance with MTA objectives and
other best practices; reviews results of independent audits; works with Long
Range Planning Subcommittee to determine whether capital projects
require new bond issuances; and reviews annual budget in detail before
recommending it to the full Board.
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The MTA Board currently
has no vacant seats and
holds formal meetings
usually once or twice a
month. The Board has
three subcommittees
actively engaged in
oversight of specific
segments of MTA’s
business.

•

The Long Range Planning Subcommittee – reviews MTA projects that
involve long planning timeframes or have potential for major community
impacts; reviews the proposed 20 year Plan and its supporting detail to
develop a list of capital projects prioritized according to MTA’s financial
planning goals; and works with the Finance and Audit Subcommittee to
determine whether the capital plan requires new bond issuances.

•

The Personnel Subcommittee – reviews and approves collective bargaining
agreements and determines adjustments to compensation, including cost of
living adjustments and pay scales. This subcommittee also reviews MTA’s
human resource practices and policies, and oversees the development or
revision of policies, to ensure compliance and consistency with MTA’s
objectives and other best practices.

The MTA Board currently has no vacant seats and is quite active. They hold
formal meetings as necessary—usually once or twice a month—and individual
Board members stop by the MTA offices more often to attend subcommittee
meetings, sign contracts or other documents, or to talk with MTA management
about specific concerns, questions, or ideas they may have about the Authority’s
finances or capital projects.
The Maine State Legislature
Title 23 §§1961-1983 provide for legislative oversight of the Maine Turnpike
Authority in a number of ways:

The Legislature oversees
MTA by approving the
agency’s operating budget,
setting its bond cap,
confirming gubernatorial
appointments to the Board
and considering any
proposed legislation
affecting MTA. The Joint
Standing Committee on
Transportation is the
legislative entity with the
most direct oversight of
MTA.

•

Each year the Legislature votes to approve MTA’s operating budget after
the Transportation Committee has reviewed the budget in detail and
reported it out in a bill.

•

The Legislature sets the amount of MTA's bond cap in statute.

•

The Transportation Committee, and then the full Legislature, reviews and
confirms the Governor's appointments to the MTA Board.

•

The Transportation Committee, and then the full Legislature, reviews and
considers any proposed legislation pertaining to the MTA.

The Legislature’s Joint Standing Committee on Transportation is the legislative
entity with the most direct oversight of the Maine Turnpike Authority. The
Committee has the opportunity, during Committee meetings, to ask questions of
MTA’s management about any of the Authority’s significant decisions, such as
decisions affecting timelines for capital projects, plans for adjustments to tolls, or
plans to issue new bonds.
The Transportation Committee assigns a subcommittee of its members to review
and scrutinize the detail of MTA’s operating budget before it goes to the full
Committee for consideration. OPEGA reviewed the materials MTA provides as
part of the operating budget review process and noted that they contain substantial
detail on MTA’s budgeted and actual expenses. However, we also found that the
operating budget submitted for review, and ultimately legislative approval, does not
include all of MTA’s operating expenses. (See Recommendation 5.)
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MTA is also subject to review by the Legislature under the Government Evaluation
Act (GEA) as required by 3 MRSA §§951– 963. The Authority’s last GEA review
was conducted by the Transportation Committee in 2005. As part of this process,
MTA is required to submit a report containing a variety of information about its
activities, finances and performance. OPEGA observed that MTA’s 2005 GEA
report was very well done and included all the information required by the GEA
statute.
The Maine Department of Transportation

MaineDOT must approve
all MTA construction
contracts. In addition, the
MaineDOT Commissioner,
or his designee, is a full
member of the MTA Board
and, therefore, a full
participant in all Board
oversight activities.

The Maine Department of Transportation has an interesting and unique oversight
role with respect to MTA. Statute dictates MaineDOT’s commissioner is an exofficio member on the Board. The Commissioner may appoint a designee, and
currently the Deputy Commissioner fills this role. As a full member of the MTA
Board, MaineDOT, through its Deputy Commissioner, has a say in all of the
Authority’s most significant long term planning, financial management, and capital
projects. MaineDOT’s Deputy Commissioner is also currently a member of the
Board's Long Term Planning Subcommittee.
In addition to a seat on MTA’s Board, statute also gives MaineDOT approval
authority over some specific MTA contracts. Title 23 §1966.2 requires the
MaineDOT to approve all contracts and agreements relating to the construction or
reconstruction of the Turnpike, and the construction or reconstruction of
connecting tunnels and bridges, overpasses, underpasses, interchanges and toll
facilities. According to MTA, the Authority generally expects MaineDOT to
question whether the applicable project uses MaineDOT specifications, is within
projected budget and has been part of the regular planning process.
The Trustee
There are three primary parties involved in the Maine Turnpike Authority’s bond
instruments:

As MTA’s Bond Trustee,
Bangor Savings Bank is
responsible for
communicating pertinent
information to
bondholders, and ensuring
MTA’s accounts are
adequately funded to
cover all principal and
interest payments to
bondholders.

•

the grantor – MTA;

•

the beneficiaries – bond holders;

•

the trustee – currently Bangor Savings Bank.

Bangor Savings Bank has been the corporate trustee for MTA revenue bonds since
August 2006. This is an administrative function carried out by the Fiduciary
Department of the bank. The representatives of Bangor Savings Bank that
OPEGA spoke with explained that the specifics of the Bank’s role as Trustee are
governed by MTA’s Bond Resolution, and where not defined in the Resolution, by
general fiduciary laws. The Trustee’s tasks include acting as the conduit for any
information that needs to be disseminated to the public and making principale and
interest payments to the bondholders in accordance with due dates. They are also
involved in the creation of new bonds and redemption or call of existing bonds.
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The Trustee's primary focus is whether the principal and interest payments on the
Bonds are paid on time. MTA is required to fund the accounts from which these
payments are made on the 15th of each month. Interest payments are made on
January 1st and July 1st of each year. The annual principal payment is made on July
1 of each year. The Trustee monitors the appropriate accounts to be sure they are
funded adequately and then makes the payments to the Depository Trust Company
which disburses the funds to each bondholder.
In addition, the Trustee releases funds to cover MTA’s capital and operating
expenses after receiving certification from MTA of the need for the funds. MTA
can not access their funds without the Trustee’s release. The Trustee does not
generally question the appropriateness of the expenditures before releasing the
funds. Instead it relies on a formal certification by MTA’s management as adequate
evidence that the funds are needed for budgeted expenditures.
The Trustee receives certain information and reports from MTA as required by the
Bond Resolution, including financial statements and a copy of the Consulting
Engineer’s annual report. The Trustee does not generally interact with other
entities involved with MTA or get involved in the MTA’s operations or how the
Authority is spending its funds. However, the Trustee is expected to interject as
needed to protect bondholders, including bringing suit if necessary.
The Consulting Engineer
MTA’s Consulting Engineer
must assess the turnpike
annually and report on the
road’s condition and
required maintenance.
The CE must also
recommend the amount of
insurance MTA needs to
carry and the amount that
MTA must deposit in the
Reserve Maintenance
Account each year.

Sections 805 and 806 of MTA’s Bond Resolution describe the requirements and
duties of the Consulting Engineer. The MTA must employ an independent
engineer or engineering firm or corporation having a nationwide and favorable
reputation for skill and experience in such work as its CE. The CE, in turn, must
make an inspection at least once a year of the Turnpike and submit a report of
findings to the Trustee and the Authority by October first of each year. This
report must include the CE’s:
a) findings as to whether the Turnpike has been maintained in good repair,
working order and condition;
b) advice and recommendations as to the proper maintenance, repair and
operation of the Turnpike during the next fiscal year and an estimate of the
amount of money necessary for such purposes;
c) advice and recommendations as to the insurance to be carried under the
provisions of Section 807 of the Bond Resolution; and
d) recommendations as to the amount that should be deposited during the
next fiscal year to the Reserve Maintenance Fund.
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Since the 1940’s, HNTB
has been the MTA’s
Consulting Engineer. This
long term relationship has
benefits, but presents
some risks as HNTB has
also been MTA’s primary
contractor for project
management and
engineering.

MTA has contracted with Howard, Needles, Tammen & Bergendoff (HNTB) as its
CE since the 1940’s and has never worked with any other CE. HNTB also serves
as the MTA’s general engineering services firm. The current arrangement provides
benefits with regard to efficiency and depth of knowledge of MTA’s system. MTA
also explained that the long term relationship is seen as a strength by bond rating
agencies. We believe, however, that the nature of the relationship between HNTB
and MTA has potential to impact HNTB’s independence, and thus effectiveness, in
fulfilling the Consulting Engineer’s role representing bondholders’ interests. (See
Recommendation 2.)
Comparing MTA’s Legislative Oversight to Other States’
OPEGA selected four tolling authorities from other states to compare their
legislative oversight with MTA’s. These four were selected because they are most
comparable to MTA in type of asset and region, and MTA agreed they were the
best comparables. They are the New York Thruway Authority, the New Jersey
Turnpike Authority, the New Hampshire Turnpike Bureau and the Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission. The New Hampshire Turnpike Bureau is part of New
Hampshire’s Department of Transportation (NHDOT). The other three tolling
authorities are independent like MTA.
OPEGA reviewed the sections of statute from each state pertaining to governance
and legislative oversight of the tolling authority. We noted that MTA has similar
legislative oversight to three of the four other state turnpikes although it is the only
independent tolling authority we reviewed that has its operating budget approved
by the Legislature. Our comparison is summarized in Table 8.

Table 8. Comparison of Legislative Oversight in Five Northeastern States

BUDGET

Maine Turnpike
Authority

New Hampshire
Turnpike Bureau

X

X*

CAPITAL PLANNING

X*

TOLL CHANGES

X

BOND ISSUANCE OR
BOND CAPS

X**

X

REVIEW GOVERNOR
APPOINTMENTS TO
AUTHORITY

X

N/A

New Jersey
Turnpike
Authority

X

Pennsylvania
Turnpike
Commission

New York
Thruway Authority

X

X**

X

X

*Since New Hampshire's Turnpike is part of NHDOT, the Legislature implicitly approves toll rates and bond
issuances when approving the NHDOT budget and capital plan.
**These states had bond caps but no legislative involvement in bond issuance.
Source: State statutes as compiled by the Law and Legislative Reference Library.
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OPEGA compared the MTA
to four other tolling
entities and found their
oversight was generally
comparable. However, of
the four, MTA is the only
independent Authority with
its operating budget
subject to legislative
approval.

Similar to Maine’s, each of the other authorities, with the exception of New
Hampshire, has an independent board whose members are appointed by the
Governor with the advice and consent of at least one branch of the legislature.
There is also usually a close relationship between the Commissioner of
Transportation for the state and the authority board with commissioners or their
designee's serving on the board as is the case in Maine. In addition, most states,
except New Jersey, had their turnpike authority bond caps set by the legislature in
statute. Some legislatures had adopted statutory language requiring their turnpike
authorities to competitively bid contracts for construction projects. MTA is subject
to similar requirements by virtue of the fact that MaineDOT must approve
construction contracts.

MTA’s Expenditures ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
Expectations for Use of Toll Revenue
Title 23 §1974 limits the uses of toll revenues, and all other revenues derived from
Turnpike operations, to the following purposes:
A. Maintenance, repair and operation of the Turnpike and the establishment of
related reserves required or permitted by the resolutions authorizing the
issuance of bonds or by the trust indentures relating to those bonds.
B. Payment of the cost of any debt incurred by the Authority, including, but not
limited to, interest and principal payments on issued bonds and payments into
any required sinking funds.
Title 23 §1974 defines the
allowable uses for MTA’s
revenues. The uses
specified in statute are
consistent with those in
the Bond Resolution.

C. Construction or reconstruction to improve the Turnpike to meet greater
traffic demands or improve safety of operation, including related necessary
and authorized reserves.
D. Maintenance, construction or reconstruction of access roads and interchanges,
or portions thereof.
E. Payments to reserve or sinking funds established to meet anticipated future
costs of constructing or reconstructing designated interchanges or portions
thereof, or to accomplish other designated purposes for which the Authority
is authorized to issue bonds.
F. Repayment to the federal government for grants or loans that were used in
connection with the construction or reconstruction of any portion of the
Turnpike or of any interconnecting access roads, but only to the extent that
the repayment is required in order for the Authority to maintain or establish
tolls on the Turnpike.
G. Payment or repayment to the federal government or any agency of the federal
government of any charges, taxes or other payments required by law in
connection with the construction, reconstruction or operation of the Turnpike
or the financing or refinancing of the Turnpike or any part of the Turnpike.
These uses are consistent with the uses allowed in the Bond Resolution for the
various accounts established by the Resolution – described on pages 20 and 21 that receive monies from toll and other operating revenue.
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What MTA Spends Its Toll Revenue On
MTA uses its toll revenue for three general purposes:
• operating expenses, including routine maintenance;
• principal and interest payments for issued bonds, and required reserves; and
• repair, reconstruction or construction projects for maintenance and capital
improvement.
Table 9 gives the revenue dollars spent in each category for 2005 – 2009.
Table 9. Uses of MTA Toll Revenue 2005 – 2009 (in thousands, rounded to nearest thousand)
Category
2005
2006
2007
2008
Revenue
$ 84,068
$ 86,819
$ 87,804
$ 85,821
Operating Expenses
$ 32,460
$ 35,989
$ 37,466
Principal, Interest & Reserves for Debt
$ 22,232
$ 23,862
$ 26,516
Construction & Reconstruction Projects
$ 20,899
$ 26,928
$ 25,639
Total Uses
$ 75,670
$ 86,778
$ 89,621
Source: MTA’s Source and Application Fund Report provided annually to MaineDOT

Roughly 28% of MTA’s toll
revenue was spent on
construction and
reconstruction in the
period 2005 - 2009.
Another 40% was spent on
operating expenses.

$
$
$
$

37,794
28,566
27,383
93,742

2009
$ 105,707
$
$
$
$

38,110
29,277
23,507
90,894

Roughly 28% of MTA’s toll revenue was spent on construction and reconstruction
projects in the period 2005 - 2009. MTA strives to repave the entire 109 miles of
the Turnpike every 12-15 years, so paving projects are ongoing nearly every paving
season. In addition, MTA is responsible for the maintenance and repair of
approximately 175
Public information on MTA’s finances can be found:
bridges and overpasses,
• in MTA’s Annual Reports which contain the annual
50 of which will need
independent auditor’s report and MTA’s financial
rehabilitation within the
statements (available on MTA’s website),
next 10 years. While
•
in MTA’s 2005 Government Evaluation Act Report
bond proceeds are used
(available in the Maine State Law and Legislative
for capital projects,
Reference Library);
MTA tries to cover a
• on various bond information websites, including DAC
substantial portion of
Bond and EMMA (Electronic Municipal Market
the costs of those
Access); and
projects using toll
• in documents submitted to the Legislature’s Joint
revenue.
Standing Committee on Transportation.
Operating expenses
include salaries, wages and benefits, employee training and recognition,
maintenance supplies, the State Police Troop G budget, utilities, and other typical
day to day expenses. This category also includes routine maintenance on the
Turnpike, i.e. plowing, sanding and mowing. MTA spent about 40% of toll
revenue on operating expenses for the period 2005 - 2009. Both the operating
expenses and construction project categories may also include unplanned
expenditures, such as repair of damage to an overpass or bridge struck by a vehicle.
MTA often discusses its use of toll and other operating revenues in terms of the
funds and accounts from which it funds those expenditures. As described on page
20, those funds and accounts are established by the Bond Resolution and are
arranged in a “bucket” system that serves to prioritize the use of MTA’s revenues.
Figure 3 illustrates how revenue flows through those accounts in order of priority
and what use categories each account typically funds.
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Figure 3. Uses of MTA’s Operating Revenue and the Bond Resolution Accounts

Funds Established
Under Current MTA
Bond Resolution

Toll and
Concession
Revenue

Revenue Uses
Revenue Fund
Operating Expenses including
Routine Maintenance (e.g.
plowing, sanding, mowing)
Debt Service Fund
Principal and Interest
Payments on Revenue Bonds
Debt Service Reserve Fund
Required Res erves for Debt –
Revenue Bonds
Reserve Maintenance Fund

Repair, Reconstruction and
Construction Projects
General Reserve Fund
I mprovement Account (1)
Emergencies and Contingencies
(i.e. unexpected, unbudgeted
expenses)

I nterc hange Account (2)
MaineDOT Provision Account
Subordinated Debt Servic e Fund

Subordinated Bonds
(Spec ial Obligation Bonds for
MaineDOT)

Subordinated Debt Servic e
Reserve Fund

Required Res erves for Debt
- Subordinated Bonds
Capital Fund
Any Other Lawful Purpose

Legend

Bond
Proceeds

Solid arrows – represent what MTA typically uses each fund for..
Dashed arrows – repres ent other uses for that fund allowed by t he Bond
Resolution if cert ain situat ions and/or conditions exist.
(1)

Improvement Account can be used to fill shortfalls in higher accounts.
To do this it must be transferred to the Revenue Fund and t hen flow
into the account with the shortfall.

(2)

Projects funded by the Interchange Account are done in c oordination
with MaineDOT.
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Analysis of MTA’s Operating Expenses
From an accounting perspective, an organization’s operating expenses are typically
those expenses necessary for the normal day-to-day running of a business or
income-producing property. MTA’s Bond
Typical operating expenses for an
Resolution similarly defines operating
organization include:
expenses as “the Authority's reasonable and
• salaries, wages and benefits
necessary current expenses of maintenance, repair
• rent
and operation of the Turnpike…” . It further
• equipment and fixtures
specifies that operating expenses shall
• maintenance and repairs, such
as snow and trash removal,
include, without limitation, the following
janitorial service, pest control,
expenses, to the extent they are “properly and
and lawn care
directly attributable to the operation of the
• marketing and advertising
Turnpike, …”:
• office expenses
• all ordinary and usual expenses of
• supplies
maintenance, repair and operation,
• taxes and legal fees
• telephone and utilities
which may include expenses not
• insurance
annually recurring;
• travel and vehicle expenses
• premiums for insurance;
• professional services, such as
accountants, attorneys, and
• all administrative and engineering
payroll providers
expenses relating to maintenance,
repair and operation of the
Turnpike; and
• all fees and expenses required to be paid by the Authority under the
provisions of the Resolution or by law.
OPEGA analyzed
expenditures coded to
MTA’s various operating
expense accounts in 2005
- 2009. In addition to
operating expenses, these
expenditures include the
costs of construction
projects paid for with
revenue. The
expenditures we analyzed
averaged $61 million
annually and 72.8% were
for salaries, benefits and
contractual services.

Operating expenses, according to the Resolution’s definition, shall not include any
reserves for extraordinary maintenance or repair, any costs or expenses for new
construction, any allowance for depreciation, or any deposits or transfers to the
credit of the other accounts established under the Bond Resolution, including the
Reserve Maintenance Fund.
OPEGA analyzed expenditures coded to MTA’s operating expense accounts for
2005 – 2009. These expenditures averaged about $61.2 million annually and
included both operating expenses and construction project uses shown in Table 9.
Appendix D contains detail by expense category for each year.
Table 10 shows the 30 expense categories that contain approximately 97% of
MTA’s operating expenses for the period 2005 - 2009 9 . Approximately 73% of
those expenditures have been for salaries, employee benefits and contractual
services. Of the 30 expense categories, 18 had overall increases or decreases of
25% or more from 2005 to 2009.

The expenses categories are assigned by MTA staff under MTA’s current detailed account
structure as part of the accounting process. OPEGA has combined some similar expense
categories for the purposes of our analysis.

9
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Table 10. MTA Expense Categories Comprising 97% of Total Operating Expenses for Period 2005 - 2009
Expense Category

Total $
2005 - 2009

% of 5 yr
Total

2005
$ Spent

2009
$ Spent

% Change
over 5 yrs

Salaries
$104,832,997
34.2%
$19,212,872 $22,493,744
17.1%
Contractual Services
$75,943,643
24.8%
$11,375,641 $13,370,412
17.5%
Employee Benefits
$42,263,438
13.8%
$7,333,513
$9,973,406
36.0%
Consulting Engineering Fees & Exp.
$14,772,341
4.8%
$3,048,915
$2,319,622
-23.9%
Work Performed By Others
$13,924,373
4.5%
$3,282,610
$2,079,445
-36.7%
Telephone
$4,521,762
1.5%
$942,052
$710,840
-24.5%
Salt & Calcium Chloride
$4,040,111
1.3%
$853,818
$486,266
-43.0%
Comprehensive Gen. Liability
$3,316,909
1.1%
$892,095
$471,802
-47.1%
Workers Compensation
$3,294,873
1.1%
$309,449
$986,615
218.8%
Electricity
$2,965,070
1.0%
$493,238
$598,190
21.3%
Reg. & Spec. Counsel Fees & Exp.
$2,585,408
0.8%
$319,243
$455,926
42.8%
Office Machines & Equip. Pur/Rent
$2,377,744
0.8%
$344,103
$496,514
44.3%
Fuel For Heating
$1,997,305
0.7%
$340,333
$519,106
52.5%
Snowplowing Equipment
$1,668,897
0.5%
$524,282
$255,750
-51.2%
Money Transport Services
$1,593,876
0.5%
$302,455
$334,223
10.5%
Diesel Oil Equipment Maintenance
$1,586,882
0.5%
$292,155
$256,166
-12.3%
Trustee's Fees
$1,542,919
0.5%
$190,082
$352,459
85.4%
Truck Purchases
$1,500,397
0.5%
$433,049
$23,150
-94.7%
Gas Equipment Maintenance
$1,348,595
0.4%
$224,361
$218,477
-2.6%
Postage & Shipping
$1,183,636
0.4%
$225,706
$317,241
40.6%
Travel & Subsistence
$1,104,402
0.4%
$411,847
$132,441
-67.8%
Printing
$1,093,359
0.4%
$253,355
$249,424
-1.6%
Acct. Mach Supplies & Maintenance
$1,049,545
0.3%
$319,686
$255,873
-20.0%
Paint Products
$1,011,570
0.3%
$154,636
$237,017
53.3%
Informational Services
$985,628
0.3%
$146,907
$199,331
35.7%
Indemnification Insurance
$970,198
0.3%
$61,520
$331,355
438.6%
Rent: Land/Buildings
$967,406
0.3%
$194,023
$177,636
-8.4%
Truck Parts, Accessories & Repair
$862,004
0.3%
$187,797
$197,361
5.1%
Auto Purchases
$697,457
0.2%
$41,440
$0
-100.0%
Organization Fee
$629,603
0.2%
$164,023
$102,354
-37.6%
Source: Calculated by OPEGA from data in expense file provided by MTA. Full analysis in Appendix D.

Our full analysis shows that MTA’s total operating expenses have increased
15.5% over the five year period. Table 11 shows the percentage changes from
year to year. The amount of change between years is inconsistent in part
because costs for construction
and reconstruction projects
Table 11. Annual % Change in Operating Expense
vary each year depending on
Total Operating
% Chg From
the nature and timing of
Expense
Prior Year
Year
projects. Similarly, costs of
2005
$53,359,195.86
Turnpike maintenance like
2006
$62,916,662.80
17.9%
plowing and sanding are
2007
$63,104,363.39
0.3%
impacted by weather
2008
$65,241,802.13
3.4%
conditions and vary annually.
2009
$61,616,332.14
-5.6%
Total 5 Yr. Period
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Defining Reasonableness
MTA defines reasonable expenditures as those that are legal, consistent with the
MTA's mission and goals, within approved budgetary limits, and authorized for
payment. This definition provides fairly wide latitude for assessing the
reasonableness of operating expenditures.
The Legislature and the Authority’s Board play a role in determining the
reasonableness of MTA’s operating expenses via their approval of the Authority’s
operating budget. In fact, both
statute and the Bond Resolution
Excerpt of 23 MRSA §1961-6
require that MTA’s operating
On or before January 31st of each year, the Authority shall present to each
regular session of the Legislature for its approval a budget for the operating
expenses in any year not exceed
expenses of the Authority for the calendar year that begins after the
the approved budget. Under 23
adjournment of that regular session…….. The Authority may only pay operating
MRSA §1961-6, the Authority may
expenses in accordance with allocations approved by the Legislature or as
only pay operating expenses in
necessary to satisfy the requirements of any resolution authorizing bonds of
accordance with allocations
the Authority.
approved by the Legislature or as
Excerpt of Section 803(e) from MTA’s Current Bond Resolution
necessary to satisfy the
The Authority covenants that the Operating Expenses incurred in any Fiscal
requirements of any resolution
Year will not exceed the reasonable and necessary amount thereof, and that it
authorizing bonds of the
will not expend any amount or incur any obligations for maintenance, repair
Authority. Similarly, Section 803
and operation in excess of the amounts provided for Operating Expenses in the
of the Bond Resolution requires
Annual Budget, except as provided in Section 504 hereof and except amounts
payable from the Reserve Maintenance Fund and the General Reserve Fund.
the Authority to adopt a budget
each year that must be filed with
the Trustee. It further provides that the Authority will not incur operating
expenses that exceed what is provided for in the annual budget unless those
expenses are paid from funds other than the Revenue Fund.

The Legislature receives
detailed information about
the operating expenses
paid from MTA’s Revenue
Fund. However, the budget
the Legislature approves
does not include expenses
paid from the Reserve
Maintenance Fund, which
represent roughly 40% of
MTA’s total annual
operating costs.

The Legislature’s Transportation Committee receives detailed information related
to the operating budget MTA submits for the Legislature’s approval. This
information includes budgeted versus actual expenses by expense category for
several previous years, as well as detailed salary and wages by position. The Board
also receives this detailed information and likely is provided more as it is involved
in making decisions about all of MTA’s finances. OPEGA noted several issues,
however, that interfere with the Legislature’s ability to have a complete picture of
what it is costing to operate the Authority, to understand all expenses and/or judge
their reasonableness. See Recommendation 5.
The primary issue is that the operating budget submitted to the Legislature for
approval does not include all of MTA’s operating expenses. In our analysis of
operating expenses for 2005 – 2009, we noted that on average about 40.6% of
MTA’s operating expenses each year have been paid for from MTA’s Reserve
Maintenance Fund. These expenses are not included in MTA’s operating budget.
Table 12 and Figure 4 show the breakdown of expenses funded from the Revenue
Fund versus the Reserve Maintenance Fund by year.
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MTA’s Reserve
Maintenance Fund pays
for 50% or more of costs
such as insurances, safety
equipment, travel and
subsistence, legal counsel
fees and printing, among
others.

All of MTA’s expenses for insurance, i.e. worker’s compensation and liability, are
paid for from the Reserve Maintenance Fund. Other categories typically
considered operating expenses that have been funded 50% or more from the
Reserve Maintenance Fund in the period 2005 – 2009 include:
• Truck and Auto Purchases
• Postage
• Office Machines and
• Snowplowing Equipment
Equipment (Purchase, Rent
• Printing
and Maintenance)
• Organization Fees and Dues
• Safety Equipment
• Electrical Supplies
• Rent
• Employee Training
• Informational Services
• Travel and Subsistence
• Legal Counsel Fees
• Telephone

Table 12. Operating Expenses Funded by Revenue and Reserve Maintenance Funds
Funded by Revenue Fund
Funded by Res Maint Fund
Year
Total Oper Exp
RF $
% of Total
RMF $
% of Total
2005
$53,359,196
$32,459,653
60.8%
$20,899,542
39.2%
2006
$62,916,663
$35,988,601
57.2%
$26,928,061
42.8%
2007
$63,104,363
$37,465,689
59.4%
$25,638,675
40.6%
2008
$65,241,802
$37,793,531
57.9%
$27,448,271
42.1%
2009
$61,616,332
$38,109,687
61.8%
$23,506,645
38.2%
Total 5 Year
$181,817,162
59.4%
$124,421,195
40.6%
$306,238,356
Figure 4. Percent of MTA’s Total Operating Expenses 2005- 2009
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Reasonableness of MTA’s Operating Expenditures
OPEGA sought to assess the reasonableness of MTA’s operating expenses.
MTA’s status as a quasi-State agency, with its own self-generating revenue source,
made it challenging to find a standard for comparison. Some expect MTA to
behave like a State agency; others expect it to behave like a for-profit private entity.
Whether MTA’s operating expenses are judged as reasonable, depends on what
those expectations are. In conducting this review, OPEGA has used what is
typically expected of both types of organizations as comparisons.
Office of Program Evaluation & Government Accountability
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OPEGA reviewed 224 MTA
invoices from 2005 –
2009 totaling about $1
million in expenses. Some
of the expenditures
reviewed could potentially
be questioned on the
basis of their nature or
magnitude.

We analyzed MTA’s operating expense transactions for 2005 – 2009 and identified
those with the highest potential for being judged unreasonable. We selected a
judgmental sample of these transactions and reviewed the related 224 invoices or
other documents used for processing payment of these expenses. Expenditures
processed on those documents totaled $1,008,609 – representing 0.3% of MTA’s
total operating expenses over the five-year period. We sought explanation for
MTA’s purpose in incurring the expenses and tested for proper approvals, adequate
supporting document and accurate account coding.
MTA’s expenditures are generally consistent with the culture of a regulated private
entity that is financially sound, values quality, desires to stay current, believes in
being a good corporate citizen, recognizes its employees and assertively promotes
its own best interests. From this perspective, MTA’s expenditures could be judged
as reasonable. In fact, the Authority’s consistent pursuit of technologies to
improve efficiencies and customer service, and its investments in higher quality
equipment and assets that have a longer useful life, would likely be seen as sound
business strategies.
However, a number of the expenditures we reviewed – by virtue of their nature or
magnitude – might be questioned as to their reasonableness, appropriateness or
necessity when judged against the expectations for fiscal restraint and adherence to
mission typically applied to governmental entities. The categories that most of
these expenditures fell into are described below.

The expenses OPEGA
identified that might be
questioned were in five
categories: Employee
Recognition, Sponsorships
and Donations, Lobbying,
Travel and Meals, and
Support of Other State
Efforts. All expenses in
these groupings totaled
$2.3 million over a 5 year
period.

From 2005 to 2009, MTA
spent $257,780 on
employee recognition
including service awards,
banquets and cookouts,
safety awards, holiday
turkeys and items sent to
staff members serving in
the military overseas.

Operating Expenditures that Might Be Questioned
Certain expenditures contained within the five categories we identified as possibly
questionable would likely be recognized as reasonable and appropriate regardless of
one’s perspective. Other expenditures within each category, however, could be
questioned and OPEGA examined many of these in detail.
The five year total of expenditures identified by OPEGA in all of the following
categories is $2,265,773.53. Some of these categories correspond directly with
established MTA expense account codes. We included all expenses coded to that
category in this total, though we did not review them all in detail. Other categories
described below are groupings of expenses determined by OPEGA as a result of
our detailed expenditure review.
The five year total calculates to an average annual expense of $453,154,
representing only 0.74% of MTA’s average annual operating expenses. Roughly
70% of the five year total expenditures ($1,591,295) were budgeted and expensed
within perennial projects funded by the Reserve Maintenance Fund and not
approved by the Legislature.
Employee Recognition. In the five year period under review, MTA coded
$222,159 to expense categories for employee recognition events and items.
OPEGA identified an additional $35,620 that had been charged to other account
codes bringing total 2005 - 2009 expenses identified in this category to about
$257,780. Employee recognition expenditures included length of service awards
and gifts, annual employee banquets or cookouts, safety awards and gifts, annual
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gift certificates for turkeys at Thanksgiving and items sent to MTA employees
serving overseas in the military.
MTA spent $454,238 over
five years on sponsorships
or donations to at least 50
different non-profit
organizations. $157,000
of this total was for gift
certificates purchased in
2005 and 2006 from
various hotel chains and
restaurants then donated
to other organizations.

Lobbying costs totaled
$577,237 for the MTA
over a 5 year period, not
including the cost of their
internal government
relations staff.

Sponsorships and Donations. OPEGA identified $297,238 in expenses for
sponsorships or donations to charitable and non-charitable non-profit
organizations that were coded to several different expense categories. According to
MTA, donations in 2005 – 2007 were also made in the form of gift certificates.
OPEGA identified over $157,000 in gift certificate purchases made in 2005 and
2006 from various hotel chains and restaurants that were coded to the Travel and
Subsistence expense category. MTA reports that the gift certificates were donated
to a variety of organizations, although no formal records of the donations exist. In
all, OPEGA identified $454,238 sponsorships or donations made to 50 different
organizations. Some organizations received contributions on an annual basis.
MTA is a member of some of the recipient organizations and, consequently also
provides support through membership dues or other payments. We noted that
sponsorships or donations also went to non-charitable organizations that did not
appear to have a direct tie to MTA’s mission. This may be because MTA’s top
management sits on the boards or councils of some of the organizations, or could
be indicative of an expansion of MTA’s mission. (See Recommendation 6.)
Lobbying. OPEGA identified $577,237 in 2005 – 2009 expenses that primarily
appear to be for lobbying services. MTA has an internal government relations
function, which was supplemented at various points with services from a former
MTA employee, an independent government relations consulting firm (Maine
Governmental Relations), and Preti Flaherty Beliveau and Pachios, the firm that
provides most of MTA’s legal counsel.
Travel and Meals. From 2005 – 2009, MTA coded $1,104,402 to the expense
category Travel and Subsistence. OPEGA determined that at least $157,000 of this
was attributable to the purchase of gift certificates for donations mentioned earlier.
A substantial portion of the remaining $947,402 can be attributed to:

Over 5 years the MTA
coded $1.1 million as
travel and subsistence
expenses. These expenses
included: frequent national
and international travel
(mostly before 2008);
meals at regular
supervisory and employee
meetings; meals for board
meetings and events;
meals for management
meetings and events; and
workday lunch meetings.

•

Frequent national and international travel, primarily from 2005 through
2007, to participate in conferences and meetings of several industry
organizations, meet with various entities involved in MTA bond issuances,
meet with MTA’s Consulting Engineer, or visit other tolling authorities and
observe their operations (e.g. to research open road tolling). This travel
was primarily on the part of MTA’s Executive Director, but occasionally
involved other members of MTA’s management team or Board. Often
these trips involved stays at expensive hotels as well as expensive meals some of which appeared to involve MTA paying for people other than
MTA staff.

•

Meals associated with mandatory quarterly supervisory meetings, and
annual employee meetings, with the Executive Director to discuss MTA
policies, procedures, organizational issues and other matters.

•

Meals associated with MTA Board meetings or gatherings at Maine-based,
higher end restaurants. Such meetings or gatherings typically appear to
include one or more members of MTA’s management team. Sometimes
they also appear to include other guests like MTA’s consultants.
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•

MTA’s travel and
subsistence expenses
declined by 67.8% from
2005 to 2009. This was
primarily due to reduced
travel and less frequent
meals. MTA managers
explained they made
changes to their practices
in response to negative
public reaction from news
stories about some
expenses in 2006 and
2007.

Meals associated with meetings and gatherings of members of MTA’s
management team at Maine-based restaurants or other facilities. Frequently
these expenses were incurred for what appear to be dinner meetings at
expensive restaurants that occasionally included consultants or other guests.
We also observed expenses for what appear to be work day luncheon
meetings among two or more members of MTA’s management team. The
lunches were either on site at MTA facilities or at local restaurants. While
not overly expensive individually, these luncheon meetings seem to occur
with some frequency, and sometimes include consultants or other invited
guests.

As shown previously in Table 10, MTA’s expenses in the Travel & Subsistence
category have declined by 67.8%
from 2005 to 2009. There has
Table 13. Annual % Change in Travel & Subsistence
been a fairly consistent
Total T&S
% Chg From
downward trend each year since
Year
Expense
Prior Year
2005 as shown in Table 13 and
2005
$411,847
Figure 5. The decline appears to
2006
$215,683
-47.6%
be primarily related to a
2007
$169,985
-21.2%
reduction in national and
2008
$174,446
2.6%
international travel, as well as less
2009
$132,441
-24.1%
frequent in-state meals. MTA
Total 5 Yr. Period
$1,104,402
management explained that these
changes in behavior were partly the result of negative public reaction to some
expenses in 2006 and 2007 that made the Authority more aware of public
expectations for its activities. Some of the decline is likely also due to the fact that
MTA discontinued the practice of purchasing gift certificates for donations that
were being coded to the Travel & Subsistence expense category in 2005 and 2006.
Figure 5. Travel & Subsistance Expense 2005 - 2009
$500,000
$400,000
-47.6%

$300,000

-21.2%

$200,000

2.6%
-24.1%

$100,000
$0
2005

A comprehensive travel
and meals policy has been
in place at the MTA since
2004, but was not
effectively implemented
among management.

2006

2007

2008

2009

MTA’s written policy on travel and meal reimbursements has been in place since at
least 2004 and had some minor updates in 2006. This policy is comprehensive and
should serve to limit travel and meal expenses to only those that are reasonable and
necessary for the conduct of MTA’s business. However, we noted several issues
with travel and meal expenses, including non-compliance with certain aspects of
the policy, that indicate it has not been effectively implemented, particularly among
MTA’s top management. (See Recommendation 7.)
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From 2005 to 2009, the
MTA spent $29,116 on
support of other state
efforts. These costs
stemmed from requests
made to MTA by various
individuals within State
government, but were not
always clearly linked to the
MTA’s mission.

Support of Other State Efforts. MTA has also incurred expenses for purposes
that seem more closely related to supporting general economic development, or
other State efforts, than to its own core mission. OPEGA identified miscellaneous
expenditures, totaling $29,116 over the five years, that fell in this category. These
include:
• the purchase and distribution of tourism-related giveaways, e.g. lighthouseshaped cookie cutters;
• travel costs for MTA’s Board chairman to participate in international trade
missions; and
• sponsorship to cover costs for the Legislature’s Clerk of the House to
attend a national training conference.
MTA management indicated that some of these expenses were incurred as a result
of requests from various individuals within State government. While such
expenditures are immaterial in relation to MTA’s total operating expenditures, they
are indicative of a possible expansion of MTA’s mission that is being driven either
by the State, MTA’s perception of its role, or both. Such expenses also represent a
use of toll revenue that some may not expect based on the language in MTA’s
statute and the Bond Resolution.

Benchmarking Against Other Tolling Authorities ―――――――――――
MTA’s Performance Compared to Other States’

OPEGA intended to
compare MTA’s
performance data to that
of its peers, but
encountered difficulty
obtaining reliable data for
the other tolling entities.
We were unable to
complete this analysis
despite our best efforts.

OPEGA intended to answer questions about the MTA’s performance by
comparing performance data for the Turnpike Authority and a number of its peers
in other states. In our attempt to complete that comparison we encountered more
than the usual number of data collection issues, including difficulty finding truly
comparable entities, available data that was self-reported and not reported similarly
from one entity to the next, and in the end, entities in other states that mostly
refused to comply with our requests for specific and up-to-date performance data.
The MTA and the NH Turnpike Bureau were the only ones to provide data in a
useable form as requested. Limited additional data on other states was gathered
from publicly available sources, but it was not from the same time period, and had
very apparent issues with inconsistent reporting of critical information such as
administrative costs and number of employees assigned to admin versus traffic
enforcement versus road maintenance.
In the end, there was too little available data for meaningful analysis. Even a
comparison of MTA to NH Turnpike Bureau was complicated by uncertainty as to
the comparability of certain reported financial data, like administrative costs, given
that the NH Turnpike Bureau is incorporated within NH’s Department of
Transportation. We concluded that drawing comparisons between tolling entities is
a challenging task since the tolling authorities are independent entities with widely
varying asset types and organizational structures. They also appear generally
uninterested in being compared to others, and therefore unmotivated to make their
performance data available in a uniform format that facilitates such comparisons.
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As part of the performance
comparison effort, OPEGA
identified a number of key
performance indicators
that could prove useful in
tracking MTA’s
performance over time.

However, in the course of our work on this question we identified a number of key
performance indicators that could prove useful in tracking MTA’s performance if
MTA, in conjunction with its oversight bodies, was to set goals and measureable
objectives for each and consistently report how its actual performance compared to
the goals and objectives year to year. Having such a performance measurement
system would help MTA management, and its overseers, identify areas where the
Turnpike Authority is meeting or exceeding its goals, and areas where it may be
falling short and could reconsider its strategies or the allocation of resources. In
addition, the act of working with its oversight bodies to determine the goals for
each performance measure could be a useful activity to galvanize all involved
parties around a set of clear, specific goals for what a high performing MTA would
look like.
Meaningful goals and objectives should focus on the activities that are most critical
to achievement of MTA’s mission. Ideally, they should also represent the following
performance categories as appropriate for the activity:
•

effectiveness – whether the desired outcome is being achieved;

•

efficiency – how the inputs used compare to outputs produced;

•

timeliness – whether the outputs are produced at the appropriate time
without requiring excessive waiting on the part of customers;

•

quality – whether the outputs are as expected and meet customer
expectations; and

•

economy – how well the costs associated with the activities are being
contained and controlled.

In the case of MTA, it may make sense to choose measures for both the
maintenance of the Turnpike and the organization’s customer service operations.
MTA appears to already have some financial and performance objectives and is
collecting or tracking some types of data that could be utilized in a more formalized
performance measurement effort. That effort, however, would still require MTA
to clearly define what performance measures are most useful, what processes will
be used to assure the data is consistently and accurately captured.
Table 14 includes several of the performance measures OPEGA identified, along
with the type of data that would be needed for each measure, where that data
should be available, and what elements of performance each measure would assess.
These are by no means the only performance measures that could be used, and are
perhaps not the best ones, but they are offered as examples should the MTA and
its oversight entities choose to begin using the performance measurement approach
outlined above.
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Table 14. Examples of Potential Performance Measures for the Maine Turnpike Authority

In any performance
measurement system, it is
critical to consistently
calculate the data from
year to year in order to
facilitate trending and
comparisons.

Performance
Measure

Purpose

Data Required

Source for Data

Administrative Costs
as a % of Total Costs

To assess how much
administrative costs are
driving MTA’s budget

Total costs,
Administrative costs

MTA’s
accounting
system

Maintenance Costs
Per Lane Mile

To assess the annual cost
of maintenance per lane
mile of MTA roadway

Maintenance costs,
Number of lane
miles

MTA’s
accounting
system and inhouse statistics

Average Bridge
Condition

To assess the overall
condition of the
Authority’s bridges and
whether the bridge assets
are being maintained
adequately

Condition of each
bridge as rated
during the current
year

MTA’s in-house
engineers,
contracted
engineers, or
the CE report

Number of Fatalities
Per 100 miles

To assess safety of the
Turnpike in terms of
quality of the policing
function and adequacy of
response to accidents

Number of fatalities
per year, Number of
road miles operated
by the MTA

Statistics
maintained by
MTA and/or the
State’s Highway
Safety Division

Consistency in calculating the measures from one year to the next is critical to the
usefulness of performance measures such as these. If administrative costs are
calculated to include items such as meetings with employees and provision of
employee recognition in one year, but those items are included in maintenance the
next year, the data will not be comparable over time and will be useless for spotting
trends. For this reason, it is important to assure a specific calculation method is
pre-defined and consistently applied for each performance measure.
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Recommendations ―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――

1

Expectations for Cash Transfers to MaineDOT Should be Clarified
Title 23 §1961(6) states that MTA must transfer its operating surplus to the
Department of Transportation each year. Operating surplus is defined in 23
MRSA §1964(6-A) as total annual operating revenues, “after money has been put aside to
pay the reasonable operating expenses, to pay or to reserve for capital expenditures and to meet the
requirements of any resolution authorizing bonds of the Maine Turnpike Authority…”.
These statutory provisions were established as the result of a referendum that
passed in November 1991. Prior to that time, cash transfers from MTA to
MaineDOT were made based on an amount set in statute. Statutory provisions
requiring transfers from MTA began in 1981 when the Legislature took action to
continue the Authority as a separate entity, regardless of whether or not there were
still outstanding revenue bonds to be paid. Statute was amended to adjust the
maximum amount of transfers several times throughout the 1980’s and early 1990’s
with the amount ranging from $4.7 million to $17.4 million annually.
Even after the requirement for a specified dollar amount was replaced with the
requirement to transfer “operating surplus” in 1991, MTA continued to make
annual cash transfers to MaineDOT in amounts ranging from $4.7 million to $8.7
million. These transfers continued until MTA began paying on the special
obligation bonds issued on behalf of MaineDOT in 1996. Initial annual payments
on those bonds were approximately $4.7 million.
No transfers of operating surplus have been made to MaineDOT since 1997, even
though annual payments on the special obligation bonds were reduced by about
half through re-financings in 1998 and 2008 10 . MTA maintains that it has had no
surplus according to the statutory definition. OPEGA’s review of MTA’s finances
finds MTA’s conclusion supportable given the current definition of operating
surplus which lacks specificity as to:
• the point is time when the surplus is supposed to be calculated
• whether it should be figured based on budgeted figures or actual revenues and

expenditures; and
• whether it is meant to capture only current year expenditures or also projected

future expenditures.
The Legislature and MaineDOT appear to have accepted MTA’s explanation as
they have not required any transfers. There is also some indication that at least
MaineDOT, and perhaps the Legislature’s Transportation Committee, no longer
expected any transfers once MTA began paying on the bonds for MaineDOT.

10

These special obligation bonds will be paid off in 2018.
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There is, however, no clear public record to clarify what the expectation might have
been and statute has not changed.
The statutory requirements for cash transfers since 1981, and the past history of
MTA making transfers even after the 1991 language change, raises an expectation
that there is a surplus to be transferred. It is our observation, however, that any
future cash transfers of surplus under the current definition are unlikely.
Recommended Legislative Action:
We believe that clarifying the Legislature’s current expectations regarding cash
transfers from MTA to MaineDOT would be beneficial to both the Legislature and
MTA. If the Legislature no longer finds transfers to be necessary or appropriate, it
could consider removing the statutory requirement for the transfer of operating
surplus. If the intent is for MTA to make additional cash contributions beyond
what it already pays toward cooperative projects and payment on existing bonds for
MaineDOT, then the Legislature should consider either:
• amending the definition of operating surplus to include more specificity about

when and how the surplus is to be calculated, particularly in regard to the terms
“pay or reserve for” and “set aside”; or
• replacing “operating surplus” with a specific dollar amount to be transferred.

As discussed on page 15, requiring a transfer of a specific dollar amount would
have implications for MTA’s financial situation and potentially its bond rating. It is
likely that MTA would make other adjustments to compensate for transferred
revenues after analyzing its options and their impacts. The Legislature should seek
to understand those possible consequences when considering potential actions.

2

MTA’s Relationship with its Contracted Engineering Firm Needs
to be Redefined
MTA has had a long-term and exclusive (sole source) relationship with its current
engineering services contractor, HNTB. Over the years this firm has served both
in the capacity of Consulting Engineer, required by the Bond Resolution, and as
MTA's general engineering services firm for construction and maintenance
projects. As a result, HNTB's VP and Principal Engineer assigned to MTA has
effectively become part of MTA's management team. MTA appears to view and
use HNTB as an extension of its own Engineering Department.
The current relationship provides benefits in efficiency and depth of knowledge of
MTA’s system. However, the sole sourced dual roles and the degree to which
HNTB staff are integrated into MTA’s planning processes and decisions also
present the following risks:
• As Consulting Engineer, HNTB is in position to have significant influence over

determining what maintenance and improvement work needs to be done, and
the budgeted cost of those projects, while the firm is also in the position of
profiting from these projects as MTA’s general engineering services firm. This
risk would exist regardless of whether it was HNTB or some other firm that
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filled both roles. The risk is presently increased, however, because of the
degree to which the firm participates in MTA’s capital and maintenance
program planning, budgeting and decision-making.
• HNTB may not have sufficient independence from MTA to effectively fill the

role of Consulting Engineer, and provide bondholder protection, as intended
by the Bond Resolution.
• MTA and MaineDOT may pay more for engineering services on those

cooperative projects administered by MTA. HNTB will be involved in those
projects and rates for services under MTA’s sole source arrangement may be
higher than those that MaineDOT would be able to secure through its
competitive procurement process.
Recommended Management Action:
MTA reports that it has worked to bring more separation between MTA and
HNTB over the years as MTA has developed its own Engineering Department.
MTA’s Board should take steps to continue moving toward a more arm’s length
relationship with HNTB. Options include:
• Splitting the two roles into separate contracts and competitively bidding one or

both every four years using a process for contractor selection that is consistent
with the process used in selecting consultant engineers at MaineDOT. Each
contract would specify scope of work, performance expectations, and cost.
• Continuing to move some of the work typically performed by HNTB to MTA’s

own Engineering Department. This will likely require additional resources for
either a) doing the actual engineering work on projects or b) managing a
competitive bidding process for project engineering services and subsequent
monitoring of engineering contracts and administration of the contracts.
MTA’s Board should conduct an objective cost benefit analysis of outsourcing
versus in-house resources before making this decision.

3

MTA Should Improve Contract Management for Services
OPEGA’s review of contract files found that contract management practices for
construction services and purchases of goods were generally sound. Management
of contracts associated with services, however, has often been informal and
inconsistent. This increases the risk that:
• Unnecessary services will be provided and paid for;
• Services not meeting MTA’s expectations for quality or price will be procured;
• Expense reimbursements to vendors will be higher than necessary; and
• MTA will not have adequate legal remedies available to address contractor

performance or billing issues.
Specifically we noted:
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a) MTA does not have written policies and procedures that set forth
expectations and responsibilities for monitoring and administering service
contracts.
b) Original, signed versions of contracts for professional services were not all
filed in a centralized location. Rather they resided in the files of the person
responsible for the contract. If that person was not available, MTA had
difficulty producing the contract. OPEGA discovered one written agreement
between MTA and a provider of government relations services that was not
included in the list of MTA contracts initially provided to OPEGA because it
had been overlooked.
c) Several situations in which MTA has procured a service from a specific
vendor over a period of time, but the contracts have not been kept current or
there had never been a contract formalizing the contract period, scope,
performance expectations and agreed upon prices or rates.
Of particular note was MTA’s administration of its engineering services contract
with HNTB, for which MTA paid over $5.7 million in 2009. Due to the nature of
the relationship between the two parties, management of the contract has been
more informal than is prudent for external contractors. Specifically, OPEGA
noted that:
a) The contract has not been kept current and does not reflect current
arrangements and expectations between MTA and HNTB. The contract was
established in 1985 with an amendment in 1997 that increased the allowable
rate for overhead and profit. It references an outdated bond resolution and
the scope of services defined in the contract for Consulting Engineer are
related to past resolution requirements that no longer exist. The contract also
calls for outdated reimbursement rates for mileage, and does not reflect
current arrangements between HNTB and MTA for reimbursement of
expenses.
b) There is often no formal written agreement or other documentation on the
agreed upon scope or price of any particular work that MTA requests. Rather,
it is common to establish these specifics through a verbal negotiation and
understanding between MTA’s Chief Operations Officer and HNTB.
OPEGA notes that Article I.B of the contract does require that "Special
Services" - which are really the project engineering services - shall be
performed by HNTB only upon written instruction from the Authority.
c) The information provided on HNTB invoices for billing of subsistence and
travel expenses (including mileage reimbursement) is not detailed enough to
allow MTA’s staff to know what those expenses are for, or to judge their
reasonableness. MTA does not regularly review the detailed support for these
charges that HNTB says it maintains. These expense reimbursements can add
up. OPEGA documented a total of $45,411 in subsistence and travel
reimbursements paid on invoices for the three month period October to
December 2008, with total reimbursable expenses on those invoices being
$253,064.
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Recommended Management Actions:
A. MTA should establish formal, current written agreements for all contracts.
They should have defined contract duration and cost, scope of services,
expected deliverables, and specific terms and conditions, including rate
schedules and agreements with regard to reimbursement of expenses
B. MTA should develop a centralized filing and tracking system for all services
contracts, like the existing construction contract file, to aid:
• Accessing original, signed contracts;
• Monitoring contracts for expirations or updating; and
• Identifying situations where contracts should be established.
C. MTA should establish and adhere to a standard process for monitoring and
administering services contracts that includes appropriate procedures for
assuring only needed services are provided, services provided meet
expectations for quality, timeliness, etc. and charges for those services are in
accordance with the contract before payment to contractors are made.
Responsibility for these procedures should also be clearly assigned.
D. As a best practice, MTA should also formalize its processes for managing
both construction and other services contracts into written policy and
procedure as a means of communicating it to all staff and assuring consistent
adherence to the established practices.
E. Specifically related to HNTB, MTA should assure there is a written agreement
on scope and estimated cost of each project MTA requests HNTB services
for. In addition, MTA should require HNTB to provide additional detail on
invoices that includes:
• summary of total monthly hours and expenses by employee across all

projects,
• detail of individual reimbursable expenses, i.e. date incurred, what the

expense is for, breakdown of mileage charges for HNTB vehicles.
MTA should also periodically review HNTB’s supporting documentation for
its invoices. This would be most effective if conducted through a periodic
audit conducted by MTA’s external auditors or by a MTA department not
responsible for approving the HNTB invoices.
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4

Controls Over Sole Sourcing Should be Strengthened
Fifteen of MTA’s 90 active contracts that could have been competitively bid
(16.6%) are sole source arrangements, meaning the vendor was selected without
soliciting proposals or costs from other vendors. Two of these contracts are
associated with service plazas along the Turnpike and generated about $3.8 million
in revenue for MTA in 2009. The other 13 had associated payments of about $10.3
million in 2009.
OPEGA reviewed eight of the 15 sole source arrangements as part of our contract
review. All the contracts in our sample were for services. Some of the services
associated with these contracts had never been competitively bid, including some
procured from HNTB. Others had apparently been competitively bid at some
point in the past and then never re-bid. The bid process occurred so long ago in
some cases that MTA was not sure when it was done and could provide no
documentation.
There was no written justification for the seven sole source arrangements we
reviewed, although MTA management provided reasonable explanations for them.
Based on these explanations, two of the contracts we reviewed do not appear to be
good candidates for competitive bidding because of the particular conditions under
which these services are being procured. The other five, though, were services that
could be competitively bid.
OPEGA acknowledges there are situations in which sole source procurement may
be more appropriate. However, MTA has no formal criteria or written policy for
determining when sole source arrangements are appropriate, or documenting
justification and approvals for them.
According to management, the reasons for selecting each sole source vendor are
unique, and therefore the decision making process has never been reduced to a
written policy. Management also described sole sourced contracts as resulting from
situations that require a lengthy ongoing collaboration between the parties, usually
in the development of a unique product and/or relationship. 11
OPEGA observed that MTA management also values the familiarity, and related
efficiencies, that come from long-term relationships with the same vendors.
Without a competitive selection process, however, the Authority is at risk of
procuring goods and services that are not the best value. Policies for determining
when sole sourcing is appropriate, and requiring some type of justification and
approval for sole source arrangements, can mitigate these risks.
Recommended Management Action:
MTA should adopt a formal policy that includes criteria for when sole sourcing and
contract extensions are appropriate. MTA managers should be required to justify
their sole source requests, and continuing contract extensions, against the criteria
and document that justification in writing. Sole source contracts, or other
The Legislature’s Transportation Committee, reviewed MTA’s specific reasons for sole
sourcing six of its contracts as part of the 2005 Government Evaluations Act review.
11
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arrangements, exceeding an established dollar amount should be reviewed and
approved by the MTA Board.
MTA could consider whether to adopt the State’s Purchasing Policy and
procedures for sole source contracts, which have recently been revised in response
to OPEGA recommendations to strengthen the State’s processes.

5

MTA Should Provide Detail on All Operating Expenses as Part of
Legislature’s Statutory Review and Approval of Budget
Statue requires that MTA submit its budget for operating expenses to the
Legislature for approval each year. Under 23 MRSA §1961-6, the Authority may
only pay operating expenses in accordance with allocations approved by the
Legislature, or as necessary to satisfy the requirements of any resolution authorizing
bonds of the Authority. In this way, the Legislature plays a role in establishing
MTA’s operating expenses at a “reasonable” level.
The Joint Standing Committee on Transportation reviews the budget submitted by
MTA as part of the Legislature’s approval process, which takes the form of a bill.
Past Transportation Committee members said they were pleased with the
expenditure detail MTA provides, noting that the information is much more
detailed than that typically provided by State agencies. Committee members also
commented on MTA’s responsiveness to their questions and willingness to provide
additional information and detail when requested to do so.
OPEGA reviewed the materials and information supplied to the Transportation
Committee. We agree that the detail provided allows for a substantial amount of
transparency and noted that the budget materials even include detail on prior years’
actual versus budgeted expenses for each expense category.
However, the operating budget submitted to the Legislature for approval does not
include all of MTA’s operating expenses. Rather, it only includes those operating
expenses that MTA is planning to fund with monies from its Revenue Fund
account. Operating expenses that MTA plans to pay for with monies from its
Reserve Maintenance Fund are presented separately, for informational purposes
only, in the form of budgeted costs for “perennial” projects. MTA does not
routinely present any information on actual expenditures incurred for these
“perennial” projects, and paid for from the Reserve Maintenance Fund, to the
Legislature.
This format does not allow the Legislature to see, or approve, MTA’s operating
expenses in total, or the dollars budgeted and spent for particular operating
expense categories. In our analysis of operating expenses for 2005 – 2009, we
noted that on average about 40.6% of MTA’s operating expenses each year have
been paid for from the Reserve Maintenance Fund and, were not part of the
operating budget submitted for Legislative approval.
Furthermore, the format does not allow the Legislature to monitor whether MTA
is keeping its actual operating expenses within the approved budget. OPEGA saw
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evidence that expenditures identified by MTA as “unbudgeted” are sometimes
coded so they can be paid for under Reserve Maintenance Fund “perennial”
projects. The Bond Resolution allows this as it only requires MTA to adhere to the
budget for operating expenses approved by the Board and funded by the Revenue
Fund.
We also noted that the information provided in the operating budget is typically
detailed by MTA department and that some summarization of the detail would
allow the Committee to more easily see the total, and trends, of expenditures
budgeted and spent in particular expense categories. Either MTA or non-partisan
legislative staff should easily be able to provide such summarization if requested,
but we think it would be helpful for MTA to provide it as part of the prepared
budget materials.
Lastly, throughout our analysis of MTA’s operating expenses we noted
inconsistency in the account coding for similar types of expenses. For example,
some expenses for employee recognition items were coded to the safety equipment
expenses and sponsorship and donations were coded to a variety of different
expense categories. Such inconsistency affects MTA’s and the Legislature’s
understanding of exactly how many dollars are going to each type of expense.
Recommended Management Action:
To fully comply with statute, MTA’s budget presented to the Legislature for
approval should include all expenses typically considered operating expenses,
regardless of what account they are being funded from. MTA could show detail by
the funding accounts if desired. This would be similar to how State agencies show
detail by funding source for different types of expenses within individual programs.
MTA could also provide information on which expense categories, and the dollars
budgeted for them, were at levels required by the Bond Resolution, i.e. insurance.
The budget materials for the entire operating expense budget should continue to
include information on actual expenditures in each category for prior years.
At a minimum, MTA should provide the Legislature the same type of expense
detail on its “perennial” budget funded from Reserve Maintenance as it does for
the operating budget that is submitted for approval.
MTA should also provide, in the budget materials prepared, a summary of the
detail budget and actual expenditures by expense category for all of MTA operating
expenses, regardless of fund, to accompany the breakdowns by department.
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6

MTA Should Formalize Criteria and Processes for Sponsorships
and Donations
OPEGA identified at least $454,238 in sponsorships and donations to as many as
50 different charitable and non-charitable organizations. It was difficult to
determine exactly how much MTA has in these types of expenditures as there is
not a specific expense account code to capture them. The sponsorship and
donation expenses we identified had been coded to expense categories
Organization Fees, Informational Services, Work Performed by Others,
Miscellaneous Fees and Travel and Subsistence.
The total dollars we identified includes $157,000 in gift certificates that MTA says
were donated to various organizations although there have been no records kept of
the specific donations made or received by any particular organization. These gift
certificates were purchased by the Executive Director in 2005 and 2006. He
reports distributing these, with no involvement from other MTA personnel, as
donations over the period 2005 – 2007. The gift certificate purchases had been
coded to the Travel and Subsistence expense category. We understand that MTA
discontinued the practice of making donations in the form of gift certificates after
2007.
We noted the following about the sponsorship and donation expenses we
identified:
• MTA’s typical donation to charitable organizations ranged from $200 - $500 in

any given year. There were several organizations that received more than that,
however. For example in 2009, L/A Arts received $600, the Maine Irish
Heritage Center received $2,500, and the Nature Conservancy of Maine
Chapter and the New England Pond Hockey Festival each received $1,000.
• Some of the organizations receiving sponsorships and donations are also

supported by MTA through membership dues and other payments. Examples
include:
Maine Better Transportation Association (MBTA) to which MTA made total
payments of $403,640 between 2005 and 2009. Some of this amount is for
annual membership dues. MTA also pays MBTA rent for office space for
MTA’s Government Relations Director to use when he is in Augusta at $1,375
per quarter. We identified an additional $39,438 in payments that appear to be
sponsorships and donations. 12 According to MTA, MBTA was also the
recipient of substantial donations in the form of gift certificates.
Maine Development Foundation (MDF) to which MTA paid membership dues
of $1,500 per year. MDF received at least an additional $18,100 from MTA in
the form of sponsorships over the five year period.
Maine State Chamber of Commerce to which MTA made total payments of
$103,295 over the five year period that included $10,000 per year in
OPEGA is unsure what the remaining payments to MBTA were for as there was not enough
detail in the electronic transaction file we were provided to make that determination without
reviewing each individual invoice.

12
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membership dues. An additional $35,500 of that total appears to be for
sponsorships or donations.
• MTA has made donations to non-charitable organizations with no direct link to

MTA’s mission and purpose. Some of them are organizations that have
members of MTA management or Board members on their boards or
commissions. Donations to some of the others are possibly indicative of an
expansion of MTA’s mission. For example, over the period 2005 – 2009, MTA
has spent at least the following in donations and sponsorships: $10,000 to the
Maine Center for Economic Policy, $3,255 to GrowSmart Maine, $2,500 to the
Maine Grocer’s Association, $10,000 to the Maine Restaurant Association as an
Expo sponsor, $11,000 for the Governor’s Conference on Tourism, and
$27,000 to the Maine Preservation Foundation. According to MTA, the Maine
Preservation Foundation also received substantial donations in the form of gift
certificates.
OPEGA reviewed the documentation associated with a number of the sponsorship
and donation expenses during our testing of MTA’s expenditures. We noted in
general that these expenses are not well supported by documentation showing the
solicitation to MTA, the purpose the donation would be put to, or confirmation of
receipt of the donation. We also noted that MTA has no formal policies or
procedures for guiding what types of organizations will receive MTA support and
how much support they will receive.
Given the expense activity OPEGA observed, we believe there is risk of MTA
resources being used to support efforts not directly tied to its mission. There is
also risk that perceived, or actual, personal benefit will accrue to members of MTA
management from these sponsorships and donations.
Recommended Management Action:
The Authority should establish a formal policy and process for sponsorships and
donations that includes criteria for deciding which organizations will receive them
and in what amounts. Sponsorships and donations should be approved by vote of
the MTA Board and be well documented with copies of the solicitation requests
received by MTA, as well as receipts or letters confirming receipt by the
organization.
MTA should also establish a specific expense code for sponsorships and donations
so that a budget can be set and actual expenditures tracked against it. This expense
category would show as a detailed line item in MTA’s operating budget presented
for Legislative approval.
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7

MTA Should Clarify and Ensure Adherence to Approval and
Documentation Requirements for Expenses, in Particular Travel
and Meal Expenses
MTA processes payments for operating expenses on a variety of documents
including invoices from individual vendors, credit card statements, employee
reimbursement requests, Request for Check Forms, and Revolving Checks.
OPEGA reviewed 224 of these documents specifically selected because they
contained one or more expenses that had potential for being considered
inappropriate, excessive or unnecessary. We noted the following with regard to
approvals on these documents:
• 20 payments did not have proper approvals, either because they had been
approved by individuals that did not have approval authority under MTA’s
current Purchasing Policy, or because they had been requisitioned and
approved by the same individual.
• Monthly credit card payments being made via a Request for Check were

typically approved by MTA’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Those payments
covered the charges on the individual statements for all cardholders, including
those for the CFO and Executive Director. There was no review and approval
of the credit card statements by the supervisor of the employee incurring
charges, or by the Board for the charges incurred by the Executive Director.
The lack of appropriate approvals may stem from the fact that MTA’s approval
policies for the types of expenses we reviewed were not particularly clear on whose
approval is required for different dollar limits, different documents or different
kinds of expenses. For example, the Purchasing Policy contains an approval matrix
that OPEGA found confusing for determining who should be signing for various
departments and dollar limits. That Policy does not state that the same individual
cannot approve both the requisition and the subsequent invoice for an item even
though MTA’s Director of Finance told us that was prohibited.
We also noted several issues specific to travel and meal expenses. MTA has a
comprehensive Travel and Meal Reimbursement Policy that clearly applies to
employee reimbursements. It specifically notes that the requirements are meant to
apply to travel and meal expenses incurred on MTA credit cards. Despite this, our
review of travel and meal expenses charged to MTA credit cards found instances of
MTA paying for expenses incurred by members of MTA’s management team that
were discouraged, or not allowed, under the Policy including:
• private limousine services;
• hotel rooms of a type that would be viewed as exceeding what is necessary to

be “consistent with reasonable living standards”;
• meals and entertainment during business meetings with fellow employees that

are not documented as meeting one of the exceptions where reimbursement
would be allowed;
• in-room movies;
• airline club dues; and
• alcoholic beverages.
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We also found that in general travel and meal expenses incurred on MTA credit
cards issued to MTA managers did not have all the supporting documentation
required by the Travel and Meals Reimbursement Policy. Many of the expenses
had no supporting documentation at all. The Policy requires expenses to be
supported by detailed receipts along with records of the amount, time, place, names
of persons and business purpose for each. Despite the lack of required
documentation, MTA had still paid for the expenses.
Finally, we observed that travel and meal expenses processed on documents other
than employee reimbursement requests or credit card statements, although not
technically covered by the Travel and Meal Reimbursement Policy, also included
items not allowed under the policy, like alcoholic beverages and private limousine
services. The expenses on these documents often did not have adequate
supporting documentation such that we could determine the business purpose of
the expense, specifics on who was covered by the expense and the dates or
locations of the expenses.
Recommended Management Action:
MTA should take steps to clarify, and ensure effective implementation of, its
policies governing:
•

authorized approvers and approval limits for various types of expenses and
expense documents;

•

supporting documentation required for all travel and meal expenses paid
for by MTA, regardless of who incurred or authorized the expenses or what
type of documents they are processed on; and

•

allowable travel and meal expenses for all MTA employees and managers,
regardless of the type of document they are processed on.

Such steps should include developing or revising written policies as appropriate,
communicating the specifics of those policies to MTA employees at all levels, and
establishing controls to assure policies are adhered to.
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Agency Response――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
In accordance with 3 MRSA §996, OPEGA provided the Maine Turnpike
Authority an opportunity to submit additional comments on the draft of this
report. The Authority’s response letter can be found at the end of this report.
In addition, OPEGA discussed the preceding issues and recommendations with
MTA’s management in advance. Upon receiving our recommendations, MTA
devoted significant attention to developing action plans that would address those
issues that are the Authority’s responsibility. Details of the proposed actions were
shared with OPEGA as MTA sought feedback on whether they would sufficiently
address the concerns identified. According to MTA management, some of
OPEGA’s recommendations have provided further impetus for implementing
ideas they had already been considering.
We understand MTA has already begun implementing some actions, and others
will be submitted to the Board for review and approval. MTA has sought to strike
a balance between fiscal controls and efficient operations, as well as balance
between compliance with statute and compliance with the terms of its Bond
Resolution. Not all of the proposed actions exactly mirror OPEGA’s
recommendations, but in our opinion they are reasonable, both in scope and
timeframe, for addressing the issues we raised. If effectively implemented, they
should strengthen MTA’s processes, begin to substantially redefine the relationship
with HNTB, and bring additional transparency to MTA’s budget and expenditures.
We note that some actions being taken by MTA go beyond the scope of OPEGA’s
recommendations and will provide for additional improvements and efficiencies.
We also observe that MTA’s detailed plans have been developed with an eye
toward using any new resources, e.g. personnel or technology, most efficiently and
effectively for MTA’s longer term needs. We see this as an indication that MTA is
truly interested in fully integrating the changes in a way that impacts MTA’s culture
and makes it a stronger organization.
MTA’s planned management actions, as provided by its management team, are
summarized below. They are numbered to correspond with the issues described by
OPEGA in the Recommendations section of the report.

2

MTA's Relationship with its Contracted Engineering Firm Needs to be
Redefined
MTA’s Chief Operating Officer has proposed a detailed action plan that will be
substantially implemented in the first half of 2011. The plan formalizes MTA’s
agreements with HNTB, and provides for transitioning portions of work HNTB
has historically performed to either in-house resources or other consultants. It
addresses issues identified by OPEGA as well as policies, procedures and staffing
requirements MTA considers vital to the successful management of a larger capital
program in 2011 to 2015.
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When crafting the plan, MTA was mindful of its need to continue to provide
timely, cost-effective, safe, quality-driven, and environmentally sensitive projects.
Consequently, HNTB will continue to be MTA’s primary engineering consultant
on 2011 – 2012 projects currently in progress, and until MTA has developed
sufficient capacity to manage its procurement of various engineering services
differently. Key actions included in MTA’s overall plan are:
A. Establish new contracts with HNTB that have defined durations, scopes of
service, terms and conditions and costs.
1. By June 2011, establish four new general consulting agreements (GCA)
with HNTB to reflect the various services MTA expects to procure.
These are consulting engineer services 13 , program management
services 14 , project engineering services and construction inspection
services.
2. By December 31, 2011, establish a project-specific written agreement
defining duration, scope and cost for each 2011 and 2012 project
assigned to HNTB under the GCA’s for project engineering or
construction inspection services.
The MTA Board, with Trustee approval, will award the Consulting Engineer
contract and re-approve it every five years. MTA expects to continue awarding
this contract to HNTB, with five year terms, until such time as the Board
deems it appropriate or advisable to competitively bid the consulting engineer
services. The other three services will also continue to be procured from
HNTB initially, but MTA expects to reduce the amount of services procured
under these contracts as it builds in-house capacity to perform or competitively
bid more work.
B. Develop a formal project management process during the first half of 2011
where MTA Engineering Department will assign and manage all engineering
work.
1. By June 30, 2011, create and fill a new staff position to assume project
management responsibilities. These responsibilities involve: managing
all consultant resources, including HNTB; managing the RFP process
for new design projects and studies; providing additional review of
plans and specifications; and providing the MTA with capacity to
perform some assessment work in-house.
2. By the end of 2011, implement a formal in-house process for selection
and assignment of consultants to perform project development and
design work, prior to project initiation. For each project, MTA will
decide whether to assign work directly to HNTB under the established
Scope of services for the Consulting Engineer Services contract will include fulfilling Bond
Resolution functions; high-level planning and assisting with 20-Year Plan as requested by
the MTA; providing advice and counsel to the MTA board and executive management team;
acting as day-to-day traffic engineer; and forecasting functions.
14 Through this contract, HNTB will continue to assist MTA’s engineering group with some
administrative functions. Scope of services will include managing the library of
specifications and standards details for construction contracts; assisting with administration
of the overall capital and reserve maintenance program, as well as the coordination of
projects; performing some design work as assigned by MTA; and providing full project
management on some projects, especially complex projects in HNTB’s area of expertise.
13
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GCA or to solicit proposals from other MaineDOT pre-qualified firms
and select one or more of those firms to perform work. MTA expects
that projects under $100,000 will continue to be directly assigned to
HNTB for efficiency reasons, but it will begin competitively selecting
the consultants for larger projects. In 2011, the Authority intends to
competitively bid the engineering services for at least one major 2012
construction project.
C. Use resources other than HNTB to assume some of the construction
inspection responsibilities:
1. By July 1, 2011, hire two additional MTA construction inspectors (one
senior-level resident engineer and one resident engineer to join the
three existing MTA technician-level inspectors. MTA has performed a
preliminary cost/benefit analysis and has determined that, in the long
run, the two additional inspectors are warranted and the new positions
will cost less than consultant resources.
2. Due to immediate needs and their high level of experience and success
working for the MTA in this area, HNTB will still have a contract to
perform construction inspection. However, by April 2011, MTA will
solicit proposals from other engineering firms pre-qualified by
MaineDOT to fill additional inspector openings created by the larger
2011-2015 capital program. MTA expects to establish contracts with
other firms as a result of these proposals. MTA engineering staff will
manage those consultant inspectors directly.

3

MTA Should Improve Contract Management for Professional Services
MTA has begun development of a contract management database and related
procedures that is expected to be complete in April 2011. This contract
management system will provide for centralized tracking and review of all
contracts. The database will be used to determine when contracts are due for
updating or reconsideration, and to help assure those contracts get timely attention.
Once development of the contract database software is complete, MTA will begin
populating the database with information on all its current contracts. In
conjunction with this process, MTA will be identifying all contracts that are out of
date or do not have the specific terms and conditions recommended by OPEGA.
MTA will take action to update and strengthen those contracts as they are
identified. MTA expects to be completed with the review of all contracts, and to
have the database fully populated, by October 1, 2011.
MTA will also establish a formal contract management and administration policy
for all contracts by fall 2011. The policy is expected to clarify the roles and
responsibilities associated with monitoring professional services contracts to assure
acceptable contractor performance, and adherence to contract terms and
conditions.
In response to OPEGA’s recommendations for management of HNTB contracts,
MTA intends to establish new contracts as described in Action 2 above. In
addition, MTA will require that HNTB provide additional detail for reimbursable
expenses on each invoice, similar to what HNTB is required to provide on its
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invoicing to MaineDOT. MTA is also considering the most cost-effective way to
periodically audit HNTB’s expenses. Initially, MTA expects to hire its external
auditors to conduct this audit, with the first audit performed by spring 2012. This
work may eventually be conducted under an in-house internal audit program.

4

Controls Over Sole Sourcing Should be Strengthened
MTA staff will draft a formal policy on sole sourcing consistent with OPEGA’s
recommendations for standard criteria, written justification and Board review of
sole source arrangements. Staff expects to submit the draft to the Board’s Finance
and Audit Subcommittee by the summer of 2011. Staff will work with the
Subcommittee to finalize the policy and present to the full Board for approval.
Assuming Board approval is obtained, MTA expects to implement a policy in the
autumn of 2011. In conjunction with this effort, MTA will establish written
guidelines on the Request for Quotations process for professional services.
MTA will also begin conducting a regular review of sole source contracts to
determine if their sole source status remains appropriate as part of the contract
management system described above in Action 3.

5

MTA Should Provide Detail on All Operating Expenses as Part of
Legislature’s Statutory Review and Approval of Budget
MTA's Board and management strongly believe that protecting its ability to pay
certain operating expenses is critical to maintaining the desired bond ratings.
Consequently, MTA intends to continue budgeting for operating expenses that are
critical to complying with bondholder expectations in the Reserve Maintenance
project budget that is not subject to the Legislature’s approval. MTA is committed,
however, to improving the transparency of all its operating expenses, and assuring
that any expenses excluded from the operating budget submitted for legislative
approval are appropriately limited. To this end, MTA will take several actions:
1. Expand information provided to the Legislature in the budget materials.
Beginning with the budget for 2013 submitted in fall of 2011, budget
materials will include:
• detail by expense category for all operating expenses, regardless of the
fund they are budgeted to, with indication of which are included in the
operating budget for the Legislature’s approval and which are not; and
• a summary of total actual versus budgeted operating expenses by
expense category across all MTA departments and funds.
2. Review all operating expenses currently funded by the Reserve Maintenance
Fund and identify those that are not critical to complying with Bond
Resolution terms. In the future, these expenses will be funded from the
Revenue Fund and will be included in operating budgets presented for
legislative approval. MTA staff have already begun this review. The Board
has requested that bond counsel also participate in this process and provide
an opinion.
3. Audit expenses paid for by the Reserve Maintenance Fund annually,
thereafter, to assure any that should be submitted for Legislature’s approval
are captured in the operating budget considered by the Legislature. MTA is
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assessing whether to establish an in-house internal audit program that
would be assigned this responsibility.
4. Update accounting reference codes for expenses and standardize use of
these codes across departments by winter 2011-12.

6

MTA Should Formalize Criteria and Processes for Sponsorships and
Donations
MTA staff will draft a formal policy on sponsorships and donations consistent with
OPEGA’s recommendations. The policy, which will include criteria and process
for guiding expenditures of this type, will be submitted to the MTA Board for
review and approval in the autumn of 2011. Assuming Board approval is obtained,
the policy will be implemented by January 1, 2012.
In addition, MTA intends to develop annual budgets for sponsorships and
donations that specify the amounts MTA expects to contribute to particular
organizations each year. An accounting code will be established to capture
sponsorship and donation expenditures, and regular monthly reports will be
generated for monitoring actual expenses against the budget. MTA expects to have
the first budget prepared for the calendar year 2013 and implement the monitoring
process in 2012.

7

MTA Should Clarify and Ensure Adherence to Approval and Documentation
Requirements for Expenses, in Particular Travel and Meal Expenses
MTA has identified a number of written policies and procedures that will be
updated or established to clarify the Authority’s expectations regarding approval,
documentation and appropriateness of expenditures. MTA will update its
Purchasing Policy, including the approval matrix, field purchasing policy, invoice
authorizations and purchasing card policy by November 1, 2011. In addition,
policies and procedures covering the following will also be current and in place by
that time, and will include proper controls to minimize risk of inappropriate
expenditures:
• travel;
• company paid meals;
• company credit cards;
• payroll reimbursement and cell phone reimbursement; and
• petty cash and the revolving checking account.
MTA will distribute the policies and discuss their requirements with all MTA
supervisors at the regular quarterly Supervisors’ meetings. Management has already
sent memos on approval and documentation requirements for travel and meal
expenses to all credit card holders and those supervisors that have Open Purchase
Orders for these types of expenses. The agenda for the March 2011 Supervisors’
meeting will include a review and discussion of the Travel Policy. Other policies
and procedures will be distributed and scheduled for discussion as they are
finalized.
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MTA is also considering the most cost-effective way to audit for compliance with
various policies and procedures. Options include requiring review of expenses by
MTA’s Controller, requesting that external auditors incorporate specific testing into
their annual audit or establishing an in-house internal audit program as described
below.
In the course of addressing issues raised by OPEGA, MTA identified several additional opportunities to
strengthen its internal control framework. MTA intends to act on these opportunities by the end of 2011:
Establish a system for tracking status of MTA policy documents using the same database framework and
process as the system being developed for contract management. This tracking system will provide for
identifying when policies need to be reviewed for updates, and will assign responsibility for those reviews
and updates to particular individuals. As part of the process of populating the policy database, MTA will
review all policies and update them as necessary.
Update or establish additional written policies and procedures to govern employee job training and
internships, protection of whistleblowers, network access, computer usage, and union negotiations.
Develop a formal internal audit program within MTA that may include establishment of an internal audit
position. MTA will seek assistance from a consultant in designing a program that has sufficient
independence and resources. MTA envisions that capacity for handling whistleblower complaints would
also be built into the internal audit program.
Replace a soon-to-be-vacant position with a Project Engineer position. Responsibilities of the new
position will include: creating and administering proposed future asset and fleet management systems;
tracking and managing performance measures in Operations & Maintenance; and providing general
project coordination. The new position will replace an existing position in the budget.
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The scope for this review, as approved by the Government Oversight Committee, included a number of questions
covering a broad range of topic areas. In order to answer each question fully, OPEGA conducted work including:
•

interviewing the managers and staff of the Maine Turnpike Authority as needed;

•

reviewing MTA’s documented policies and procedures concerning purchases and travel and meals;

•

surveying tolling entities from other states in an attempt to gather performance data for comparison with
MTA’s;

•

interviewing the Bond Trustee, MaineDOT Commissioner, Consulting Engineer, Transportation Committee
chair, and MTA Board members about their oversight roles and functions;

•

obtaining a data file including all of MTA’s transactions from 2005 to 2009, and subjecting it to rigorous
analysis;

•

reviewing MTA’s most recent annual report, enacting statute, audited financial statements, 20 year planning
documents, Consulting Engineer’s reports and Traffic Forecast reports;

•

reviewing the MTA’s legislative history;

•

obtaining and reviewing the statutes of tolling entities from other states in order to compare the oversight
required by statute to that of MTA;

•

analyzing the methods rating agencies used to determine the MTA’s bond rating, the trends in MTA’s bond
rating, and MTA’s bond rating in comparison to those of other tolling entities

•

obtaining records from both the Legislature’s Office of Fiscal and Program Review and the MTA of cash
transfers from the MTA to the State, and analyzing the types and amounts of transfers;

•

obtaining record of non-cash contributions MTA has made to Maine’s transportation infrastructure, and
attempting to confirm the value of these contributions with MaineDOT;

•

selecting a sample of MTA’s expense transactions for detailed review, and reviewing all invoices and other
documentation associated with those transactions;

•

selecting a sample of contracts to review for compliance with MTA’s Purchasing Policy and to assess the
adequacy of the Authority’s contractor selection and contract administration processes;

•

seeking performance benchmarks appropriate to entities like the MTA that are responsible for the operation
of a toll road; and

•

reviewing MTA’s current Bond Resolution.

Early in this review, OPEGA decided to contract with a consultant to opine on issues that require legal and bond
expertise in relation to MTA’s Bond Resolution. OPEGA sought recommendations for a consultant from the State
Attorney General, the State Treasurer and the Executive Director of the Maine Municipal Bond Bank. From this
process, we selected Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge and requested that firm address the scope related questions
concerning:
•

the specific covenants included in the MTA’s current Bond Resolution;

•

whether MTA’s Bond Resolution includes covenants that are atypical of those in the resolutions of other
tolling entities that issue revenue bonds; and

•

how the Legislature may, or may not, be constricted by the Bond Resolution, or anything else, in what future
legislative action can be taken with regard to the Maine Turnpike Authority.
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Summary of 23 MRSA Chapter 24 Sections Relevant to OPEGA's Review
§1961 Legislative Findings; Cooperation with the Department of Transportation; Bonds; Governmental Function –
States that a safe, efficient and functional turnpike is essential to the State transportation system and the wellbeing of Maine’s citizens. Requires the MTA carry out its purposes in cooperation with the MaineDOT and
provide its operating surplus to the MaineDOT each year. Declares that the purposes of the chapter are public
and that the MTA shall be regarded as performing a governmental function. Requires the MTA to comply with
the Sensible Transportation Policy Act. Requires the MTA submit to the Legislature, annually, a budget for the
following year’s operating expenses, along with a statement of revenues needed for capital costs, reserves, and
to meet bond resolution requirements.
§1962

Preservation of Rights – Protects the rights of existing bondholders and anyone to whom the MTA owes
contractual obligations.

§1963

Maine Turnpike Authority – States that the MTA will operate and maintain the Turnpike from Kittery to Augusta
until the Legislature provides for its termination.

§1964

Definitions – Defines certain terms as used in the chapter.

§1965

Maine Turnpike Authority; Powers; Membership – Describes the powers of the MTA and establishes the
membership of the Authority: the MaineDOT Commissioner as an ex officio member, and 6 other members
appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Legislature for 7 year terms.

§1966

Obligations of the Authority – States that all contracts for Turnpike construction and reconstruction must be
approved by the MaineDOT. States that revenue bonds issued under by MTA are not a debt of the State or a
pledge of the faith and credit of the State. Requires a report detailing the Authority’s receipts and expenditures
from all sources be submitted to the Legislature semiannually.

§1968

Issuance of Bonds – Provides for the issuance of Turnpike revenue bonds, not to exceed $486,000,000, for
purposes described in §1969, and for the issuance of up to $40,000,000 in special obligation bonds for
MaineDOT projects prior to June 30, 1997. States MTA bonds do not constitute a debt of the State and are
payable from the operating revenues of the Turnpike and provides MTA the authority to set bond terms.

§1969

Application of Proceeds of Bonds or Notes in Anticipation Thereof – States how bond proceeds shall be applied,
including for: construction and reconstruction of the Turnpike, payment to the MaineDOT for MaineDOT
projects, repayment of federal grants or loans used to construct or maintain the Turnpike, payment of costs to
construct or reconstruct interchanges, bond issuance costs, creation of reserves.

§1970

Bonds; How Secured – Provides the bonds may be secured by a trust indenture or bond resolution between the
MTA and a trust company or bank, and describes what may be included in the trust indenture or resolution.

§1971

Exemption from Taxes – States that by accomplishing the purpose stated in this chapter the Authority will be
performing essential governmental functions, and will not be required to pay taxes on property or income.

§1972

Refunding Bonds – Grants the MTA the authority to refinance existing bonds.

§1973

Maintenance of the Turnpike – Authorizes the MTA to maintain and repair the Turnpike and utilize the services
of the Maine State Police. Sets the maximum speed limit on the Turnpike. Gives the MTA tolling authority and
declares the fixing of tolls is not subject to supervision or regulation by any State entity. Establishes that toll
rates may be revised, will include a commuter system discount and will exempt the military.

§1974

Use of Turnpike Revenues – States how Turnpike revenues may be expended. Provides for use of revenues for
construction or improvement of interchanges not incorporated into the Turnpike. Describes Maine State Police
duties to be paid by MTA. Provides for the use of revenues for certain MaineDOT projects.

§1975

Provisions in Case of Default on Bonds – Describes duties of the bond trustee and the rights of bondholders in
the event of default on bonds.

§1978

Termination of the Authority – States the Authority will not be dissolved until the Legislature directs its
termination and all bonds have been paid or a trust has been established sufficient to pay the bonds.

§1979

Governmental Functions – States that the purposes of the chapter are public and that the Authority shall be
regarded as performing a governmental function in the carrying out of the provisions of the chapter.
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Appendix C. Bond Resolution Summary Provided by Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge

TO: Office of Program Evaluation and Government Accountability
FROM: Walter J. St. Onge III
Isaac D. Fine
DATE: September 2, 2010
RE: Maine Turnpike Authority General Bond Resolution
In accordance with our engagement with the Office of Program Evaluation and Government
Accountability (OPEGA) in connection with OPEGA’s current review of the Maine Turnpike Authority (the
“Authority”), we have reviewed the Authority’s General Turnpike Revenue Bond Resolution adopted April 18,
1991 as amended through September 13, 2007 (the “Bond Resolution”). The Request for Quotations provided by
OPEGA seeks input on certain matters related to the Authority’s obligations under the Bond Resolution. This
memorandum addresses each topic in turn. Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein are used as defined in
the Bond Resolution.
For purposes of this memorandum, in addition to the Bond Resolution, we have reviewed the Authority’s
enabling act (23 MRSA §§ 1961-1983), the Official Statement of the Authority dated January 29, 2009 pertaining
to its $50,000,000 Turnpike Revenue Bonds, Series 2009, the General Bond Resolution of the State of New
1
2
Hampshire Turnpike System and Trust Agreements of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority , reports of rating
agencies relating to toll facilities in the United States, relevant case law and other documents that we deemed
pertinent to our analysis.
PART 1
A listing and brief description of the specific legal obligations to bondholders contained in the Bond
Resolution that affect:
how the Authority must manage its finances, assets, operations or planning; and/or
what the Authority must establish or maintain for an organizational, governances and accountability
structure.
1

Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge (“EAPD”) has served as bond counsel to the State of New Hampshire for all of its debt
issuance for many years, including with respect to the establishment of and all revenue bond financings for the State of New
Hampshire Turnpike System.
2

EAPD served as underwriters’ counsel with respect to the 1997 bond issues of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority at which
time the trust agreements referenced herein were adopted. EAPD also served as bond counsel to the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority from December 2007 to November 2009 and since then has served as bond counsel to the Massachusetts Department
of Transportation, the successor to the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.
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This section of the memorandum summarizes each article of the Bond Resolution, focusing on the
obligations to bondholders that affect (i) how the Authority must manage its finances, assets, operations or
planning; and (ii) what the Authority must establish or maintain for an accountability structure. In particular,
the section-by-section summary of Article VIII highlights the financial tests, reporting requirements and other
obligations that the Authority must meet on an ongoing basis.
The Bond Resolution does not impose any particular requirements regarding the organizational or
governance structure of the Authority. The Authority is essentially permitted to conduct its activities as it
determines, subject to limitations imposed by the Enabling Act and compliance with the terms of the Bond
Resolution.
Article I – Definitions
Article I provides the definitions for each of the defined terms used in the Bond Resolution.
Articles II-IV – Terms of Bonds
Articles II, III and IV provide the general terms applicable to all Bonds issued under the Bond Resolution.
The specific terms of each individual series of Bonds issued by the Authority under the Bond Resolution, such as
the principal amounts, maturities, interest rates and redemption terms, are contained in the supplemental bond
resolution related to such series of Bonds. The documents that are required to be delivered upon the issuance of
each series of Bonds are listed in Section 202. The supplemental resolution for each series of Bonds may contain
additional conditions to the bond issue. For example, certain outstanding Bonds were issued with bond insurance
policies issued for the benefit of the applicable bondholders. This resulted in certain provisions of the Bond
Resolution being modified to reflect the particular requirements of the individual bond insurers. See, for example,
the definition of “Investment Securities” in Section 101 and the provisions of Article IX that refer to the various
bond insurers.
Sections 204 and 205 set forth the requirements for the issuance of additional parity Bonds and additional
Subordinated Bonds. The most important requirement is that the Authority must certify that Net Revenues were
3
at least equal to the Net Revenue Requirement for the fiscal year immediately preceding the fiscal year in which
the Additional Bonds are to be issued. In the case of additional parity bonds, the Authority must also demonstrate
that, based on reports prepared by a consulting engineer and a traffic consultant, projected Net Revenues are
expected to be (i) at least equal to the Net Revenue Requirement for a certain period of time following the
issuance of such additional parity bonds and (ii) at least equal to 120% of maximum Debt Service on all
outstanding Bonds for any fiscal year in which such Bonds will be outstanding.
3

The Net Revenue Requirement means the greater of (i) 120% of Debt Service and (ii) 100% of the sum of Debt Service, the
Required Reserve Maintenance Deposit, the Required Debt Service Reserve Deposit and any other Required Deposit. This is a
customary concept for many revenue bond issues of all types.
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Article V – Funds and Accounts
Article V includes the pledge of all Revenues and other moneys and securities held under
the Bond Resolution to pay the Bonds and the Subordinated Bonds. Article V also establishes
each of the funds and accounts under the Bond Resolution, and sets out the purposes for which
such funds and accounts may be used. To the extent the Authority must follow the specifications
of Article V in managing its finances, it is useful to provide some detail on how certain of these
funds function.
Revenue Fund – All Revenues received by the Authority are deposited in the Revenue Fund. The
moneys in the Revenue Fund are used to pay the Operating Expenses of the Authority and the Debt
Service Charges on the Bonds. The Revenue Fund is also used to make up any deficiency in the Debt
Service Reserve Fund, Reserve Maintenance Fund and General Reserve Fund.
Debt Service Reserve Fund / Subordinated Debt Service Reserve Fund – Moneys in the Debt Service
Reserve Fund and the Subordinated Debt Service Reserve Fund are used to pay debt service on the
Bonds and Subordinated Bonds, respectively, whenever moneys in the Debt Service Fund or
Subordinated Debt Service Fund, respectively, are insufficient for such purpose.
Reserve Maintenance Fund – This fund can be used for any of the following purposes, as directed by
the Authority: (1) pay the costs of renewal and replacement projects (“Reserve Maintenance Fund
Projects”); (2) pay the costs of constructing, rehabilitating or improving the Turnpike (“Turnpike
Projects”) in order to prevent a loss of Revenues; (3) pay insurance premiums; (4) replenish the Debt
Service Reserve Fund, subject to certain conditions; and (5) to pay for an Emergency, subject to
certain conditions.
General Reserve Fund – The Bond Resolution established within the General Reserve Fund, the
Insurance Account, the Improvement Account, the Department of Transportation Provision Account
and the Interchange Account. On a monthly basis, the moneys in the General Reserve Fund are
transferred to the accounts established to pay Debt Service on the Bonds and the Subordinated Bonds
to the extent a deficiency exists in such accounts, and then to the Insurance Account, Improvement
Account, Department of Transportation Provision Account and the Interchange Account in the
amounts specified by the Authority. Any balance remaining after such transfers is deposited in the
Improvement Account.
Department of Transportation Provision Account – Moneys in this account may be transferred (i) to
a trustee for payment of special obligation bonds of the Department of Transportation (ii) to the
Department of Transportation, (iii) to replenish the Debt Service Reserve Fund or (iv) to another
account within the General Reserve Fund.
See the summary of Section 801 below for restrictions on certain transfers from this account.
Improvement Account – This account is the final use of Revenues under the Bond Resolution.
Moneys in this account may be used at the direction of the Authority to pay for Reserve
Maintenance Fund Projects, Turnpike Projects or an Emergency, or transferred to the Debt Service
Reserve Fund or another account within the General Reserve Fund or “to pay for any other lawful
corporate purpose of the Authority as authorized in the Enabling Act,” as long as there are no
deficiencies in any fund or account, no event of default exists and Net Revenues were at least equal
to 200% of Debt Service for the fiscal year preceding such payment.
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Article VI – Investment of Funds
The moneys on deposit in any fund or account created under the Bond Resolution can only be invested
as provided in Article VI. The investment parameters for some funds are more flexible than those applicable to
other funds. For example, the types of investments available to the Debt Service Reserve Fund and
Subordinated Debt Service Reserve Fund are more limited than those available to the Revenue Fund or Capital
Fund. This is a common limitation. Article VI also dictates where the earnings from the investment of moneys
in each fund are deposited. In general, investment earnings are transferred to the Revenue Fund, with certain
exceptions set forth in Section 602(d).
Articles VII-VIII – Authority Covenants
Article VII includes the Authority covenants to pay debt service on the Bonds, to take all action that may
be necessary to confirm the pledge made under the Bond Resolution, and to do all that may be necessary to
ensure the tax-exempt status of any tax-exempt Bonds. Section 704 provides that the Authority shall not issue
any indebtedness secured by the Pledged Collateral other than the Bonds and the Subordinated Bonds. However,
the Authority may issue indebtedness under a separate resolution that is secured by a pledge of Non-Turnpike
Revenues or other moneys that are not part of the Pledged Collateral. Non-Turnpike Revenues are any moneys
received by the Authority from other than operation of the Turnpike, including payments received from the
federal government or the State or any fees levied by the Authority in connection with any project that is not a
Turnpike Project. However, Non-Turnpike Revenues do not include payments or taxes which are pledged to the
payment of debt service on Bonds issued under the Bond Resolution.
Article VIII contains the provisions that most directly affect how the Authority must manage its
finances, assets and operations.
Section 801 – The Authority must operate the Turnpike in a sound manner and keep the Turnpike in
good repair and working condition. The Authority may not acquire a road that is more than five miles long
unless it is authorized to charge tolls on such road in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of the acquisition,
operation and maintenance of such road or unless the Authority demonstrates that, based on a Consultant’s
Report, Net Revenues would be at least equal to the Net Revenue Requirement for each fiscal year in which the
road was acquired and the five fiscal years thereafter. However, the Authority may authorize the acquisition of
any road without meeting the Net Revenue Requirement upon the unanimous consent of its members so long as
no event of default exists under the Bond Resolution and the Authority can demonstrate that it expects to be in
compliance with the other covenants and conditions contain in the Bond Resolution for the current fiscal year
and the following five fiscal years.
Section 801 further provides that the Authority may not transfer to the Department of Transportation from
the Department of Transportation Provision Account an amount in excess of $8,700,000 in any fiscal year.
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Section 802 – The tolls established by the Authority must be sufficient (1) to provide funds for the
payment of Operating Expenses and (2) to provide Net Revenues that are at least equal to the Net Revenue
Requirement in any fiscal year. The Authority may not reduce or modify tolls unless it demonstrates that, based
on a Consultant’s Report, it is expected that the Net Revenue Requirement will be satisfied in the current fiscal
year and in each of the five fiscal years following the rate reduction or modification.
th

If Net Revenues are less than the Net Revenue Requirement then the Authority must, before the 15 day
of February of the following fiscal year, request the preparation of a Consultant’s Report for the purpose of
making recommendations as to a revised toll schedule in order that Net Revenues are reasonably expected to
equal the Net Revenue Requirement for the following fiscal year. The Authority must adopt and institute the
revised toll schedule within 180 days after receipt of the Consultant’s Report.
th

Section 803 – Annual Budget – On or before the 20 day of October of each year, the Authority must
adopt a preliminary budget for the following fiscal year, which must include a preliminary determination of the
Required Debt Service Deposit, the Required Reserve Maintenance Deposit and any Required Debt Service
Reserve Deposit. On or before December 20 of each year the Authority must adopt a final budget, which sets
the final Required Debt Service Deposit and Required Reserve Maintenance Deposit and any Required Debt
Service Reserve Deposit. If the final budget is not approved by December 20, then the preliminary budget (if
approved by the Consulting Engineer) is treated as the Annual Budget. The amount expended on operation and
maintenance of the Turnpike may not exceed the amount provided for Operating Expenses in the Annual
Budget, except in the case of an Emergency or if paid from the Reserve Maintenance Fund or General Reserve
Fund.
Section 804 – Annual Report and Audit – The Authority must keep accurate records of the Revenues
collected, the number and class of vehicles using the Turnpike and the application of the Revenues. At least
once each fiscal year, the Authority must file with the Trustee and Consulting Engineer copies of any revised
toll schedule for the preceding fiscal year as well as an annual report setting forth:
• an income and expense statement showing Revenues, Operating Expenses and Debt Service;
• the number of vehicles in each class using the Turnpike;
• all deposits and withdrawals from each fund and account;
• the details of all Bonds issued, paid, purchased or redeemed;
• a balance sheet;
• the amounts in each fund and account at the end of the preceding fiscal year; and
• the proceeds of any sales of property.
The Authority must employ an Accountant to audit its books relating to the Turnpike for the preceding
fiscal year and, within 120 days after each fiscal year, file the audited financial statements with the same parties
receiving the annual report described above.
Section 805 – The Authority must employ an independent engineer or engineering firm and a traffic
engineer or consultant to carry out the duties of the Consulting Engineer and the Traffic Consultant,
respectively, set forth in the Bond Resolution.
Section 806 – Report of Consulting Engineer – The Authority must cause the Consulting Engineering to
do an annual inspection of the Turnpike and, by October 1 of each year, to submit a report to the Authority
setting forth (i) the Consulting Engineer’s findings with respect to the condition of the Turnpike, (ii)
recommendations for proper operation and maintenance of the Turnpike for the following fiscal year and the
estimated costs thereof, (iii) recommendations regarding the insurance to be carried by the Authority and (iv)
recommendations for the amount to be deposited in the Reserve Maintenance Fund.
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Section 807 – This section lists the types of insurance that the Authority is required to carry. They
include multi-risk insurance covering loss or damage to the Turnpike, use and occupancy insurance covering
interruption in the use of Turnpike facilities, public liability insurance and workers’ compensation insurance.
Section 808 – Insurance Schedule – Within the first three months of each fiscal year, the Authority must
provide the Trustee and Consulting Engineer with a schedule of all insurance policies currently in effect. This
section sets forth the required disposition of insurance proceeds received on account of damage or destruction of
any part of the Turnpike and the proceeds of use and occupancy insurance.
Section 809 – Any person with whom the Authority contracts for construction must furnish a bond or
marketable securities to secure the performance of the work contracted for. Each contract must provide that the
Authority will retain a certain percentage of the payments to be made to ensure adequate performance.
Section 810 – The Authority may allow the State or any of its agencies, departments or subdivisions to
pay the costs of operating and maintaining the Turnpike out of funds other than Revenues.
Section 811 – The Authority may not sell or lease the Turnpike or create or permit to be created any lien
on the Revenues or funds created under the Bond Resolution. However, the Authority may sell or dispose of any
property if (i) such property has become obsolete or is to be replaced by other property or (ii) the Consulting
Engineer states such disposition is consistent with prudent practice and the Authority certifies that it expects to
satisfy the test for issuing additional parity bonds (as described in the second paragraph under the heading
“Articles II-IV – Terms of Bonds” above) after such disposition. The Authority also may grant leases or licenses
with respect to any property consistent with the operation of the Turnpike as permitted by the Enabling Act, and
the net proceeds of any such lease or license shall constitute Revenues and be deposited in the Revenue Fund.
Article IX – Events of Default and Remedies
Article IX lists the events that constitute an event of default and the remedies available to the Trustee and
the bondholders upon an event of default, which include the right to accelerate the payment of the Bonds. Article
IX also provides that, upon demand of the Trustee following a declaration of acceleration, all Revenues shall be
paid over to the Trustee to be applied first, to the payment of certain fees, second, to the payment of operating
expenses, third, to the payment of debt service on the Bonds and fourth, to the payment of debt service on the
Subordinated Bonds.
Article X – Fiduciaries
Article X describes the responsibilities of the Trustee and the conditions under which the Trustee may
resign or be removed.
Article XI – Supplemental Resolutions, Amendments and Modifications
The Bond Resolution may be amended and supplemented as provided in Article XI. Certain types of
amendments can be made by filing such amendment with the Trustee (as described in Section 1101), some
amendments require the consent of the Trustee (as described in Section 1102) and some amendments can be
made only with bondholder consent (as described in Section 1105).
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Article XII – Defeasance
Article XII sets forth the circumstances under which the security provided by the Bond Resolution is
released with respect to any bonds issued under the Bond Resolution. Such release occurs when moneys
sufficient to pay the debt service (or certain securities maturing in the amounts and at the times necessary to pay
the debt service) on such bonds have been paid or provided to the Trustee.
Article XIII – Miscellaneous
Article XIII provides that the Bond Resolution is binding upon successors of the Authority and it
contains certain other standard provisions for any bond resolution or trust agreement.

PART 2
An opinion on whether these obligations are typical for revenue bond resolutions for bonds issued by
tolling authorities developed in the early 1990s. In the current market? For example, are there obligations
that would not usually be found in revenue bond resolutions developed in these time periods, or obligations
that are more or less restrictive on the issuing entity than might be typical?
The specific terms of the governing document for each issuer of toll revenue bonds (or any revenue bond for that
matter) vary to reflect the individual circumstances of each issuer and the nature of the governmental entity that is
issuing the debt. Differing state laws and enabling acts will result in differences, often in terms of governance of
the entity. For example, the State of Maine chose to establish a separate legal entity, the Maine Turnpike
Authority. Other jurisdictions have used the same approach, but in some cases a statewide department of
transportation has operational responsibility for the tolled facilities, but a revenue bond financing structure may
still be used with the debt issued through the state treasurer’s office. The State of New Hampshire, for example,
uses this approach.
We believe the terms of the Bond Resolution are generally comparable to those of other toll revenue bond
issuers. This is true both for bond documents originally used in the early 1990s as well as in the current market.
Most revenue bond issuers need to balance the terms of their financing documents against their overall
responsibilities for operating their particular revenue enterprise, whether a toll road or some other system or
facility. While more stringent legal covenants and protections for bondholders may allow for a higher debt rating,
the legal structure to which any revenue bond issue is subject is only one consideration, among many, in the
rating process. An entity may still choose to adopt less stringent covenants in order to maintain operational
flexibility and to be able to adapt to changing circumstances over time. Moreover, the types of covenants that
might be required for a mature, well-established toll road, such as the Maine Turnpike will be different from
those required for a new, start-up entity. The essential terms of the Bond Resolution seem appropriate for the
Authority in light of its track record and responsibilities in 1991 as well as more current circumstances.
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In undertaking our analysis, we reviewed the specific terms of the Bond Resolution and compared them to two
other toll revenue bond documents: the State of New Hampshire’s General Bond Resolution for its Turnpike
System Revenue Bonds, which was adopted in November, 1987, and the Western Turnpike Trust Agreement of
the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority dated as of September 1, 1997. All of these documents contain
fundamentally similar provisions. The Bond Resolution sets forth the terms under which bonds may be issued.
(See Article II, III and IV) It pledges toll revenues and other moneys to secure the repayment of the bonds. (See
Section 501). The first use of toll revenues, as with most revenue bond structures, whether toll roads or other
revenue enterprises, is to pay operating expenses of the Turnpike. (See Section 504). Without the continued
operation of the Turnpike, no revenues would be received to repay the debt. Net toll revenues are then used to
pay debt service on bonds, replenish any shortfalls in the debt service reserve fund and then essentially fund ongoing capital improvements. (See Sections 504 through 509). Finally, any remaining funds are available for any
“lawful corporate purpose of the Authority as authorized in the Enabling Act…” (Section 509)
Both New Hampshire and Massachusetts have similar provisions. The details, of course, vary to reflect in part
specific requirements that pertain solely to a particular issuer. For example, the Bond Resolution incorporates
various provisions required by terms of the Enabling Act. See, for example, the various provisions and references
to the “Department of Transportation Provision Account” and the “Interchange Account.”
Certain covenants contained in the Bond Resolution are more detailed than those contained in the governing
documents for other revenue bond issuers. While the increased specificity may be more restrictive on the
Authority in certain circumstances, it also provides more clarity with respect to the Authority’s obligations to
bondholders as compared to more general terms of other bond documents. Examples of this include the
following:
The Debt Service Reserve Fund Requirement (see definition thereof in Section 101) is effectively
established at one-half of maximum annual Debt Service so long as Net Revenues for the two
preceding years were at least 200% of Debt Service on all Bonds Outstanding; otherwise, the
requirement is 100% of maximum annual Debt Service. Other bond documents typically set the
requirement at maximum annual debt service or, in some cases, simply at one-half the maximum
amount, but less often with this hybrid approach;
Section 801 establishes a set of requirements if the Authority seeks to expand the system. (See
description of this covenant above.) A similar concept is often found in the governing bond documents
of other toll road bond issuers, although not necessarily with the same amount of detail. Most issuers
are permitted to expand their “system,” even if the expanded roads may or may not be tolled, but
compliance with the toll covenants is still needed.
The requirements for the annual report (see Section 804) are more detailed than may be found in some
other cases, although this specificity also provides more certainty as to what the Authority must
provide; and
The Authority must conduct an annual inspection of the Turnpike (see Section 806) whereas other bond
resolutions may require less frequent inspections, such as at least once every 3 years, or, in some cases
no inspection may be required at all.
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The Bond Resolution also provides that the bonds may be subject to acceleration upon an event of default (see
Section 902). The remedy of acceleration is not universally available in revenue bond transactions. Absent
significant cash reserves, the revenue bond issuer typically will not have sufficient funds on hand to pay all of the
outstanding bonds at once. While accelerating the debt will preserve the aggregate claim for bondholders,
satisfaction of the claim will likely not occur sooner than would have been the case without acceleration because
the only source of repayment is the ongoing flow of toll revenues or other pledged revenues derived from the
continued operation of the particular revenue enterprise. For example, the New Hampshire turnpike system
revenue bonds do allow acceleration as a remedy, but the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority bonds do not.
The requirements for amending the Bond Resolution vary from what some other revenue bond resolutions
contain. The Bond Resolution requires the consent of the holders of two-thirds in principal amount of bonds
outstanding (see Section 1105) while other bond resolutions may be amended upon the consent of a majority of
bondholders. Both thresholds are used in governmental issues. However, these amendment provisions are not
used very often due to the fact that it is difficult in many cases to obtain the necessary consents of bondholders, at
whatever percentage is required. Also, in the case of bond insured issues, the bond insurer often retains the right
either to consent in addition to the holders, or to consent in lieu of the actual holders.

PART 3
An opinion on how, if at all, the obligations to bondholders contained in the resolution might limit any
actions the Legislature could consider taking regarding the Authority or its function, or the Legislature’s
ability to establish statutory directives for the Authority.
The Authority was established by an act of the Maine Legislature and, in general, it remains subject to further
legislative action that could either expand or restrict the activities of the Authority. The only limitation on future
action by the Maine Legislature is the contract clauses of the United States Constitution and the Maine
Constitution. Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution (the “Contract Clause”) provides, in part, that
no state shall pass any law impairing the obligations of contracts. Article 1, Section 11 of the Maine Constitution
contains similar language. The issuance of the Authority’s bonds created a contractual relationship between the
Authority and its Bondholders. As a result, while the Maine Legislature continues to have the power to enact
further legislation that may adversely affect the Authority, it may only do so to the extent constitutionally
permissible.
The Contract Clause is not an absolute bar to legislation that might adversely affect the Authority, its obligations
under the Bond Resolution or even Bondholders directly. Assuming that any particular legislative action does
“impair” the contract with Bondholders, it may still be found constitutional to the extent the impairment is
reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose. In United States Trust Company v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1 (1977), the United States Supreme Court reiterated the basic principles of the Contract Clause and
held that a higher degree of scrutiny would apply to laws that impaired contracts of governmental entities,
particularly financial covenants. In other words, while states retain significant power to modify private contracts
through the exercise of their police powers (for example, imposing new regulations or legal requirements for
conduct of a particular business might adversely affect certain contractual relationships, but would likely be
constitutional to the extent the legislation protected public health or safety), a more substantial justification would
be needed to justify impairment of financial obligations.
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It should be noted that the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine arguably established a more stringent standard that
would prohibit virtually any impairment, regardless of how material. In First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine
Turnpike Authority, 153 Me. 131 (1957), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found unconstitutional an act by
the Legislature that would have required the Authority to reimburse certain utilities for the relocation costs of
their facilities because such reimbursement represented a diversion of funds pledged to bondholders under the
Authority’s then-existing bond resolution. This case predated by 20 years the U.S. Trust decision cited above and
it is not clear to what extent the earlier analysis would remain the law today. Such an analysis is beyond the scope
of this Memorandum. It is worth noting, though, that the current Bond Resolution allows revenues to be used for
any lawful corporate purpose of the Authority after the payment of debt service and the satisfaction of other
required deposits and thus a particular legislative direction to the Authority might be permissible.
While the analysis of any Contract Clause claim is fairly well settled, assessing the outcome of any particular
controversy depends on the actual facts and circumstances of the legislation. For example, necessity will be found
if the particular objectives of the legislation could not be satisfied by a “less drastic alternative.” Other factors
used to assess the reasonableness of any particular impairment include the extent of the impairment and the
degree to which the circumstances giving rise to the impairment were foreseeable at the time the contract was
made. It is not possible to assess a potential Contract Clause claim in the abstract, other than to outline the
considerations to be used in analyzing the question.
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Appendix D. Analysis of MTA’s Expenditures 2005 – 2009
Line Item Name

2005
Total

2006
Total

2007
Total

2008
Total

2009
Total

2005 - 2009
Total

% of 5 yr
Total

% Change
Over 5 years

Salaries

$19,212,871.63

$19,894,574.70

$21,112,662.42

$22,119,143.99

$22,493,744.29

$104,832,997.03

34.2%

17.1%

Contractual Services

$11,375,640.81

$18,766,480.21

$15,416,252.40

$17,014,857.79

$13,370,412.03

$75,943,643.24

24.8%

17.5%

Employee Benefits (Medical, Dental, Life, MSRS)

$7,333,513.29

$7,463,849.16

$7,739,653.87

$9,753,015.85

$9,973,405.81

$42,263,437.98

13.8%

36.0%

Consulting Engineering Fees & Exp

$3,048,914.51

$2,826,181.22

$3,687,546.43

$2,890,076.56

$2,319,622.27

$14,772,340.99

4.8%

-23.9%

Work Performed By Others

$3,282,610.04

$3,056,622.34

$3,322,401.25

$2,183,294.33

$2,079,444.68

$13,924,372.64

4.5%

-36.7%

Telephone

$942,052.21

$1,209,508.61

$868,654.75

$790,706.03

$710,840.18

$4,521,761.78

1.5%

-24.5%

Salt & Calcium Chloride

$853,817.85

$748,036.21

$850,719.70

$1,101,271.73

$486,265.82

$4,040,111.31

1.3%

-43.0%

Comprehensive Gen Liab

$892,095.00

$862,112.00

$406,637.00

$684,263.22

$471,802.27

$3,316,909.49

1.1%

-47.1%

Workers Comp

$309,449.03

$915,014.31

$476,690.07

$607,104.95

$986,614.99

$3,294,873.35

1.1%

218.8%

Electricity

$493,237.79

$628,938.68

$662,614.17

$582,090.11

$598,189.54

$2,965,070.29

1.0%

21.3%

Reg. & Spec Counsel Fees & Exp

$319,242.82

$581,797.08

$532,211.60

$696,230.10

$455,926.05

$2,585,407.65

0.8%

42.8%

Office Machines & Equip Pur/Rent

$344,103.11

$443,355.63

$647,248.06

$446,523.85

$496,513.79

$2,377,744.44

0.8%

44.3%

Fuel For Heating

$340,333.04

$294,141.41

$402,131.16

$441,593.34

$519,105.76

$1,997,304.71

0.7%

52.5%

Snowplowing Equipment

$524,281.75

$188,560.26

$484,139.98

$216,165.28

$255,750.04

$1,668,897.31

0.5%

-51.2%

Money Trnsprt Services

$302,454.99

$307,183.72

$320,151.27

$329,863.29

$334,222.95

$1,593,876.22

0.5%

10.5%

Diesel Oil Eq Maint

$292,154.54

$209,224.62

$371,105.85

$458,231.28

$256,166.18

$1,586,882.47

0.5%

-12.3%

Trustee's Fees

$190,081.64

$255,847.08

$378,146.38

$366,385.74

$352,458.64

$1,542,919.48

0.5%

85.4%

Truck Purchases

$433,048.95

$701,790.79

$354,966.00

-$12,558.72

$23,150.00

$1,500,397.02

0.5%

-94.7%

Gas Eq Maint

$224,361.09

$249,304.67

$314,388.08

$342,063.40

$218,477.43

$1,348,594.67

0.4%

-2.6%

Postage & Shipping

$225,705.51

$200,410.81

$224,911.11

$215,367.57

$317,241.30

$1,183,636.30

0.4%

40.6%

Travel and Subsistence

$411,847.35

$215,682.59

$169,984.73

$174,446.45

$132,441.16

$1,104,402.28

0.4%

-67.8%

Printing

$253,354.97

$231,630.44

$196,895.23

$162,054.33

$249,423.93

$1,093,358.90

0.4%

-1.6%

Acct. Mach Supplies, Mnt, Parts, Service

$319,685.90

$175,499.31

$167,605.66

$130,880.67

$255,873.48

$1,049,545.02

0.3%

-20.0%

Paint Products

$154,635.99

$186,494.55

$201,068.65

$232,354.13

$237,016.91

$1,011,570.23

0.3%

53.3%

Informational Services

$146,906.66

$216,327.55

$266,366.60

$156,696.52

$199,330.73

$985,628.06

0.3%

35.7%

$61,520.00

$51,850.00

$411,103.00

$114,369.54

$331,355.00

$970,197.54

0.3%

438.6%

Rent: Land/Buildings

$194,023.26

$198,265.21

$164,500.60

$232,981.00

$177,635.73

$967,405.80

0.3%

-8.4%

Truck Parts, Accessories & Repair

$187,796.78

$147,062.21

$155,983.87

$173,800.06

$197,360.83

$862,003.75

0.3%

5.1%

Auto Purchases

$41,440.00

$251,591.34

$88,077.80

$316,348.10

$0.00

$697,457.24

0.2%

-100.0%

Organization Fee

$164,022.68

$130,440.06

$129,597.64

$103,188.75

$102,354.06

$629,603.19

0.2%

-37.6%

Hazardous Waste Disposal

$156,244.58

$258,604.23

$146,217.26

$8,943.45

$24,387.23

$594,396.75

0.2%

-84.4%

Trs Bttrs Flters

$124,698.88

$102,567.69

$99,006.25

$128,538.40

$126,981.57

$581,792.79

0.2%

1.8%

$74,113.39

$91,840.63

$58,492.28

$170,768.50

$146,274.53

$541,489.33

0.2%

97.4%

$130,760.68

$111,991.06

$96,781.48

$86,684.83

$97,991.55

$524,209.60

0.2%

-25.1%

Indemnification Insurance

Bituminous Material
Safety Equip
Steelbeam Guard Rail/Fittings

$77,890.68

$6,175.84

$63,941.68

$71,223.02

$278,974.71

$498,205.93

0.2%

258.2%

Fees Spec Employee Training

$65,861.36

$102,446.69

$142,078.87

$108,356.34

$78,171.76

$496,915.02

0.2%

18.7%

Radio Receivers/Transmitter

$32,643.49

$91,342.96

$240,359.76

$55,103.24

$35,440.78

$454,890.23

0.1%

8.6%
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Line Item Name

2005
Total

2006
Total

2007
Total

2008
Total

2009
Total

2005 - 2009
Total

% of 5 yr
Total

% Change
Over 5 years

Traffic Controllers Purchase, Parts, Maintenance

$78,651.50

$525.00

$141,350.31

$750.00

$203,739.70

$425,016.51

0.1%

159.0%

Office Supplies

$83,242.86

$84,944.33

$57,585.21

$73,701.61

$68,189.95

$367,663.96

0.1%

-18.1%

Office Building Service

$46,251.82

$76,038.28

$74,156.10

$81,631.64

$77,296.49

$355,374.33

0.1%

67.1%

Shop Supplies

$49,916.59

$64,642.32

$59,666.68

$90,117.23

$80,232.88

$344,575.70

0.1%

60.7%

Shop Tools & Equip (inc Power & Hand Tools)

$55,074.20

$79,801.17

$95,988.02

$48,504.93

$45,636.51

$325,004.83

0.1%

-17.1%

Janitorial Supplies

$47,404.42

$60,153.01

$52,505.51

$65,193.37

$66,013.65

$291,269.96

0.1%

39.3%

Spreader Parts Access

$25,075.45

$49,445.13

$185,409.19

$136.39

$0.00

$260,066.16

0.1%

-100.0%

Uniform Purchase, Repair & Cleaning

$51,801.42

$54,639.72

$60,693.57

$35,023.98

$54,594.37

$256,753.06

0.1%

5.4%

Auditing Fees & Expense Account

$45,830.78

$42,594.50

$38,136.62

$55,242.38

$66,862.50

$248,666.78

0.1%

45.9%

Electrical Supplies

$68,531.93

$44,073.52

$46,939.58

$49,949.22

$35,969.88

$245,464.13

0.1%

-47.5%

Building Materials

$49,119.93

$46,057.58

$72,028.91

$33,200.43

$21,830.56

$222,237.41

0.1%

-55.6%

Employee Recognition Public Meetings

$37,309.26

$59,870.28

$39,150.75

$48,189.32

$37,639.58

$222,159.19

0.1%

0.9%

Tool & Shoe Allow

$28,664.79

$47,032.88

$47,911.16

$46,514.20

$47,537.29

$217,660.32

0.1%

65.8%

Construction Equipment Parts Access

$10,176.05

$49,556.96

$43,794.88

$47,406.70

$63,507.02

$214,441.61

0.1%

524.1%

Water

$30,604.91

$28,480.06

$32,325.41

$29,609.32

$49,749.01

$170,768.71

0.1%

62.6%

Medical Services

$27,079.30

$45,823.81

$29,072.24

$29,354.54

$37,025.03

$168,354.92

0.1%

36.7%

Unemployment Comp Payments

$25,350.44

$26,563.11

$20,019.40

$24,033.54

$58,889.39

$154,855.88

0.1%

132.3%

-$938,306.04

-$316,324.73

$636,336.94

$830,816.31

$1,211,250.35

$1,423,772.83

0.5%

-229.1%

Total
$53,359,195.86
$62,916,662.80
$63,104,363.39
$65,241,802.13
$61,616,332.14
$306,238,356.32
100.0%
Note: This financial summary does not include depreciation figures. MTA switched from cash based accounting to GAAP in 2008 which accounts for some of the big variations between years and also
for the negative figures in the OTHER row.

15.5%

OTHER

Source: OPEGA performed this analysis based on the financial data files provided by MTA.
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I. The MTA's Bond Resolution
•

OPEGA engaged the services of Edwards, Angell, Palmer & Dodge to analyze the provisions of the MTA Bond
Resolution and we believe their review is a useful component of the report. As the analysis recognizes, legislative
action regarding the Authority has the potential to affect Authority bond ratings but it may also raise constitutional
issues because of the Bond Resolution's status as a legally binding contract. The focus of the constitutional analysis
is on the Contracts Clause issue, but issues related to other constitutional provisions, most notably the takings
clause and commerce clause, can also arise with legislation related to the Authority. We believe the Edwards
Angell review helps to explain why the MTA so often believes it has a fiduciary duty to raise bond resolution
concerns in this context. We are pleased to have an objective review of our bond resolution from an independent
source and believe that this will be a helpful resource for discussion with legislators and other policy makers in the
future

II. Consulting Engineers and Contractual Engineering Services
•

The MTA believes that our organization and our customers have been well served by our relationship with HNTB
for many years. However, we understand the concerns raised by OPEGA and agree that there is a need to take
steps that will bring a greater transparency and accountability to this relationship. We have therefore developed a
detailed proposal that takes on more work in-house, formalizes our relationship with HNTB, and opens up some of
the functions currently performed by HNTB to competition. We believe that this proposal addresses the concerns
raised in the report without sacrificing the cost and efficiency benefits the MTA and its customers derive from our
relationship with HNTB.

III. Contracting Practices
•

We agree with OPEGA that having a policy on sole sourcing so that the decision making process around sole
sourcing is more accessible would have benefits to the MTA and the public it serves. MTA's sole source contracts
are few in number, and, as OPEGA notes, have reasonable explanations for their sole source nature. We also agree
that a centralized contract management system would have efficiency benefits and have begun the process of
implementing that system.

IV. Expenses
•

We agree with OPEGA's observation that the MTA's expenditures are generally consistent with the culture of a
regulated private entity that is "financially sound ... values quality ", "desires to stay current" and "believes in being
a good corporate citizen." The business function of the MTA requires interaction with other entities, including other
toll agencies, trade groups, and rating agencies, that necessitates travel. We believe that function also includes
participation by the MTA in wider spheres of transportation, economic development and public policy. For
instance, participation with groups such as Maine Motor Transport or Chambers of Commerce, enable us to better
understand the economic climate we are operating in and the needs of our business customers. Participation with
groups such as Associated General Contractors allows the MTA to better understand the issues faced by our
contractors, which translates into more efficient and economic delivery of capital projects. Participation in
community organizations, even when an organization does not seem directly "transportation" related allows the
MTA to better understand, and therefore satisfy, the communities we serve. We also note that even from a purely
governmental perspective membership and other forms of support for outside organizations is often a regular part
of operation.

•

OPEGA was required by the Government Oversight Committee to evaluate whether the MTA's expenses were
"reasonable" and did not conclude that any MTA expenses were unreasonable. There was a category of expenses

that OPEGA thought "might be questioned" from the perspective of a governmental entity and we would describe
that category of expenses as follows:
(1) OPEGA believes that MTA's expenditures are "generally consistent" with "a regulated private entity
that is financially sound" and "from this perspective the MTA's expenditures could be judged as
reasonable",
(2) Less than three quarters of one percent of the MTA's operational expenses "might be questioned as
reasonable" if the standards of a governmental entity are applied,
(3) Even this small percentages of expenses that the Report states "might be questioned" contains expenses
that "would be recognized as reasonable and appropriate regardless of one's perspective", and
(4) As OPEGA notes in the Report, a major component of this category of expenditures that "might be
questioned", which OPEGA classifies as "Travel and Subsistence", declined by 67.8% over the five year
period studied.
In summary, the number and dollar amounts of the transactions OPEGA cited as being even potentially
unreasonable are a very small percentage of the whole and continue to decline year after year. Even if the travel
and subsistence expenditures that OPEGA examined for 2009 were entirely eliminated, for instance, it would
represent approximately two tenths of one percent of the MTA's operational expenditures and would not affect in
any way the MTA's existing toll rates or borrowing needs.

V. Operating Surplus
•

It is, of course, the prerogative of the legislature to review or amend the provisions of any statute whenever they
wish. However, we are concerned with OPEGA's premise that the statute adopted by referendum in 1991 is
ambiguous to the extent that it requires amendment. This statute has served its function well for nearly 20 years
without the administration or legislature attempting to revise it. If the Committee believes this matter should be
revisited, we believe the most appropriate action would be to initiate a formal discussion between the MTA, the
MaineDOT and the Transportation Committee, with participation by the Government Oversight Committee if it so
desired.

VI. Presentation of the MTA Budget and Reserve Maintenance Fund
• As OPEGA recognizes, the Transportation Committee has always been pleased with the amount of detail provided
to it in the MTA budget process, characterizing our submittals as "much more detailed than that typically provided
by State agencies." The MTA values this working relationship with the Transportation Committee and is more than
willing to present its finances to the Legislature in any manner that would help to clarify the kind of expenses being
paid from any fund, including the Reserve Maintenance Fund. We have proposed a solution to the issues raised by
OPEGA which includes modifications to the format of our budget presentation and an analysis of whether some
expenses could be shifted from the Reserve Maintenance to the Revenue Fund. We believe that OPEGA agrees
that this is a reasonable proposal that would satisfy their concerns.

